In Re. the Marriage of: Michelle Dorothea McKenna-Koziura v. Amy Nicole Koziura

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0381

In Re. the Marriage of:

Michelle Dorothea McKenna-Koziura, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Amy Nicole Koziura,
Respondent.

Filed September 28, 2026
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-20-1713

Michelle Dorothea McKenna, St. Michael, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Amy Nicole Koziura, Minnetonka, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Harris , Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
In this parenting- time dispute, appellant argues that the district court (1) erred by
denying her request to reinstate parenting time, (2) abused its discretion by awarding

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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conduct-based attorney fees to respondent, (3) erred by imposing supervised one- on-one
parenting time, (4) violated her due-process rights, (5) erred by conditioning parenting time
based on her ability to pay certain fees, (6) improperly delegat ed its decision-making
authority to a parenting consultant, (7) erred by awarding a tax exemption to respondent,
and (8) failed to make independent findings. Because we discern no error or abuse of
discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Michelle Dorothea McKenna-Koziura1 and respondent Amy Nicole
Koziura were married and share one minor child, A.M.K. The marriage was dissolved
pursuant to a stipulated judgment and decree in September 2021, and the parties were
awarded joint legal and physical custody of A.M.K. The judgment and decree provided
that parties would share equal parenting time and established certain communication rules.
The communication rules included the use of Our Family Wizard 2 to schedule A.M.K.’s
appointments and activities, prohibiting each parent from “mak[ing] negative comments
about the other parent” if A.M.K. was present, and prohibiting each parent from
“disparag[ing] the other parent to any professional,” such as A.M.K.’s physician or teacher.
The parties also agreed to use a parenting consultant (PC) “to resolve any parenting
issues concerning [A.M.K.] which they are unable to resolve between themselves.” The

1 Appellant changed her name to Michelle McKenna during the marriage-dissolution
proceedings. We refer to Michelle McKenna-Koziura as McKenna and Amy Koziura as
Koziura throughout this opinion.

2 “Our Family Wizard” is a court-ordered communication platform for co-parenting
purposes. Winkowski v. Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. 2023).

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decree states that the PC’s decision “shall be binding upon the parties until . . . the
Court . . . rule[s] otherwise.” The decree did not specify how long the parties had to utilize
a PC to resolve future parenting issues. In November 2021, the district court appointed a
PC to resolve the parties’ disputes over A.M.K. The order provided that the appointed PC
would serve a two-year term.
2022 PC Decision
In April 2022, the PC issued a decision on overnight parenting time, school
enrollment, medical care, parenting exchanges, respectful communication, and reducing
conflict. The PC acknowledged substantial conflict between the parties and believed that
the conflict was harmful to A.M.K. The PC reported that McKenna’s attitude and conduct
toward Koziura was a consistent source of the conflict and laid out several examples of
McKenna’s behaviors. These behaviors included, but were not limited to, McKenna’s
unwillingness to use Our Family Wizard in an attempt to avoid communicating with
Koziura; disparaging Koziura in front of A.M.K.’s teachers, physicians, and other childcare
providers; accusing Koziura of parental neglect; disparaging Koziura in front of A.M.K.;
and sharing details of the parties’ disputes with A.M.K. The PC determined that the only
way to address McKenna’s behavior was to reduce her parenting time, noting that parenting
time could be reinstated if McKenna’s behavior improved. The PC also ordered the parties
to participate in co-parenting therapy and required the parties to continue using Our Family
Wizard to communicate.
In May 2022, McKenna filed a motion challenging the PC’s decision. McKenna
requested to remove the PC requirement because of financial hardship and the PC’s alleged

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bias. The district court denied McKenna’s motion, reasoning that the PC had authority to
resolve certain parenting conflicts and could impose co-parenting therapy over McKenna’s
objection, regardless of cost.
Appointment of a New PC
In August 2023, the PC informed the parties that he could no longer serve as their
PC following the expiration of his term in November 2023 and recommended a list of
potential replacements. The parties disagreed over whether they were required to select a
replacement PC, pursuant to the dissolution decree. McKenna argued that the parties had
fulfilled their obligations under the decree and that a PC was no longer necessary.
McKenna also asserted that she could not afford the cost of a PC. Koziura argued that the
decree did not contemplate an end to the parties’ use of a PC. Koziura asserted that while
an individual PC’s appointment may expire after two years, the decree required the
continued use of a PC to resolve their conflicts until A.M.K. turned 18.
The district court held that the parties were obligated to select a new PC. It reasoned
that the dissolution decree “unambiguously require[d] the parties to utilize a [PC] without
an expiration date,” and that the court could not presume a time limitation “where no such
language exist[ed] in the parties’ judgment.” It also noted that a PC was not required to
serve indefinitely, but that the PC process would “naturally terminate when the child turns
age 18.” The district court ordered the parties to file a stipulation and order identifying a
new PC.
McKenna again moved to remove the PC requirement. In a corresponding affidavit,
McKenna alleged that the PC was biased and that she could not afford the PC fees. The

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district court dismissed McKenna’s motion with prejudice. It reasoned that the matter has
been “repeatedly addressed by the Court” and that it had fully analyzed McKenna’s
arguments in prior orders. It also imposed conduct-based attorney fees against McKenna
for unreasonably contributing to the length and expense of the proceeding by “failing to
select and retain a PC and for failing to comply with multiple provisions of court orders
and PC decisions.” The parties eventually stipulated to the appointment of a new PC.
McKenna’s Supervised Parenting Time
In June 2024, McKenna took A.M.K. to the emergency room for a mental-health
evaluation. According to the visit summary, McKenna recounted the parties’ disagreement
to the attending physician and reported that A.M.K. was being pressured to say negative
things about McKenna. A.M.K. initially denied the accusations but later confirmed that he
felt pressured by Koziura and his therapist to say disparaging things about McKenna.
Following the emergency room visit, the district court issued an order for one- on-one
supervised parenting time between McKenna and A.M.K. for “inappropriately involving
the child in the litigation and improperly exposing the child[] to conflict between the
parties.” In a subsequent order, the district court expressed concern that A.M.K.’s
statements “were not the words of a ten- year-old.” It determined that McKenna’s choice
to seek an “emergency” mental-health intervention was “manipulative and potentially
endangering to [A.M.K.].”
2025 PC Decision and District Court Order
In March 2025, the visitation supervisor informed the PC of an incident that
occurred between McKenna and A.M.K. during their scheduled visit. The supervisor

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stated that she was on a call when McKenna and A.M.K. arrived. McKenna was alone
with A.M.K. for approximately two minutes before the supervisor entered the room.
McKenna then left to retrieve something from her car. A.M.K. appeared “very panicked”
and informed the supervisor that he wanted to leave. According to A.M.K., McKenna said:
“you better speak up this weekend or you and I are done and you will never see me again,
they are trying to take you from me.” A.M.K. told the supervisor that he no longer wanted
supervised visits or phone calls with McKenna, that he did not feel safe, and that he was
“afraid of what [McKenna] will say to him.” The supervisor suspended all future visits
and phone calls between McKenna and A.M.K. effective immediately.
In April 2025, the PC issued a decision temporarily suspending McKenna’s
supervised parenting time. It stated that McKenna demonstrated an “inconsistent
willingness or ability to follow coaching, modeling, and direction” during her supervised
visits with A.M.K., made “limited progress . . . in maintaining appropriate parent-child
boundaries,” and “lack[ed] the insight and ability to consistently place [A.M.K.’s] needs
above her own.” The PC required McKenna and Koziura to participate in family therapy
and McKenna to complete a parenting-capacity assessment before it would reconsider
McKenna’s parenting time.
In July 2025, McKenna again moved to remove the PC requirement because of
financial hardship and the PC’s alleged bias. McKenna also requested to reinstate equal
parenting time and eliminate the use of Our Family Wizard. Koziura filed a motion
requesting that the district court find McKenna to be a frivolous litigant. Koziura also
requested conduct-based attorney fees.

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The district court denied McKenna’s petitions in their entirety. The district court
found that McKenna raised the same issues that it previously addressed in past orders. It
also found that McKenna had not complied with the PC’s parenting-time directives. As it
relates to McKenna’s claims of financial hardship, the district court noted that McKenna
failed to provide any documentation of her current income, r etirement status, severance
payments, or public assistance to prove that her income had decreased significantly. The
district court also determined that McKenna was a frivolous litigant and awarded Koziura
conduct-based attorney fees. McKenna appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McKenna’s request
to reinstate her parenting time.

McKenna contends that the district court erred by denying her request to reinstate
her parenting time and that depriving her of parenting time without “adequate procedural
safeguards” violates public policy. We are not convinced.
“The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting-time issues and
will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118,
123 (Minn. App. 2009). “A district court’s findings of fact underlying a parenting-time
decision will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.” Hansen v. Todnem, 891 N.W.2d
51, 59 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted), aff’d on other grounds, 908 N.W.2d 592
(Minn. 2018). “A finding is clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that the district court made a mistake.” Id. (quotation omitted).

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In its January 2026 order, the district court denied McKenna’s motion to reinstate
50/50 parenting time because McKenna “has . . . not complied with the directives of the
PC, which were made after the PC reviewed significant collateral information.” The
district court also noted that McKenna “refutes the veracity of the collateral information
and has accused all of the professionals involved with [A.M.K.] of misrepresentation.”
The district court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the
record. In the PC’s April 2025 decision, which the district court adopted, the PC stated:
“Supervised parenting time and phone calls between . . . McKenna and [A.M.K.] . . . are
discontinued and temporarily suspended until the following steps are completed.” The PC
directed McKenna to participate in a parenting-capacity assessment to “evaluate [her]
attunement to [A.M.K. ] and her ability to support his emotional development and well-
being.” The PC also directed McKenna to attend family therapy “to realign parenting roles
and introduce a systems-based approach to high-conflict dynamics.” The PC stated that it
would re-evaluate McKenna’s parenting time upon review of the parenting-capacity
assessment and progress reports from the family therapist.
McKenna did not comply with these requirements. In an affidavit in support of her
motion to modify child support and parenting time, McKenna stated that she was unable to
comply with the terms set forth in the PC’s April 2025 decision. McKenna stated that
visual impairment, financial hardship, and “serious concerns regarding [the psychologist’s]
professional qualifications” prevented her from completing the parenting-capacity
assessment. She reasoned that the psychologist “lack[ed] the requisite credentials and
competency to perform comprehensive assessments.” McKenna also stated that she could

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not participate in family therapy because the therapist was “entirely dependent on
directives of the [PC].”
To persuade us otherwise, McKenna argues that “Minnesota’s statutory framework
and public policy favor[s] ongoing parent-child relationships,” and that depriving her of
parenting time thwarts those efforts. She asserts that the amendments to the parenting-time
statute in 2023 “reinforce that parenting time should not be restricted absent compelling
justifications and the courts should promote meaningful parental involvement.” In 2024,
the legislature modified certain parenting -time provisions. 2024 Minn. Laws.
Ch. 101, art. 1, § 9, at 866-68 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 6 (2024)). The
amended statute provides that when “one parent has repeatedly and intentionally denied or
interfered with another parent’s parenting time, then the court shall award attorney
fees . . . and require the parent who has been denying or interfering with parenting time to
pay the other parent for costs incurred as a result of enforcing the decision.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.175, subd. 6(k)(3). The court may also transfer custody of the child, impose
sanctions, or award other relief “as determined to be in the best interests of the children
involved.” Id., subd. 6(k)(4)(i)-(iii).
McKenna’s reliance on the amended statute is misplaced. The amendment protects
a parent who has been “repeatedly and intentionally denied” parenting time. Id.,
subd. 6(k)(3). But those facts are not present here. There is no evidence in the record to
support McKenna’s assertion that Koziura repeatedly or intentionally denied McKenna
parenting time with A.M.K. Rather, McKenna’s parenting time was temporarily suspended
because she demonstrated an “inconsistent willingness or ability to follow coaching,

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modeling, and direction” during her supervised visits with A.M.K., made “limited
progress . . . in maintaining appropriate parent-child boundaries,” and “lack[ed] the insight
and ability to consistently place [A.M.K.’s] needs above her own.”
McKenna nevertheless asserts that “parenting time should not be restricted absent
compelling justification and that courts should promote meaningful parental involvement.”
But McKenna’s argument overlooks the fact that there was a compelling justification to
temporarily suspend her supervised parenting time with A.M.K. During her last supervised
visit, McKenna told A.M.K., “you better speak up this weekend or you and I are done and
you will never see me again, they are trying to take you from me.” A.M.K. appeared “very
panicked” and informed the supervisor that he no longer wanted supervised visits or phone
calls with McKenna, that he did not feel safe, and that he was “afraid of what [McKenna]
will say to him.” Exposing A.M.K. to the parties’ ongoing conflict provides compelling
justification to suspend parenting time.
Because the district court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence in the
record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
McKenna’s request to reinstate her parenting time.
II. The district court acted within its discretion by awarding Koziura conduct-
based attorney fees.

McKenna asserts that the district court abused its discretion by awarding Koziura
conduct-based attorney fees without considering her ability to pay. We are not persuaded.
“Conduct-based fee awards may be awarded against a party who unreasonably
contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732

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N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007); Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2024). “Conduct-
based fee awards are discretionary with the district court.” Sharp v. Bilbro, 614 N.W.2d
260, 264 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Sep. 26, 2000). “Conduct-based fee
awards may be awarded regardless of a party’s ability to pay the award.” Id. We review
conduct-based attorney-fee awards for an abuse of discretion. Sanvik v. Sanvik, 850
N.W.2d 732, 737 (Minn. App. 2014). A district court abuses its discretion by making
findings of fact that are unsupported by the record, misapplying the law, or resolving the
question in a way contrary to logic and the facts on record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975
N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022).
The record demonstrates and the district court found that McKenna unreasonably
contributed to the length and expense of the proceedings by seeking court intervention “on
matters that have already been adjudicated (on more than one occasion) and/or on matters
that should be handled by the Parenting Consultant.” The district court concluded that, as
a result, Koziura incurred unnecessary legal fees responding to McKenna’s motions.
In its January 2024 order, the district court directed the parties to “immediately
select” a replacement PC following the expiration of the current PC’s term. Yet, McKenna
continuously challenged the use of a PC after the district court determined that a PC was
required. McKenna has also demonstrated a failure to comply with district court orders
and PC directives that include, but is not limited to, refusing to use Our Family Wizard to
communicate with Koziura, disparaging Koziura in front of A.M.K. or others, not
completing the parenting-capacity assessment, and choosing not to participate in family
therapy. Moreover, McKenna has repeatedly raised the same issues before the district court

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on numerous occasions. And the district court made detailed findings addressing each of
McKenna’s claims.
We are also not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion by awarding
Koziura conduct-based attorney fees without considering McKenna’s ability to pay.
District courts are not required to consider a party’s ability to pay before awarding conduct-
based attorney fees. See Bilbro, 614 N.W.2d at 264 (“Conduct-based fee awards may be
awarded regardless of a party’s ability to pay the award.”).
Therefore, the district court acted within its discretion by awarding Koziura
conduct-based attorney fees.
III. McKenna’s claims regarding the August 2024 decision are not properly before
this court.

McKenna appears to challenge the district court’s August 2024 order imposing one-
on-one supervised parenting time after McKenna brought A.M.K. to the emergency room
for a mental-health evaluation.
Notably, McKenna did not appeal the August 2024 decision. “[A]n appeal may be
taken . . . from an appealable order within 60 days after service by any party of written
notice of its filing.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 104.01, subd. 1. The district court issued its order
on August 26, 2024, and provided written notice to each party’s attorney through eservice.
The period for challenging that order expired on October 25, 2024.
The August 2024 order is outside the scope of McKenna’s appeal, which is limited
to the January 2026 decision that she is appealing. McKenna may not collaterally attack
the August 2024 order, which became final when the appeal period expired. See In re Est.

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& Tr. of Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 682, 686 (Minn. App. 2002) (stating that an order may not
be collaterally attacked after the appeal period has expired), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26,
2003).
Accordingly, McKenna’s claims regarding the August 2024 decision are not
properly before this court.
IV. McKenna’s due-process claims are not properly before this court.

McKenna appears to argue that the district court violated her due-process rights by
depriving her of equal parenting time without a hearing.
First, McKenna’s argument mischaracterizes the record. The district court held a
hearing in October 2025 before issuing its findings and order denying McKenna’s request
to reinstate equal parenting time. Moreover, McKenna cites no legal authority to support
her claim that restricting parenting time violates due process. Nor has she demonstrated
that the district court deprived her of a protected right because she has made only mere
assertions. See Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135
(Minn. 1971) (holding that mere assertion of an error unsupported by arguments or
authorities is forfeited and will not be considered). We therefore decline to address this
issue on appeal.
V. The remainder of McKenna’s arguments are forfeited.

McKenna also argues that the district court erred by conditioning parenting time
based on her ability to pay certain fees, improperly delegating its decision-making authority
to a PC; awarding a tax exemption to Koziura, and failing to make independent findings as

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it relates to her financial hardship, suspension of supervised parenting time, and willful
noncompliance.
McKenna provides no legal analysis, citation, or support for these assertions. We
decline to consider issues that are inadequately briefed. State Dep’t of Labor & Indus. by
the Special Comp. Fund v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997)
(declining to reach inadequately briefed issue). This principle applies equally to self-
represented litigants. As we have emphasized, although some accommodations may be
made for self-represented parties, they are generally held to the same standards as attorneys
and must comply with applicable court rules. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115,
119 (Minn. App. 2001).
Even assuming that McKenna’s claims are properly before us, the record does not
support McKenna’s contention that the district court conditioned parenting time based on
her ability to pay certain fees. In its January 2026 order, the district court denied
McKenna’s request to modify parenting time because McKenna “has . . . not complied with
the directives of the PC, which were made after the PC reviewed significant collateral
information.” The district court also denied McKenna’s request to eliminate certain
obligations due to financial hardship because McKenna “failed to show what her actual
financial situation is.”
Because McKenna’s claims are based on factual assertions that are not supported
by the record and lack legal authority, we conclude that her remaining arguments are
forfeited.
Affirmed.