In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: T. S. N., Parent

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0427

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: T. S. N., Parent.

Filed August 31, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-JV-25-3371

Kimberly Stommes, Jeddeloh Snyder Stommes, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant
mother T.S.N.)

Brian A. Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Kyle E. Day, Assistant County Attorney, Buffalo,
Minnesota (for respondent Wright County Health and Human Services)

Benjamin J. Schirm, 10th District Public Defender’s Office, Buffalo, Minnesota (for
respondent children)

Janell Trocke, Stillwater, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and

Slieter, Judge.∗

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

Appellant mother T.S.N. argues that the district court abused its discretion by

ordering the transfer of permanent legal and physical custody of her two children because

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

it did not make sufficiently detailed findings of the statutory requirements for the transfer

of custody and its findings are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm.

FACTS

T.S.N. is the mother of two girls, child 1 (age 16 at the time of the district court’s

order) and child 2 (age 15 at the time of the district court’s order). On July 11, 2024, mother

witnessed the girls’ biological father sexually assaulting child 1. Mother called the police

and reported the abuse that same day. The children disclosed that their father had been

regularly sexually abusing both of them for the previous two years. The father subsequently

consented to the termination of his parental rights.

On August 14, 2024, a social worker for respondent Wright County Health and

Human Services met with the children and mother at their home. During this meeting,

mother told the social worker that the girls’ father had been homeschooling them since

2020. Mother and child 1 identified K.W., whom mother referred to as a “sister” from their

church, as a source of support. K.W. and her husband D.W. are both youth leaders at the

church.1

On August 28, 2024, the county filed a petition seeking an adjudication that each

girl was a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) pursuant to Minnesota Statutes

section 260C.007, subdivision 6 (2024). The petition alleged that, in addition to the sexual

abuse by their father, the children had “experienced educational neglect” by both of their

parents. The petition recounted a conversation that a social worker had with father

1
As explained below, K.W. and D.W. become the children’s foster parents, so we refer to
them collectively by that phrase for the rest of this opinion.

2

regarding the children’s educational history. Father conveyed that, aside from the 2020-

2021 schoolyear when the children were enrolled in an online school program, there were

not “specific education lessons” but instead father “gave the children math problems to

complete, a list of Presidents to learn, and directed them to write in journals.” After the

family moved from New York to Minnesota in approximately 2023, “neither [father] nor

[mother] knew how to register the children for school,” so they continued homeschooling

until father became employed in 2024, at which time he instructed the girls to “learn on

their own, such as looking things up on the internet.”

According to the CHIPS petition, mother told the social worker that, before

witnessing the abuse, she was unaware that the abuse was occurring but “had thought

something was happening between them based on how [child 1] was acting.” The petition

stated that on August 16, 2024, mother “contacted [the county] by phone, yelling and

crying that she did not want [father] to face criminal charges on the sexual abuse

allegations.”

On September 9, 2024, the county was granted protective supervision of the

children. The children remained in the care of mother. Ten days later, child 1 reported to a

social worker that she was concerned about mother’s mental health and asked if she and

child 2 could go into foster care while their mother received mental-health services. She

asked if she and child 2 could live with her “second mom,” K.W. Mother agreed, and the

children stayed with the foster parents for eight days. On September 28, mother picked up

the children from the foster parents and brought them directly to the hospital, stating that

they needed psychiatric care out of concerns for self-harm. The children were placed on a

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72-hour hold and told medical personnel and law enforcement that they did not feel safe

returning to mother’s home. The county obtained custody of the children, and they were

placed in kinship foster care with the foster parents. An out-of-home placement plan was

developed requiring mother to engage in specific mental-health services and demonstrate

improved and stable parenting skills. On October 16, 2024, mother entered an admission

that the children were in need of protection services due to their sexual abuse.

The children continued to live with the foster parents, who eventually obtained their

foster-parent license. Between January and April 2025, the district court held several

review hearings. The county advised that mother was making progress on the case plan,

though things were moving slowly. Updated out-of-home placement plans dated April 17,

2025, describe that child 1 has “developed socially at an exponential pace from July of

2024” and “has become very social in school and approachable to both teachers, peers, and

people in the community” and that child 2 is “starting to question others, speak up for

themself and others, smile more, laugh, and has been looking people in the eyes instead of

looking down and not speaking. [Child 2] is beginning to react and behave like a typical

teenager.” Both children communicated their desire to continue placement with the foster

parents.

On June 5, 2025, the county filed a juvenile-protection petition to transfer

permanent legal and physical custody to the foster parents.2 The petition outlined that both

children wished to stay with the foster parents and that participation in family therapy and

2
In the alternative, the petition sought termination of mother’s parental rights, but that
request was later dropped.

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supervised visits with mother had caused the children significant stress. The petition further

described concerns about mother’s ability to care for the children:

[Mother] demonstrates impaired functioning which impedes
her ability to understand the children’s needs and provide
parental care to meet their needs.

. . . [Mother] appears to not understand the severity of the
neglect the children have experienced in her care and the need
to remedy this, as she has repeatedly voiced to [the county] that
the only problem for herself and the children was posttraumatic
stress disorder as a result of the sexual assaults by [father].

The petition set forth a list of services that the department had provided to mother,

including individual therapy, family therapy, in-home skills services, transportation

assistance, supervised visitation, and referrals for financial services and additional mental-

health services.

The petition alleged that it is in the children’s best interest for custody to be

transferred to the foster parents, noting that “[a] positive parent-child relationship has

developed” between the children and the foster parents, “[t]he children have made an

excellent adjustment to the home and community of” the foster parents, and the foster

parents “are the children’s kin and present a permanent family unit for the children.” The

petition further stated that “[t]he children experienced long-term neglect in [mother’s]

care,” noting that “[i]n addition to educational neglect, the children were largely isolated,

rarely leaving the family home” and “had minimal opportunities for social interaction and

development.” The children “did not receive basic care/hygiene skill development.” Their

mother “instructed them not to wash their eyes, ears, or genitals, or they would get

infections,” and the children “did not know how to brush their teeth or properly wash their

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body or hair.” The petition further described that mother offered to buy the children

vibrators when they were approximately 12 to 13 years old and their father instructed

mother “to show [the children] how to shave their private area and to have them keep it

shaved” around the same age. Additionally, the children “had limited knowledge of health,

diet, and food” and did not know many fruits or vegetables.

The petition outlined that both children “repeatedly expressed their concerns about

[mother]” and “consistently report[ed] wanting to remain with their current caregivers for

safety and healing.” The petition quoted letters written by both children to mother and to

the court. Child 1’s letter to mother stated that she wants “little to no contact” with mother

and that she doesn’t want mother “to have a say so in [her] life.” Child 2’s letter to mother

stated that she doesn’t “want to go back to [mother]” though she is “fine with [them] having

some sort of bond just not mother and daughter, it’s too forced.”

The petition further alleged that mother has not consistently cooperated with the

county:

[Mother] has struggled to work effectively with [the county]
on a consistent basis toward successful reunification. On nearly
a monthly basis [mother] has expressed being unwilling to
work with, speak with, and/or meet with [the county]. [Mother]
told [the county] she had a legal right to not speak with [the
county] and sent [the county] screenshots of Google searches
regarding this. [Mother] has frequently been focused on her
disagreement of county involvement, disapproval of the
children’s placement, and perception she was not being helped.
[Mother] has often communicated with [the county] only by
yelling over the phone or texting heated messages focused on
what she felt [the county] was doing wrong. While [mother]
has had periodic productive conversations with [the county]
during this matter, her overall difficulty participating in

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constructive communication has contributed to delays in
services and progress.

The petition recommended transfer of permanent legal and physical custody to the foster

parents and stated that reasonable efforts have been made to facilitate reunification, but

that mother has failed to correct the conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home

placement.

A trial occurred in October 2025. Mother testified. The social worker and the family

therapist who had been working with the family testified. An in-home skills counselor who

worked with mother testified. Both child 1 and child 2 testified. And the foster parents

testified.

Mother testified that she saw father engaging in sexual abuse in 2024 and that father

was thereafter convicted of sexual abuse. She denied teaching her daughters how to shave

their pubic region. Mother described her participation in services. She denied that her

“mental health negatively impacted [the girls].” She testified that she did not end up getting

an adult rehabilitative mental-health-services (ARMHS) worker and that she did not think

she needed one. Mother denied that the girls said that they do not feel safe in the family

house where the abuse occurred and stated that she would continue to live there.

During her testimony, the social worker agreed that mother’s “failure to understand

the effect of her mental health on her girls” has “been a persistent concern over the course

of this case.” The social worker testified that mother believed that her mental-health issues

stemmed from the fact that she witnessed an assault of her daughter. The social worker

testified that mother did not engage in parenting-education services but did eventually

7

engage with some psychological services. She testified that mother eventually attended

visits with the children but focused more on her needs during them. She confirmed that

mother consistently attended therapy once or twice weekly. The social worker testified that

mother’s compliance with her case plan had not been sufficient to address the safety

concerns related to the children because “one key part of the case plan was to recognize

how her mental is health is affecting the children, and that still has not come to fruition.”

The social worker testified that the foster parents “provide a ton of care” to the children

and “tend to their emotional, physical, and any types of needs.”

The guardian ad litem testified that transfer of custody to the foster parents was in

the children’s best interests based on the children’s wishes, the fact that they were thriving

with the foster parents, the fact that mother had not progressed to unsupervised visits, and

the fact that there was not sufficient time—given the children’s need for permanency,

safety, and stability—for mother to demonstrate her ability to safely and capably parent the

children.

The district court issued an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody

of both children to the foster parents. The district court deferred finalization of the transfer

of custody until eligibility for Northstar Kinship Assistance was determined. Mother

appealed the district court’s order. We dismissed the appeal as premature because the

kinship assistance determination was still pending. Northstar Assistance was then

approved, and the custody transfer was finalized. Mother appeals.

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DECISION

“Consistent with the level of proof generally required in child protection

proceedings, the county must prove the allegations of the petition for permanent placement

by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Welfare of A.R.G.-B., 551 N.W.2d 256, 261

(Minn. App. 1996); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 1 (stating that the standard of

proof in permanency matters other than terminations of parental rights is clear and

convincing evidence). Appellate courts “determine[] on appeal whether the trial court’s

findings address the statutory criteria and are supported by ‘substantial evidence’” or

whether the findings are clearly erroneous. A.R.G.-B., 551 N.W.2d at 261 (quoting In re

Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990)). “The evidence and its reasonable

inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id. An order

permanently placing a child out of the home of a parent or guardian requires the following

detailed findings:

(1) how the child’s best interests are served by the order;
(2) the nature and extent of the responsible social
services agency’s reasonable efforts . . . ;
(3) the parent’s or parents’ efforts and ability to use
services to correct the conditions which led to the out-of-home
placement; and
(4) that the conditions which led to the out-of-home
placement have not been corrected so that the child can safely
return home.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a) (2024). Each statutory requirement must be proved by clear and

convincing evidence. In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d 346, 355 (Minn. App.

2024).

9

Mother argues that the four statutory requirements are not supported by clear and

convincing evidence and that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the

statutory requirements were met.3 We address each requirement in turn.

A. Best Interests

Mother argues that the district court’s best-interests findings are inadequate because

“they do not provide any insight into which facts or opinions were most persuasive for the

court’s ultimate decision and did not demonstrate the court’s comprehensive consideration

of the statutory criteria” and that it is not in the children’s best interests to transfer custody

to the foster parents.4 The county argues that the district court’s findings and conclusions

are supported by clear and convincing evidence that a transfer of custody was in the best

interests of both children.

A child’s best interests are “the paramount consideration” in juvenile-protection

matters. Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (Supp. 2025). “The ‘best interests of the child’

3
Mother separates her brief into three issues: (1) involuntary transfer of custody was
improper because none of the four statutory requirements were established by sufficient
findings that were proved by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the transfer is not in the
best interests of the children; and (3) there is not clear and convincing evidence that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. Because efforts to reunite the family
is one of the four statutory findings referenced in mother’s first issue, we combine the
reasonable-efforts analysis and conduct our review according to the four statutory
requirements.
4
Mother also argues that the district court did not address the children’s relationship with
their other sibling within its best-interests determination. The children’s sibling is an adult
who owns the apartment where the abuse occurred and continues to live with mother.
Mother does not explain how consideration of this sibling relationship would impact the
best interests of the children in these circumstances.

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means all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a)

(2024). The best interests of a child includes “a review of the relationship between the child

and relatives and the child and other important persons with whom the child has resided or

had significant contact.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(b) (2024).5

Here, in a section of its order titled “Best Interests,” the district court found that “it

is in the children’s best interests that permanent custody of the children be transferred.” In

the same section, the district court found that mother “has little to no insight into how her

mental health continues to negatively impact the children” and cannot identify her

symptoms, how her mental health affects the children, and what tools she would use to

manage her diagnoses. Additionally, the court found that mother “continues to demonstrate

a self-centered mentality and focuses on how the abuse has impacted her,” “was unable to

articulate how the sexual abuse has affected her children,” “has no insight into the

children’s mental health needs,” and expects the children to “cope.” The district court

found that “the level of trauma and neglect the children have experienced in [mother’s]

care” has impacted them significantly and the children have a severely impaired

relationship with mother as a result. Finally, the district court explained that mother has

not taken responsibility or identified what she could do differently to ensure the girls’

5
Findings on the three-part best-interests test required for termination of parental rights are
not required in other permanency determinations. See In re Welfare of Child. of J.C.L., 958
N.W.2d 653, 657 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. May 12, 2021). The county cites
“Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(3)(i)-(iii)” for the proposition that the district court
must make three specific findings before terminating parental rights. Rule 39.05 does not
exist. It appears that the county meant to cite rule 58.04(c)(2)(ii), but that rule by its terms
only applies to termination proceedings.

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future safety and “has alienated the people and resources in which the children find

support.”

The district court also made specific findings about the “stability of proposed

permanent custodians,” finding that the foster parents are “important friends of the

children” and have a “significant relationship” with them. The court noted that both mother

and the children referred to K.W. as the girls’ “second mom.” The district court found that

the foster parents satisfy the definition of “relative” under Minnesota Statutes section

260C.007, subdivision 27, which includes “important friend of the child or of the child’s

parent or custodian, including an individual with whom the child has resided or had

significant contact.” The district court further found that the foster parents are suitable

permanent legal and physical custodians for the children.

The district court’s findings regarding the impact of mother’s mental-health

concerns and her lack of insight are supported by the record. Mother testified at trial that,

if her daughters got the “correct help,” they would be able to “cope” with living in the

apartment where they were abused, stating, “The danger’s gone. . . . I mean I know it

happened there, but with the right help they can know how to overcome it like I did with

my therapist, because I had issues about that too.” Mother further testified, “And staying

in that house now I’ve overcome it because there’s no fear in there anymore of that house,

I overcame that. I don’t even think about it.” She stated that it would be “[t]he same for

[her] daughters.” Mother also testified that, though her neuropsychological evaluation

provided helpful information, she “[knew] it didn’t affect any of [her] parenting ability

with [her] daughters.” In addition, the social worker, in her testimony, confirmed that

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mother “fail[ed] to understand the effect of her mental health on her girls” and does not

understand why mental-health treatment is necessary for her. She said that mother declined

to sign a release required to receive services from an ARMHS worker. The social worker

further testified that mother “somewhat” understands that her current apartment is

triggering for the children but that “multiple times [she has] heard [mother] say the girls

just need to get over it.” Finally, K.W. testified that, about five weeks after mother

discovered the abuse, mother told K.W. that she would allow father to move back into the

house if he “gets the help he needs” and if it was okay with the girls, though mother testified

at trial that she does not plan to have father move back in and that it was never her plan to

have him do so.

The district court’s findings regarding the suitability of the foster parents are also

supported by the record.6 Mother described K.W. as part of her support system from the

beginning of the child-protection proceedings. Mother was supportive of the children

staying with the foster parents for respite care while she addressed her mental-health needs.

The children have consistently expressed a desire to stay with the foster parents, and their

therapists and social workers have noticed vast improvement in the children’s wellbeing

6
Mother also argues that the district court “did not adequately review the suitability of the
prospective legal and physical custodians” because there was no summary of background
studies or testimony from the social worker about the foster parents. The governing law
requires that a background study be conducted before a kinship placement agreement is
signed for the purpose of a transfer of permanent legal and physical custody to a relative.
Minn. Stat. § 245C.33, subd. 1(b) (2024). But the law also provides an exemption for
prospective parents who hold a foster-care license and completed a background study in
conjunction with that application. Id. Though the record does not appear to contain
background studies for the foster parents, the record does reflect that the foster parents
became licensed foster-care providers.

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since they began living with the foster parents. And, contrary to mother’s argument, the

foster parents can meet the definition of “relative,” despite not being related, because they

are “important friends” of the children with whom the children have resided or have had

significant contact. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 27.

In sum, the district court considered all factors relevant to the children’s best

interests, including mother’s mental-health needs, the children’s wishes, and the

relationship between the children and the foster parents. Mother’s argument that the district

court’s findings “do not provide any insight into which facts or opinions were most

persuasive for the court’s ultimate decision” fails. The district court explained the relevant

factors it considered. It was not required to explain which were “most persuasive” as

mother suggests.

B. Reasonable Efforts

Mother argues that the district court “did not make sufficiently detailed findings

about the nature and extent of the responsible social services agency’s reasonable efforts

to reunify the children with the parent as it was required to do pursuant to Minn. Stat.

§ 260C.517(a).” Mother also contends that the record lacks clear and convincing evidence

that the county used reasonable efforts. Mother asserts that the district court failed to

“consider whether the County’s efforts actually assisted in alleviating the conditions that

gave rise to the out-of-home placement” and that some of the services that the district court

stated were “offered to” mother were actually services that she had obtained on her own.

She further argues that the “County’s restriction of [mother’s] access to the children’s

providers undermines any finding of reasonable efforts,” asserting that the county blocked

14

her from contacting the children’s medical providers. The county responds that it did make

reasonable efforts.

The district court ruled that the county “made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate

[mother] and to reunify the children with her.” The district court listed the services the

county offered to mother. They included ride services; parenting-education services;

individual mental-health services for mother and the girls; family therapy;

psychiatric/medication services; neurological assessments, cash and food assistance; and

the services of an ARMHS worker. The district court found that the services were “relevant

to the safety and protection of the children, adequate to meet the needs of the children and

family, culturally appropriate, available and accessible, consistent and timely, and realistic

under the circumstances.” The district court noted that mother testified that there were no

other services that she needed that the county had not provided.

We see no clear error in the district court’s finding underlying its determination that

the county made reasonable efforts. The district court’s reasonable-efforts findings are

supported by the record. Mother and the children testified to mental-health services that

they received. The family therapist testified regarding her work with the family but stated

that the family did not reach any of the stated objectives of family therapy. An in-home

skills counselor testified regarding her work with mother and her supervision of visits; she

testified that mother made progress although there were still significant areas of concern.

The social worker testified regarding the services and explained that mother accepted some

of the services offered by the county and declined to sign required releases for others,

15

including the services of an ARMHS worker. In addition, the district court received

stipulated exhibits including assessments, treatment plans, and treatment notes.

Mother’s argument that the services were not reasonable because she obtained some

services on her own is unpersuasive. Even if mother obtained some services without the

help of the county, she still received those services, and she testified that there were no

other services that she needed.

Lastly, mother’s argument that the “County’s restriction of [mother’s] access to the

children’s providers undermines any finding of reasonable efforts” also fails. The access

restrictions were put in place in response to mother’s revocation of authorizations for the

county to receive updates on the children’s therapy, preventing the county from receiving

any communication about the children, of whom the county had custody at the time. This

was a reasonable response under the circumstances and did not undermine the county’s

reasonable efforts.

Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in its findings of fact concerning

the county’s efforts to reunify the children with mother. And those findings support its

determination that the county did, in fact, make reasonable efforts.

C. Mother’s Efforts and Ability to Use Services to Correct Conditions

Mother argues that the district court did not make detailed findings about her efforts

and ability to use services to correct the conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home

placement.

Although the district court did not include a specific heading in its findings about

mother’s efforts and abilities to use the services, it made factual findings on the topic

16

throughout its order. Those findings are supported by the record. The district court found

that mother participated in some of the services provided. But it also found that she did not

reasonably use other services, for example by revoking the children’s releases of

information about the services the children were receiving because of her distrust of the

county and by not pursuing the offered ARMHS services. The district court also found that

mother was diagnosed with several psychiatric disorders but that she was “unable or

unwilling to acknowledge any deficits in her mental health or neurocognitive abilities that

contributed to her lack of parenting abilities.” The district court also found that a

neuropsychological-examination report noted mother’s weaknesses in “effective and

efficient problem-solving strategies.” It found that the description of those weaknesses

“accurately describes [mother’s] approach to working with the case plans developed for

reunification” and that mother “lacked any significant insight into her lack of problem-

solving skills and instead deflected from the issues and blamed others.” These findings

address mother’s efforts and abilities to use services, and they are supported by mother’s

testimony, the social worker’s testimony, and trial exhibits.

D. Conditions Not Corrected

Lastly, mother argues that the district court failed to make detailed findings

establishing that the conditions that led to out-of-home placement had not been corrected

and that the record does not support such findings. Again, we disagree.

The district court found that “[c]onditions leading to the out-of-home placement of

the children have not been corrected and it is not safe for the children to return home based

upon a showing that [mother] has not substantially complied with the court’s orders and

17

the out-of-home placement plan.” This finding is further supported by the district court’s

findings relating to the best-interests factors, which describe mother’s lack of progress with

her mental-health and parenting skills. As explained above, these findings are supported

by the record.

Additionally, the out-of-home placement plan required mother to “participate in

mental health services, and demonstrate improved and stable mental health functioning

which is sufficient to parent [the children] in a manner that is safe, consistent, and meets

all of their needs.” The case plan specified that mother’s progress toward the plan would

be measured by her progress on eight different mental-health goals and nine parenting

goals. As the district court found, mother did succeed on some of these measures, such as

eventually obtaining a diagnostic assessment, participating in individual and family

therapy, and receiving in-home skills services. Notably, though, mother did not participate

in ARMHS services because she would not consent to a release of information. Moreover,

the district court found that mother had not met the following criteria outlined in the out-

of-home placement plan: mother “will demonstrate overall improved emotional stability,

be able to identify services for herself, and consistently access needed services in a timely

manner”; “will be able to identify how her mental health problems have negatively

impacted [the children]”; and “will demonstrate a good prognosis for continued stability.”

And, as the district court found, mother had not obtained “safe, stable, and appropriate

housing” because she continued to live in the apartment where the abuse occurred, and

mother’s relationship with the children had also not improved to the point of unsupervised

visits. These findings, too, are supported by the record.

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In sum, the district court’s findings on each of the statutory requirements are

sufficiently detailed and are not clearly erroneous because they are supported by substantial

evidence. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion by transferring

permanent legal and physical custody of the children to the foster parents.

Affirmed.

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