In Re: Guardianship of Haley L. Miller

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0446

In Re: Guardianship of Haley L. Miller.

Filed August 31, 2026
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-PR-21-691

Nikki L. Horner, Glencoe, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Stacy L. Kabele, Kabele Law and Mediation LLC, Minnetonka, Minnesota (for respondent
Presbyterian Family Foundation)

Amy E. Olson, Amy E. Olson Legal and Family Services, Hutchinson, Minnesota (for
respondent Haley Miller)

Considered and decided by Beane, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and

Schmidt, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SCHMIDT, Judge

Appellant Nikki Horner, the mother and former guardian of respondent Haley

Miller, 1 challenges the district court’s (1) denial of her motion to remove the successor

guardian, (2) denial of her motion to strike the successor guardian’s notice of restrictions,

and (3) approval of a stipulation appointing a parenting consultant. We affirm.

1
Because Haley shares the same last name with her father, we refer to her by her first name.

FACTS

Haley, an adult who lives with autism, is subject to guardianship. In 2021, Horner

petitioned for guardianship of Haley. Bubba Miller, Haley’s father, eventually stipulated

to Horner’s appointment as guardian. Horner and Miller also agreed to appoint a parenting

consultant to resolve any issues related to visitation with Haley.

In late 2023, Horner filed a motion to discharge the parenting consultant, contending

that the appointment improperly delegated the guardian’s statutory duties. Horner, Miller,

and Haley’s counsel stipulated to the appointment of a third-party successor guardian and

to end the appointment of the parenting consultant. In early 2024, the district court named

respondent Presbyterian Family Foundation (PFF) as the successor guardian for Haley.

The district court did not rule Horner’s motion to discharge the parenting consultant.

Eight months later, Horner moved to remove, and to revoke any decisions made by,

the parenting consultant. PFF then filed a letter regarding its intent to have Haley relocated

to reside in a group home. Horner and Miller both objected to PFF’s plan and each moved

for Haley to reside in their respective homes. The district court scheduled an evidentiary

hearing to determine where Haley would live under the guardianship and dismissed

Horner’s motion about the parenting consultant as moot.

Before the hearing, Miller, PFF, and Haley’s counsel informed the district court of

a stipulation that would have Haley live with Miller, with Horner having Haley every other

weekend. Horner did not join in the stipulation. After a hearing, the district court denied

Horner’s motion for Haley to reside with her and ruled that PFF was acting within its lawful

authority to determine Haley’s residential and caregiving arrangements.

2

Horner and Miller both used professional caretakers while Haley stayed in their

homes, which was provided through funding that allowed for up to 40 hours of paid

caretaking services per week while in Miller’s home and 20 hours of services per weekend,

such as when Haley was in Horner’s home. Horner consistently billed for over 40 hours

of caretaking services for the weekends that she had Haley. PFF sent Horner three letters

about the overbilling, the final of which advised Horner that Haley’s caretaking budget

would not last the entire year if Horner continued to bill for caretaking services beyond the

allocated 20 hours per weekend. PFF also informed Horner that if the overbilling continued

it would be forced to revise the visitation schedule to one weekend per month.

In January 2026, PFF filed a notice of restrictions, which limited Haley to one

weekend per month with Horner. Horner filed a motion requesting that the district court

strike the notice of restrictions, remove PFF as guardian, and appoint a successor guardian.

The district court denied Horner’s motions without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Horner appeals.

DECISION

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Horner’s petition
without an evidentiary hearing.

Horner argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her petition

to remove PFF as Haley’s guardian without holding an evidentiary hearing. Horner has

not demonstrated that she is entitled to relief. 2

2
The parties disagree on when a district court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion
to remove a guardian. Because we conclude that Horner did not establish that she was
entitled to a hearing under either party’s proposed standard, we do not reach this question.

3

We review a district court’s decision to remove a guardian for an abuse of discretion.

In re Guardianship of DeYoung, 801 N.W.2d 211, 216 (Minn. App. 2011). A district court

abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,

misapplies the law, or issues a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.

Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022).

Horner argues that the statute governing removal of a guardian required the district

court to hold an evidentiary hearing on her petition to remove PFF as guardian. See Minn.

Stat. § 524.5-112 (2024). But nothing in statute requires an evidentiary hearing, indeed,

the word “hearing” does not appear in that statutory text. See id. And Horner cites no

authority requiring a hearing. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

committing an error of law by denying Horner’s petition to remove PFF as guardian

without first holding an evidentiary hearing.

Horner also contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying her

petition without an evidentiary hearing because issues of disputed fact needed to be

resolved. Horner cites an affidavit that listed the “chronological failures of PFF” and two

documents 3 that provide a timeline of Haley’s behavioral incidents. But the affidavit and

documents contain conclusory allegations without specific facts, which demonstrate that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Horner had not made a

prima facie case for removal. See Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn.

3
The documents that Horner offered to the district court were not presented as part of the
sworn affidavit. Thus, the district court did not need to give the same weight to the unsworn
document. See City of Golden Valley v. Wiebesick, 899 N.W.2d 152, 166 n.14
(Minn. 2017) (declining to consider an incident “based on an unsworn statement”).

4

App. 2007) (holding, in the context of a motion to modify child custody, that no prima

facie case is alleged when movant relies on allegations that are conclusory, “too vague,” or

are “devoid of allegations supported by any specific, credible evidence.” (quotations

omitted)). In addition, many of the alleged incidents contained in the affidavit and

documents predate PFF’s appointment as a successor guardian, making them irrelevant to

an analysis about removing PFF as guardian. Horner has not demonstrated that the district

court abused its discretion when it denied her petition to remove PFF as guardian without

holding an evidentiary hearing.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Horner’s motion
to remove PFF’s restrictions without an evidentiary hearing.

Horner argues that the district court abused its discretion by upholding the

restrictions that PFF placed on Horner’s visitations with Haley. We disagree.

“We review a district court’s determination of the terms of a guardianship for an

abuse of discretion.” In re Guardianship of O’Brien, 847 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Minn.

App. 2014). By statute, a guardian may place restrictions on visitation rights with others

when the guardian has good cause to believe the restriction is necessary “because

interaction with the person poses a risk of significant physical, psychological, or financial

harm to the person subject to guardianship, and there is no other means to avoid such

significant harm.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(6) (2024). See also Minn. Stat. § 524.5-

120(10) (2024) (detailing guardian’s ability to impose restrictions). 4

4
Horner argues that the district court abused its discretion by not determining if the
restrictions were necessary, whether less restrictive alternatives were available, and
whether the guardian complied with the statutory requirements. Horner’s argument is

5

As the district court determined, PFF acted within its statutory authority by

imposing the restrictions upon Haley’s visitations with Horner. The record demonstrates

that PFF imposed the restrictions due to Horner consistently billing over the allocated 20

caretaking hours during Haley’s weekend visits. The district court found—and Horner

does not dispute—that PFF warned her on three occasions about the consequences of

overbilling, including that Haley’s funding would run out and that restrictions could be

imposed should the overbilling continue. Yet, Horner continued to overbill. The record

supports the district court’s finding that PFF filed and served the notice of restrictions,

“solely for the purposes of preserving [Haley’s] adequate funding . . . to last her through

the year.” 5 The district court noted that PFF, as guardian, was best suited to make these

decisions within the best interests of Haley.

We agree with the district court that PFF acted within its statutory authority—and

acted with good cause—by imposing the restrictions given the “risk of

significant . . . financial harm” (Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(6)) of Horner billing beyond

the allocated 20-hours per weekend that was allocated for Haley’s care. We conclude the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Horner’s motion to remove the

restrictions without first holding an evidentiary hearing.

misguided because the caselaw interpreting statutes governing a guardian’s ability to
impose restrictions does not require such an analysis.
5
The district court noted that “PFF remains willing to return to the scheduled every other
weekend visits if Ms. Horner will limit her billing to the amount necessary to preserve
[Haley’s] funding for the entire year.”

6

III. Horner’s other arguments are outside the scope of our review or are forfeited.

Horner raises several arguments related to the appointment of the parenting

consultant and about alleged judicial bias. We conclude that the parenting consultant issue

is not within the scope of this appeal and that the allegations of judicial bias are forfeited.

A. The parenting consultant issue is outside the scope of this appeal.

Horner makes several arguments related to the parenting consultant. We conclude

that the parenting-consultant issue is not properly before us in this appeal.

Horner argues that the appointment improperly delegated the guardian’s statutory

duties to the parenting consultant. The order appointing the parenting consultant was filed

in October 2021. Any appeal of that order had to be filed within 60 days after Horner was

served with a notice of filing of the order. See Minn. Stat. § 525.712 (2024); see also Minn.

R. Civ. App. P. 104.1, subd. 1. Horner did not appeal. Instead, Horner appealed from the

district court’s order issued in February 2026, which denied her motions to remove PFF as

guardian and to challenge the restrictions that PFF imposed. The February 2026 order did

not rule on any issue related to the parenting consultant. The district court’s prior orders—

addressing the parenting consultant arguments that Horner makes in this appeal—are

outside the scope of the appeal.

B. The judicial bias issue is forfeited.

Horner argues that the district court judge was biased against her and that the

cumulative effect of what Horner labels erroneous and inconsistent rulings prejudiced her.

Horner requests reassignment to a new judicial officer on remand. Horner did not,

however, raise this issue to the district court. We will not consider issues that were not

7

raised in the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). In addition,

we determine that the arguments are forfeited because they are made without legal citation

or analysis. Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 811 N.W.2d 596, 600 n.2

(Minn. 2012) (“Summary arguments made without citation to legal support are waived.”).

Affirmed.

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