In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Michael Leroy Deyo

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0453

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Michael Leroy Deyo.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-MH-PR-24-766

Kathleen K. Rauenhorst, Rauenhorst & Associate, PA, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant
Michael Leroy Deyo)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kelly Meehan, Jenna Bartelt, Assistant County
Attorneys, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Attorney’s Office)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s determinations that clear and convincing
evidence supported his indeterminate civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person
(SDP) and as a person with a sexual psychopathic personality (SPP). We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Michael Leroy Deyo was born in March 1963 and is now 63 years old.
Appellant has had three convictions relevant to his commitment, two of which he received
in his twenties. First, based on his 1983 sexual assault of a stranger, the district court

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convicted appellant of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Statutes
section 609.345(c) (1982), and sentenced him to five years of probation. Second, based on
his 1988 sexual assault of another stranger, the district court convicted appellant of
terroristic threats under Minnesota Statutes section 609.713, subdivision 1 (1986), and
sentenced him to five years of probation. Third, based on his 2016 sexual assault of a
coworker, the district court convicted appellant of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
under Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(e)(i) (2016), and sentenced him
to 86 months in prison.
While in prison for his third conviction, appellant received a recommendation to
complete a prison- based, sex-offender treatment program. The program rejected him
because, during his interview, appellant “would not disclose behaviors related to his
[criminal-sexual-conduct] conviction.”
After almost five years in prison, appellant entered supervised release in the
community. The conditions of his release required him to (1) “comply with sex offender
programming as directed by the [supervising] agent,” (2) “refrain from the use or
possession of mood altering substances including alcohol,” (3) “refrain from purchasing,
possessing, accessing, or controlling any type of . . . dangerous weapon,” and (4) “refrain
from engaging in any . . . harassing, stalking, or threatening behavior.”
While on supervised release, appellant’s supervising agent referred appellant to a
sex-offender treatment program in the community. The program conducted an initial
assessment and noted that appellant “presented with low motivation for treatment.” After

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attending the program for two months, appellant was arrested for violating his supervised-
release conditions, and the program terminated his participation.
Following his arrest, the Minnesota Department of Corrections’ Hearings and
Release Unit held a hearing and found that appellant committed four violations of his
supervised-release conditions: (1) failing to comply with sex-offender programming;
(2) consuming alcohol; (3) purchasing and possessing stun guns and pepper sprays; and
(4) engaging in harassing behaviors toward two women. The commissioner of corrections
revoked appellant’s conditional release and executed the remainder of appellant’s 86-
month sentence. Appellant completed his sentence the following month, at which point he
left custody.
Shortly before the completion of his sentence, an end-of-confinement review
committee referred appellant’s case to respondent Ramsey County “for consideration of
civil commitment.” The county later petitioned for appellant’s indeterminate commitment
as both an SDP and an SPP.
The district court held a hearing on the petition, at which the state introduced
testimony and written examinations from t wo court-appointed examiners, Dr. Michael
Thompson and Dr. Andrea Lovett, in support of appellant’s commitment. The district court
granted the county’s petition and ordered appellant’s indeterminate commitment as both
an SDP and an SPP.
This appeal follows.

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DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s determinations that clear and convincing
evidence supported his commitment as (1) an SDP and (2) an SPP. We address each
argument in turn.
“[W]hether the facts found by the district court satisfy the statutory criteria for
commitment” is a question of law that we review de novo. In re Civ. Commitment of
Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Minn. App. 2014). When reviewing the findings of fact
themselves, however, “this court applies a clear-error standard of review . . . and reviews
the record in the light most favorable to” those findings. Id. Under clear-error review,
appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, reconcile conflicting evidence, or engage in fact-
finding. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-2 2 (Minn. 2021). We
defer to the district court’s credibility determinations, see In re Civ. Commitment of Stone,
711 N.W.2d 831, 839 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2006), and “need
not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness
of the [factual] findings,” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation omitted).
A person may be civilly committed as an SDP or an SPP if a petitioner proves the
associated statutory criteria by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. Stat. § 253D.07,
subd. 3 (2024). Clear and convincing evidence is “more than a preponderance of the
evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp,
895 N.W.2d 647, 654 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 20,
2017). “The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is met when the truth of the facts
asserted is highly probable.” Id.

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I. The district court did not err by determining that the county proved appellant
meets the statutory criteria for commitment as an SDP by clear and convincing
evidence.

Appellant contends that the district court erred by determining that clear and
convincing evidence supported his commitment as an SDP, and he challenges the district
court’s findings on each of the statutory criteria. We are not persuaded.
To commit a person as an SDP, the district court must find that the individual:
(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct
as defined in [Minnesota Statutes section 253D.02,]
subdivision 8;
(2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental
disorder or dysfunction; and
(3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful
sexual conduct.

Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16(a) (2024); see also Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3
(requiring clear and convincing evidence to support SDP determination).
A. The district court did not clearly err by finding that appellant engaged
in a course of harmful sexual conduct.

Appellant’s sole assertion about the first element of the SDP statute is that his “1983
and 1988 convictions are to[o] remote in time to show a course of conduct.” The county
correctly points out that, in contrast to appellant’s premise, this court has held that “the
incidents that establish the course [of harmful sexual conduct] . . . need not be recent.”
Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 837. Because binding caselaw in fact stands for the opposite
proposition than appellant’s assertion, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err
by finding that appellant engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct.

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B. The district court did not clearly err by finding that appellant has a
sexual, personality, or mental disorder that does not allow him to control
his sexual impulses adequately.

Appellant next argues, regarding the second element of the SDP statute, that (1) he
does not have “any sexual, personality or other ment al disorder or dysfunction” because
his diagnoses “rest on subjective interpretation,” and (2) “[t]here was not a sufficient
showing that these diagnos[e]s would cause [him] difficulty in controlling harmful sexual
behavior.”
The second element requires proof that the person’s “present disorder or dysfunction
does not allow them to adequately control their sexual impulses, making it highly likely
that they will engage in harmful sexual acts in the future .” In re Civ. Commitment of
Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 267-68 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 17, 2002).
As to appellant’s first argument, the district court determined that both examiners
“testified credibly at trial regarding their diagnoses.” Both examiners diagnosed appellant
with unspecified paraphilic disorder and a mild intellectual disability, and Dr. Lovett also
diagnosed appellant with antisocial personality disorder. Appellant’s first argument
therefore fails because we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. See Stone,
711 N.W.2d at 839.
Regarding appellant’s second argument, the district court found credible
Dr. Lovett’s opinion that appellant had limited to no control “over his sexual impulses”
due to his unspecified paraphilic disorder and antisocial personality disorder. Appellant’s

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second argument therefore also fails because we defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations. See id.
C. The district court did not clearly err by finding that appellant is highly
likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct.

Regarding the third element of the SDP statute, appellant argues that (1) any
evidence that suggests he would reoffend is “speculative” ; (2) “[g]roup recidivism rates”
are not relevant to individual likelihood s of reoffending; and (3) the examiner opinions
resting on “historical conduct” and “actuarial instruments” are “not sufficient to show a
current difficulty in controlling behavior.”
The word “likely” in this element “require[s] clear and convincing evidence that the
person is ‘highly likely’ to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct.” In re Civ.
Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 22 (Minn. 2014). This likelihood “cannot be defined
by a numeric value.” Id. at 21. Instead, the supreme court has identified several
nonexclusive factors for consideration, known as the Linehan factors, which include:
(a) the person’s relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
education, etc.); (b) the person’s history of violent behavior
(paying particular attention to recency, severity, and frequency
of violent acts); (c) the base rate statistics for violent behavior
among individuals of this person’s background (e.g., data
showing the rate at which rapists recidivate, the correlation
between age and criminal sexual activity, etc.); (d) the sources
of stress in the environment (cognitive and affective factors
which indicate that the person may be predisposed to cope with
stress in a violent or nonviolent manner); (e) the similarity of
the present or future context to those contexts in which the
person has used violence in the past; and (f) the person’s record
with respect to sex therapy programs.

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Id. at 22 (quoting In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994)). “No single factor is
determinative of this complex issue.” In re Civ. Commitment of Navratil, 799 N.W.2d 643,
649 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011).
The district court here considered a variety of evidence when assessing this element
including appellant’s treatment history, “Correctional and Supervision History,” and risk
assessments. The district court referenced several actuarial tools administered both
historically and recently to assess appellant’s likelihood of reoffending, and described
appellant’s most recent results as suggesting an “above average risk” for reoffending. The
district court also considered the testimony of both examiners, which referenced the
Linehan factors. The district court found credible “Dr. Lovett and Dr. Thompson’s
conclusion that [appellant] is ‘highly likely’ to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct in
the future if [he] is not committed.” Appellant fails to support his assertion that this
evidence is “speculative,” requiring reversal, and we defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations. See Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 839.
Appellant’s remaining arguments also fail. Group recidivism rates are relevant for
the Linehan factor “base rate statistics,” which “refers to recidivism rates for a particular
class, such as the overall percentage of sex offenders that reoffend.” Ince, 847 N.W.2d at
22 n.3. Appellant’s contention that “[g]roup recidivism rates should not be used to predict
individual outcomes” suggests that he is advocating for a new rule of law. But we are
bound to follow supreme court precedent, and we do not create new law. See Tereault v.
Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that “the task of extending

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existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature”), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 18,
1987).
Further, appellant provides no caselaw or legal argument to support his assertion
that “historical conduct” and “actuarial instruments” are “not sufficient to show a current
difficulty in controlling behavior.” It is also unclear why these factors would need to be
“sufficient,” on their own, when the district court here relied on a variety of evidence
including but not limited to these permissible factors. See Linehan, 518 N.W.2d at 614
(providing three factors requiring historical considerations); Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 24
(concluding that actuarial evidence can be “relevant to the determination of whether a
person is highly likely to engage in future harmful sexual conduct”). Because appellant
provides no briefing explaining his sufficiency arguments, we decline to consider them.
See Kropp, 895 N.W.2d at 653 (“Minnesota appellate courts decline to reach an issue in
the absence of adequate briefing.”).
We therefore conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that
appellant is highly likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct. And because it is
“highly probable” that appellant meets the statutory criteria for commitment as an SDP, id.
at 654, we conclude that the district court did not err by determining that the county proved
appellant meets the statutory criteria for commitment as an SDP by clear and convincing
evidence.

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II. The district court did not err by determining that the county proved appellant
meets the statutory criteria for commitment as an SPP by clear and convincing
evidence.

Appellant contends that the district court erred by determining that clear and
convincing evidence supported his commitment as an SPP, specifically arguing that the
district court’s sexual-irresponsibility and lack-of-control findings are clearly erroneous.
We disagree.
To commit an individual as an SPP, the district court must make four findings:
(1) the individual has a “condition[] of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior,
or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences
of personal acts,” or some combination of these conditions, which make them
“irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters”; (2) they have engaged
in “a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters”; (3) that misconduct shows “an utter
lack of power to control [their] sexual impulses”; and (4) “as a result,” they are “dangerous
to other persons.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 15 (2024); see also Minn. Stat. § 253D.07,
subd. 3 (requiring clear and convincing evidence to support commitment as SPP). Because
appellant challenges the first and third findings, we address each in turn.
A. The district court did not clearly err by finding that appellant has
conditions that render him irresponsible in sexual matters.

Appellant argues that he does not meet the first element of the SPP statute because
(1) he does not have any of the required conditions and (2) the examiners’ opinions “are
derived primarily from [his] historical conduct rather than his present day condition.”

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Regarding appellant’s first argument, the district court found credible “Dr. Lovett’s
opinion that [appellant’s] behavior is characterized by emotional instability, impulsiveness
of behavior, a lack of customary standards of good judgment and a failure to appreciate the
consequences of his personal acts.” Further, the record shows that appellant has
consistently minimized his impact on others, dismissed his need for treatment, and blamed
alcohol and his victims for his actions.
Regarding appellant’s second argument, it appears that appellant misunderstands
the examiners’ opinions, which reference both historical and present-day conduct.
Dr. Lovett reported that, at the time of her evaluation, all four of the statutory conditions
were present. She explained, for example, that during her evaluation, appellant denied that
the victim of his 2016 assault “was negatively impacted by his sexual misconduct against
her.” Appellant also told Dr. Lovett “that he does not require sex offender treatment.”
Dr. Lovett referenced these statements to support her opinion that appellant fails to
appreciate the consequences of his acts.
Because of the substantial support in the record and the deference we owe to the
district court’s credibility determinations, we conclude that the district court did not clearly
err by finding that appellant has conditions that render him irresponsible in sexual matters.
B. The district court did not clearly err by finding that appellant has an
utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses.

Appellant argues that he does not meet the third element of the SPP statute because
(1) he has only “sometimes failed to control his behavior” and has gone “long periods

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without reoffending,” and (2) the county “did not show that [his] impulses were so strong
they cannot be controlled.”
In assessing whether a person has the lack of control contemplated in the SPP
statute, courts consider several factors, including “the nature and frequency of the sexual
assaults, the degree of violence involved,” any relationship between the person and
victim(s), “the [person’s] medical and family history, [and] the results of psychological
and psychiatric testing and evaluation.” In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994).
The SPP statute does not require “a complete lack of ability to control,” but rather at least
a “serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” In re Martinelli, 649 N.W.2d 886, 890
(Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2002).
Regarding appellant’s first argument, we note that whether a person has avoided
reoffending in the past is not in itself sufficient to demonstrate that they can currently
control their sexual impulses. See In re Preston, 629 N.W.2d 104, 111 (Minn. App. 2001)
(rejecting argument that person’s “ability to control his impulses [was] demonstrated by”
lack of evidence of reoffending while released on bail). Moreover, both examiners
expressly testified that the gap between appellant’s 1988 and 2016 offenses “is not
pertinent in terms of his current risk of sexual recidivism.” The gap “does not necessarily
indicate that nothing occurred,” and, regardless, appellant ultimately reoffended in 2016
and 2023, supporting the finding that his behavior is not currently under control. The
district court found the experts’ opinions and Dr. Lovett’s summary about this element to
be credible.

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Regarding his second argument, it appears that appellant misconstrues the emphasis
of this statutory element by focusing on the strength of a person’s impulses alone, rather
than on the relationship between a person’s impulses and their ability to control them. See
id. (“[I]f a person has the ability to control the sexual impulse, the standard for commitment
is not met.” (quotation omitted)). Further, appellant provides no caselaw or legal argument
to support his assertion that the county needed to “show that [his] impulses were so strong
they cannot be controlled.” We therefore decline to consider this issue as inadequately
briefed. Kropp, 895 N.W.2d at 653.
Because of the substantial support in the record, and the fact that the district court
accurately applied the law, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding
that appellant has an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses. And because it is
“highly probable” that appellant meets the statutory criteria for commitment as an SPP, id.
at 654, we conclude that the district court did not err by determining that the county proved
appellant meets the statutory criteria for commitment as an SPP by clear and convincing
evidence.
Affirmed.