In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: K. L. S. and C. C. S., Parents

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0483

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of:

K. L. S. and C. C. S., Parents.

Filed September 8, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File Nos. 69HI-JV-24-64, 69HI-JV-23-33

Anne Morris Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant K.L.S.)

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Rachel L.L. Caplan, Assistant County
Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis County Public Health and Human
Services Department)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Corradi, Special Assistant Public Defender, Corradi Law Office, Hibbing,
Minnesota (for respondents L.S. and W.S.)

Sara Henkel, Virginia, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
On appeal from a district court’s order terminating parental rights, appellant mother
challenges the district court’s determination that respondent county made reasonable

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efforts to rehabilitate her and reunite her with the children, that termination is supported by
a statutory basis, and that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best
interests. We affirm.
FACTS
This case concerns the termination of appellant mother K.L.S.’s parental rights to
her two oldest children, Child 1 and Child 2, born in 2012 and 2013. Mother also has two
younger children, Child 3 and Child 4, born in 2016 and 2019. Mother consented to the
adoption of Child 3 and Child 4 in 2025, and her parental rights to these two children are
not at issue on appeal. Additionally, father, C.C.S., whose parental rights to all four
children have been terminated, is not a party to this appeal. The following summarizes the
district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order terminating mother’s
parental rights to Child 1 and Child 2, supplemented by the record as necessary to
understand the issues on appeal.
The County’s Involvement with the Family, 2019-2022
Respondent St. Louis County Public Health and Human Services Department (the
county) became involved with the family in 2019. The county’s involvement was based
on concerns related to , among other issues, child neglect, substance use in the home, and
exposure to domestic violence. In one incident in 2019, father hit mother and left her with
a black eye. One of the children was present at the time of the assault. Father was arrested
and went to jail. Father was later released from jail and returned home. The county
provided voluntary assistance to the family beginning in 2019. In 2021, the county

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documented further concerns regarding the children’s school attendance, mother’s
sobriety, and the presence of unsafe individuals in the home.
In March 2022, the parents divorced. In December 2022, the county opened a new
case-management file based on allegations that mother was allowing unsafe people into
the home while the children were present. A county social worker also reported that the
home was “filthy with garbage, food, and clothes,” that mother “sleeps for days,” and that
it was unclear whether anyone in the home was caring for the children.
Due to these concerns, the county created case plans for the family. The plans were
“voluntary targeted case management plans, calling for [mother] to ensure that [Child 1
and Child 2] attend school on a regular basis, live in a home free from substance use and
domestic violence, obtain diagnostic assessments and follow recommendations, and have
safe and sober caregivers.” The plans also called for mother “ to sign [releases of
information], obtain a [diagnostic assessment ] for herself and follow recommendations,
address her physical and mental health needs, and ma ke necessary phone calls to
accomplish the plan goals.”
Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) Petition and Order
On March 7, 2023, the county filed a CHIPS petition alleging that the children were
in need of protection or services because mother was not providing adequate supervision
and care of the children, was not ensuring the children attended school, used substances in
front of the children, allowed unsafe individuals in the home, failed to follow through with
medical appointments, and could not safely parent the children. The county also requested
protective supervision of the children, which the district court granted on March 27.

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About two months later, on May 2, 2023, police officers arrested mother after
finding her passed out in her vehicle with methamphetamine in her possession. That same
day, a social worker went to mother’s home to check on the children and discovered that
the children were in the care of mother’s boyfriend. They also credibly suspected that the
boyfriend was under the influence of controlled substances at the time he was caring for
the children. Another individual was also at the home. Two days later, the district court
held an emergency protective care hearing and awarded temporary custody of the children
to the county for purposes of out-of-home placement.
The county then created out-of-home placement plans that were approved by the
district court. The plans were developed with mother and based on the existing December
2022 targeted case-management plans. The case plans addressed concerns related to
mother’s substance use, neglect of the children, and the children’s exposure to domestic
violence. The plans required mother to: (1) “ be a safe and sober caregiver by identifying
triggers and emotions that lead to [substance] use, by obtaining and maintaining sobriety
through use of supports, complete a chemical-use assessment and follow
recommendations, comply with [urinalysis tests (UAs)], and complete hair follicle testing”;
(2) participate in therapy; (3) engage in parenting education; (4) demonstrate parenting
skills; (5) “maintain[] safe and stable housing and ensure that the children have safe and
sober caregivers” ; (6) “sign releases ”; (7) “demonstrate accountability skills”;
(8) respectfully work with the county; and (9) “remain law abiding.” Later iterations of
the plans added requirements for mother to obtain an Adult Rehabilitative Mental Health
Services (ARMHS) provider, participate in “a sexual assault program to reduce her

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co-dependence on men ,” and refrain from letting unsafe individuals into the home. The
district court found that the plan requirements regarding mother’s mental health “were
specifically targeted to increase [mother’s] resiliency and ability to manage stress,
understand and cope with both her and the children’s trauma histories and current and
future mental health needs, and provide a safe and supportive environment to discuss issues
arising within the home and family system.” The district court further found that the
elements of the case plans “were appropriate expectations” for mother.
Following development of the case plans, the county provided services and support
to mother to address the conditions that resulted in the children’s removal from the home.
The services included: assisting mother in getting help to address her substance use,
transportation assistance, funds to reinstate mother’s driver’s license, coaching for
parenting skills, support for medical and mental health appointments, safety planning, and
respite care.
Although the county provided assistance to mother and reminded mother multiple
times that her case plan required her to maintain a safe and sober home, mother continued
to use substances and allow unsafe individuals into the home. For example, in May 2023,
the social worker noted that mother continued to struggle with substance use and was
dating an individual with an extensive criminal history including crimes of violence. I n
May 2024, mother completed an updated comprehensive assessment following an alcohol
involved incident when mother was assaulted by a boyfriend and was found to be misusing
a prescription medication—Gabapentin —and in possession of another substance—
Adderall— without a prescription. And in June 2024, mother spent 24 hours in jail after

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she was found with a bottle of whiskey and in the company of a man who was on warrant
status.
On August 8, 2024, mother was scheduled to have a two-hour supervised visit with
the children. But mother called the social worker “and said she was being sent to detox
and needed to cancel the visit.” The social worker later received communication from
mother’s probation officer that mother was misusing medication and the district court
“ordered her to go to detox and get an updated assessment,” which caused her to miss the
visit.
Additionally, prior to filing the termination of parental rights (TPR ) petition, the
county attempted a trial home visit for Child 1 that was unsuccessful.1 The visit lasted
from November 2023 to May 2024. The visit ended after the county documented issues of
domestic violence in the home between mother and her boyfriend, substance use by mother,
and an incident in which mother was sexually assaulted by her boyfriend in the home.
TPR Petition
On September 18, 2024, approximately a year and a half after the CHIPS petition
was filed,2 the county petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights. The county alleged
four statutory grounds for termination under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301(b)
(2024): (1) failure to comply with the duties imposed by the parent and child relationship;

1 Child 2 did not participate in trial home visits and remained in out- of-home placement
from May 2023 to the time of trial.

2 In June 2023, prior to the filing of the TPR petition, mother entered admissions to the
allegations in the CHIPS petition.

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(2) palpable unfitness; (3) failure to correct the conditions that led to the children’s out-of-
home placement, despite reasonable efforts by the county; and (4) neglect of the children
in foster care. Mother denied the allegations.
A second trial home visit for Child 1 took place from December 11 to 20, 2024,
following the filing of the TPR petition and before the TPR trial. This visit ended abruptly
after mother acknowledged that she was in contact with an unsafe person and continued to
use controlled substances. On the date that the visit was terminated, mother’s probation
officer found clear evidence on mother’s phone that she was buying and selling controlled
substances and had recently used hallucinogenic mushrooms. Mother was arrested and
ordered to remain incarcerated until a bed became available at an inpatient treatment
facility. Mother was discharged to inpatient treatment in January 2025 and completed
treatment in March. The social worker noted that, at that point, mother “will be
transitioning to mental health court.” A diagnostic assessment completed around that same
time stated that mother “never felt a need to cut down on her alcohol or drug use and she
described herself as being ‘highly impulsive’ regarding . . . entering relationships.”
During the summer of 2025, mother renewed her relationship with an ex-boyfriend
who had previously abused her. In the fall of 2025, the county continued to have concerns
about domestic violence in the home after the social worker observed that mother had a
black eye and cuts on her face. Additionally, mother’s probation officer reported concerns
about mother’s misuse of prescription medications and her inability to account for missing
medications. In December 2025, mother was seen in a liquor store, which mother
acknowledged at trial was a violation of the expectations imposed upon her by the court.

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After the incident at the liquor store, mother was placed on electronic home monitoring,
with tracking and alcohol testing and ordered to get a new comprehensive substance-use
assessment. Mother voluntarily resumed treatment that month, but did not attend
consistently. Additionally, mother was seen at a bar in Hibbing in January 2026, just prior
to the TPR trial.
During the time between the filing of the TPR petition and the trial, the county
continued to offer services to mother and the children including, but not limited to: helping
mother find treatment; finding foster placements for Child 1 and Child 2; assisting mother
with medical issues; providing support for mother’s medical appointments; coordinating
the second trial home visit for Child 1; and finding specialized health options for Child 2.
TPR Trial
On January 28, 2026, the district court held a one-day trial on the TPR petition. The
district court heard testimony from several witnesses, including: mother, the county social
worker, a foster parent, the guardian ad litem (GAL), two of mother’s service providers,
and Child 1. The district court also received 61 exhibits into evidence.
In a thorough and detailed order filed on February 27, the district court concluded
that clear and convincing evidence supported each of the four statutory grounds for
termination of mother’s parental rights as alleged in the petition.
3 The district court also

3 We note that there is a discrepancy between the statutory citations in the district court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court found that the county established
four statutory bases under Minnesota Statutes sections 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5),
and (8) (2024). But in the district court’s conclusions of law, it indicated that termination
was supported by section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2), (3), (4), and (7) (2024). The
district court’s reference to these subdivisions in its conclusions of law is consistent with

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found that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify the family,
but that mother “failed to honestly engage with the offered services, failed to take account
for her own actions and limitations,” and failed to address her own mental-health and
chemical-dependency needs to be able to care for the children. In the order, the district
court also found that “[mother’s] testimony was not credible as to multiple significant
points.” And the district court found that termination of mother’s parental rights was in
the children’s best interests. Based on its analysis of these factors, the district court granted
the county’s petition to terminate mother’s parental rights to Child 1 and Child 2.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
Parental rights may be terminated only for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). To involuntarily terminate
parental rights, a district court must determine that: (1) the county made reasonable efforts
to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family or that such efforts were not required; (2) at
least one of the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights exists; and (3) termination
is in the child’s best interests. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8; .317, subd. 1
(2024); see also In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
An appellate court reviews a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights “to
determine whether the district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether

the county’s petition. For the reasons discussed below, we determine that clear and
convincing evidence supports the termination of mother’s parental rights under section
260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4), and we do not reach the remaining statutory grounds.

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the district court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly
erroneous.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either
manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Child. of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61
(Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). We review a district court’s ultimate decision to
terminate parental rights for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.H. ,
968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021); see also S.E.P.,
744 N.W.2d at 385 (noting that a reviewing court gives “ considerable deference to the
district court’s decision to terminate parental rights”).
Mother raises three issues on appeal. First, she argues that the district court abused
its discretion by concluding that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and
reunify her with the children. Second, mother contends that the district court abused its
discretion when it found that the county proved four separate statutory bases for
termination by clear and convincing evidence. Third, she asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by determining that termination of her parental rights is in the best
interests of the children. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court acted within its discretion when it determined that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.

We first address mother’s challenge to the district court’s determination that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the children. Prior to terminating
parental rights, a district court must rule that the county made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family or determine that reasonable efforts are not

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statutorily required. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8; see also Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)
(2024); T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 664. Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond mere
matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.W.,
727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2007). “The county’s efforts must be aimed at alleviating the conditions that gave rise to
out-of-home placement, and they must conform to the problems presented.” In re Welfare
of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App. 2012). In analyzing the reasonableness
of the county’s efforts, the district court must consider whether the services offered were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and, if
appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and child’s
family;
(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well-being of the
child;
(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the child and
family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). The district court also weighs “the length of the time
the county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K.,
455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). The county
bears the burden of proving that it made reasonable efforts. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(f)
(2024). “[W]hat constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ depends on the facts of each case.” J.H.,
968 N.W.2d at 601. We review the district court’s ultimate determination about the
reasonableness of the county’s efforts for an abuse of discretion and the underlying findings

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of fact for clear error. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321-22 (Minn.
App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015).
In its order terminating mother’s parental rights, the district court determined that
the county provided reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to the children’s
out-of-home placement and reunify the family. These efforts included, among others, a
chemical-health assessment, assistance in obtaining treatment for mother’s substance
abuse, UAs to assist mother with demonstrating sobriety, transportation and phone-service
assistance, referrals for diagnostic assessments and psychological evaluations, parenting-
education services, visitation, respite care, parenting skills coaching, assistance with
obtaining an order for protection (OFP) against a boyfriend, changing the locks on her
door, and safety planning. In addition, the district court found the county “made numerous
offers to help [mother] establish ongoing supports,” which included “ARMHS services,
recovery support services, sexual assault support services, and domestic violence support
services.” The district court characterized these services as “extensive” and “beyond
reasonable” in responding to the needs of the family. Additionally, the district court
specifically found that “there are no additional services or programs that would likely
enable [mother] to assume custody of the children in the foreseeable future.”
On appeal, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it ruled
that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify the family. In
support of this argument, she does not contend that any of the district court’s underlying
findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Instead, she raises two general concerns with the
district court’s determination. We are not persuaded by either claim.

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Services Related to Domestic Violence
First, mother contends that the county’s “assistance in addressing her status as a
domestic violence survivor [was] lacking.” But mother does not identify any specific,
additional services that she believes the county should have reasonably provided to assist
mother in addressing her status as a domestic violence survivor. And, while the county
bears the burden of proving at the TPR trial that it put forth reasonable efforts, “[o]ur
caselaw does not allow us to presume error on appeal” and “any error must be made to
appear affirmatively before there can be reversal.” In the Matter of Welfare of Child. of
L.P., 36 N.W.3d 419, 430-31 (Minn. App. 2026) (quotation and citation omitted) (noting
that “[t]he burde n of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it” (quotation
omitted)). Further, mother did not raise this argument at the TPR trial. Therefore, the
argument is forfeited. See In In re Welfare of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 553 (Minn.
App. 2007) (determining that parent forfeited review of an issue not raised in district court
in a TPR proceeding); see also Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating
“[a] reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were
presented and considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before it” (quotation
omitted)).
Even so, mother’s argument lacks merit. At trial, the social worker testified that she
assisted mother in “work[ing] through the trauma of her . . . domestic violence relationship
she was in with her significant other.” Additionally, the trial record reflects that the county
offered mother a number of resources related to her status as a domestic violence survivor,
such as help obtaining an OFP against a boyfriend, changing the locks on mother’s door,

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making referrals to sexual assault programs and an ARMHS worker, and developing safety
plans. The county’s provision of these services refutes mother’s claim that the county did
not provide services relevant to mother’s status as a domestic violence survivor. See, e.g.,
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 386-87 (noting that a county’s assistance in offering mother mental
health and social services amounted to reasonable efforts to help with issues related to
domestic violence).
Children’s Mental Health Needs
Second, mother contends that the county failed to provide services “other than
parenting education” to help mother meet the children’s mental health needs and
consequently the services provided by the county were not reasonable. Mother argues that,
“Had she been provided therapeutic parenting education, she would have perhaps been able
to demonstrate her ability to meet the children’s mental health needs.” Here again, mother
raises an issue that she did not raise at trial and consequently this argument is forfeited.
See T.D., 731 N.W.2d at 553 (declining to reach issue not addressed in district court);
Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582 (same).
But even assuming the issue is properly before us, the argument is not persuasive.
Mother does not explain what “therapeutic parenting education” involves, whether this
type of education was available, and whether a basis exists to conclude that such education
could have helped mother meet the children’s mental health needs. In other words, mother
has not demonstrated how the absence of this service makes the county’s efforts
unreasonable. A county is not required to make every possible effort to reunify a family;
it is required to make reasonable efforts. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a). And “what

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constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ depends on the facts of each case.” J.H., 968 N.W.2d at
601.
Here, the district court found—and the record supports —that the county made
reasonable efforts in regard to the children’s mental health needs. These efforts included
intensive family-based services, trial home visits, and other services . The social worker
testified that the children had “high needs” and that the county provided services to ensure
mother could get the children to their mental- health appointments. But the social worker
also noted that mother was not consistently meeting this need. Based on the record
evidence, we reject mother’s claim that the county failed to provide reasonable efforts by
not offering “therapeutic parenting education.”
Conclusion Regarding Reasonable Efforts
In sum, the record supports the district court’s findings regarding the efforts the
county made, and those findings support the district court’s determination that those efforts
were reasonable. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination in
that regard.
II. The district court acted within its discretion by determining that a statutory
ground exists to terminate mother’s parental rights.

We next consider mother’s argument that the district court abused its discretion
when it determined that the county met its burden to show one or more statutory grounds
existed to support termination of mother’s parental rights. Again, we are not persuaded.
To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the district court must find that the county
established by clear and convincing evidence “one or more” of the statutory grounds set

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forth in section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b). Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b); In re
Child. of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005) (“In reviewing a decision to
terminate parental rights, the appellate court determines whether there is clear and
convincing evidence to support at least one statutory ground for termination . . . .”). If
clear and convincing evidence exists to support at least one of the statutory grounds found
by the district court, an appellate court need not address whether the other statutory grounds
found by the district court are supported by the record. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92
(confirming that appellate courts “need only one properly supported statutory ground in
order to affirm a termination order”).
Here, the district court concluded that the county proved by clear and convincing
evidence that four separate statutory grounds set forth in section 260C.301,
subdivision 1(b), existed to support termination of mother’s parental rights. For the reasons
discussed below, we conclude that the record supports the district court’s determination
that the county proved at least one statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence—
section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4). Accordingly, we limit our analysis to that statutory
ground. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4); see also J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92.
Under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4), a district court has grounds to
terminate a parent’s rights if “reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have
failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4). The statute includes a presumption that reasonable efforts have failed upon
a showing that: (1) “a child [of the age of the children at issue here] has resided out of the
parental home under court order for a cumulative period of 12 months within the preceding

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22 months”; (2) “the court has approved the out-of-home placement plan”; (3) the
“conditions leading to the out-of- home placement have not been corrected” as shown by
the parent not “substantially compl[ying] with the court’s orders and a reasonable case
plan”; and (4) “reasonable efforts have been made by the [county] to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family.” Id., subd. 1(b)(4)(i)-(iv).
The district court found that each of these four factors in subdivision 1(b)(iv) were
satisfied by clear and convincing evidence because: (1) the children were in out-of-home
placement for 1,002 days as of the date of trial; (2) case plans were prepared for the family
and approved by the district court; (3) mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the
out-of-home placement; and (4) the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother
and reunite the family.
Mother does not challenge the district court’s findings with respect to the first two
factors, which are supported by the record. Accordingly, we focus on the third and fourth
factors. We address these two factors in reverse order. As to the fourth factor, we conclude
that the record fully supports the district court’s determination that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify the family for the reasons that we discussed above. Thus, the
pivotal question is whether clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s
finding on the third factor—that mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-
of-home placement of the children.
When reviewing a district court’s factual findings for clear error, appellate courts
“view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings” and do not reweigh the evidence or
reconcile conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221

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(Minn. 2021); see also J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 601 n.6 (applying Kenney in a TPR appeal) .
Additionally, appellate courts “need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to
prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the [district] court.” Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation omitted). “[A]n appellate court’s duty is fully performed
after it has fairly considered all the evidence and has determined that the evidence
reasonably supports the decision.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court found that mother had failed to substantially comply with the
conditions in the case plan relating to (1) her chemical dependency and (2) her ability to
provide the children with a safe and stable home—conditions that led to the children’s out-
of-home placement. “It is presumed that conditions leading to a child’s out- of-home
placement have not been corrected upon a showing that the parent or parents have not
substantially complied with the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4)(iii). We discuss the findings on each of these conditions in turn
and discern no clear error by the district court in its findings.
First, as to chemical dependency, the case plan required mother to be a safe and
sober caregiver, obtain and maintain sobriety, complete a chemical- use assessment and
follow recommendations, and comply with UAs. Yet, despite the county’s efforts, the
district court found “that [mother] has not made sufficient progress in her recovery for the
court to be able to conclude that she is likely to remain sober” in the foreseeable future.
The district court noted that mother “has been seen in the community in alcohol related
situations twice recently and was not honest with her [chemical dependency counselor]
about one of those incidents.” Additionally, the district court found that mother had

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“recently been sanctioned for misuse of prescriptions.” These findings are supported by
the record and are not clearly erroneous.
Second, the case plan required mother to maintain a safe and stable home and ensure
the children had safe and sober caregivers. T he district court found that this condition of
the case plan was not met because mother “continued to engage in unhealthy relationships
with unsafe men involved in the criminal justice system.” The district court also noted that
mother “repeatedly acknowledged that she could not keep certain individuals out of her
home and out of her life and that she seemingly did not have the ability to maintain safe
boundaries for herself and her children.” The district court further found that mother’s
“repeated pattern of unsafe decision making” remained the “primary obstacle to her ability
to safely parent and provide a safe home environment for the children.” These findings
also are supported by the evidence at trial and are not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that mother
failed to correct the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement of the children.
In urging us to reverse, mother asks us to take a narrow view of the reasons the
children were removed from the home, arguing that her “use of methamphetamine” was
the sole reason that the children were removed from the home and further arguing that she
addressed her methamphetamine use. In support of her argument, she emphasizes there
was testimony that she was not using methamphetamine at the time of trial. But mother’s
argument ignores that the district court ordered the children removed from mother’s care
based not only on her methamphetamine use but also based on concerns about mother’s
ability to safely care for the children, lack of supervision of the children, and exposure to

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domestic violence. Additionally, mother’s use of methamphetamine raised concerns about
substance use generally. Consequently, the case plans required mother to be “a safe and
sober caregiver” and “maintain safe and stable housing and ensure the children have safe
and sober caregivers.” And, as discussed above, the record shows that the concerns about
both safety and substance use were not corrected by the time of trial. We therefore do not
consider this argument persuasive.
In sum, based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that the district court acted
within its discretion when it determined under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4), that
mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out- of-home placement,
even with reasonable efforts by the county.
III. The district court acted within its discretion by determining that it was in the
children’s best interests to terminate mother’s parental rights.

Lastly, we consider mother’s argument that the district court abused its discretion
by concluding that terminating her parental rights i s in the best interests of Child 1 and
Child 2. This argument is unavailing.
A child’s best interests are the “paramount consideration” in termination
proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a)
(2024). A district court may not terminate parental rights unless doing so is in the child’s
best interests even when a statutory basis exists to support termination. In re Welfare of
the Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. App. 2009). Courts are to balance three
factors when considering a child’s best interests: (1) “the child’s interest[s] in preserving
the parent-child relationship,” (2) “the parent’s interest[s] in preserving the parent-child

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relationship,” and (3) “any competing interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii); see also In re Welfare Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn.
App. 2018). The competing interests of the child “include such things as a stable
environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of Child. of
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn.
Jan. 6, 2012). Any “conflicts between the rights of the child and rights of the parents are
resolved in favor of the child.” Id. at 902. We review the district court’s best-interests
determination for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 905. “Because the best -interests analysis
involves credibility determinations and is generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s
global review of a record, we give considerable deference to the district court’s findings.”
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92 (quotation omitted).
The district court’s order included specific findings on the three best-interests
factors and concluded that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best interests
of the children. First, the district court found that Child 1 and Child 2 expressed a desire
to be reunited with mother. Second, the district court acknowledged mother’s “interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship.” Third, as to the children’s competing interests,
the district court found that “[Child 2] is in, and [Child 1 is] moving towards, a permanent
placement that is an adoption resource for them.” The district court also found that mother
was “not in a position where she could safely assume custody of the children.” In balancing
the interests, the district court stated that “any interest in preserving the [parent -child]
relationship would be nominal at best and would come at significant risk to the children.”

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Based upon its consideration of the three best-interests factors, the district court concluded
that “the balance overwhelmingly favors termination.”
This district court’s findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence
and we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in its weighing of the factors.
The district court heard testimony from the social worker that the children could not be
safely returned to mother at the time of trial or “at any point in the foreseeable future.” The
social worker testified that the children both had “a particular need to achieve permanency”
and that it was in their best interests to terminate mother’s parental rights. The GAL
similarly testified, “The children deserve and need stability of safe and suitable
housing . . . and to be with caregivers who can meet their needs.” The district court found
the testimony from the social worker and the GAL credible, and we defer to those
credibility assessments. See M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d at 374-75 (stating that fact-finding is the
domain of the district court, which is in a “superior position” to assess witness credibility).
The district court’s balancing of the three best-interests factors and its findings of fact
regarding the best-interests factors are well supported by the record.
To persuade us otherwise, mother argues that the district court’s findings are
inadequate and that the district court failed to properly weigh the preferences of the
children. Neither argument is persuasive.
First, mother contends that the district court’s findings are insufficient to allow for
meaningful appellate review. We disagree. A district court is not required to “go into great
detail” when evaluating the best-interests factors, In re Welfare of Child of W.L.P.,
678 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. App. 2004), so long as it “explain[s] why termination is in

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the best interests of the child,” D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d at 545. Here, the district court made
findings on each of the best-interests factors. And its decision reflects that it considered
the interests of mother, the children’s interests, and any competing interests of the children
in finding permanency. Based on the district court’s findings, which are supported by the
record, we are satisfied that the district court adequately explained its reasons for
concluding that termination was in the children’s best interests.
Second, mother argues that the district court disregarded the children’s testimony
that they preferred to be reunited with her. Both children expressed a preference to live
with mother. Here, the district court acknowledged that the children’s testimony that they
wanted to live with mother and found that the children’s “love and support” for mother was
“laudable and understandable.” But the district court reasoned that the children’s
preferences “[did] not reflect a sophisticated understanding of their needs and their
mother’s ability to meet those needs.” The district court further determined that the
children’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship did not outweigh the
competing needs of the children, which mother would be unable to meet “in the foreseeable
future.” After evaluating the best-interests factors, the district court concluded that “the
balance overwhelmingly favors termination.” We will not reweigh this assessment on
appeal. See Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting that
in the context of child-custody matters, the law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate
court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations”). We

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therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that it is in the
children’s best interests to terminate mother’s parental rights.
Affirmed.