In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Gregg Michael Dickey

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0513

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Gregg Michael Dickey.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Douglas County District Court
File No. 21-PR-25-2010

Alexis Madlom, Vickers Law Office, Fargo, North Dakota (for appellant Gregg Michael
Dickey)

Chad M. Larson, Douglas County Attorney, Timothy Hochsprung, Assistant County
Attorney, Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent Douglas County Social Services)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran , Judge; and Florey ,
Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
The district court civilly committed Gregg Dickey as mentally ill and dangerous to
the public after receiving physician reports that he is a danger to himself or others and
evidence of more than 16 years of violent behavior for which his mental incompetence
repeatedly foreclosed criminal prosecution. Dickey challenges the commitment decision
by arguing that the district court’s findings of his personality disorders are not supported

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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by the evidence and th at th e disorders do not constitute mental illness . He argues
alternatively that the evidence does not support the finding that he is a danger to himself
or others and that the commitment order lacks adequate findings. W e affirm because the
district court’s findings are sufficient to justify Dickey’s civil commitment and the
evidence supports the findings.
FACTS
Douglas County petitioned the district court for an order civilly committing Gregg
Dickey. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and in February 2026
determined that clear and convincing evidence established that Dickey is mentally ill and
dangerous, requiring his civil commitment. We summarize the evidence and the district
court’s findings of fact.
The district court received the opinion reports and testimony of Drs. Jay Lucas and
Harlan Gilbertson. Both physicians considered Dickey’s extensive history of violent
behavior spanning more than 16 years. This behavior resulted in numerous violated
protective orders, incarceration for stalking, and more than four assault-based criminal
allegations for some of which Dickey avoided prosecution because the court found him
incompetent to stand trial. Three recent incidents involved Dickey’s allegedly stabbing his
own son, firing a gun at a moving car on a street in Alexandria, and brandishing a replica
handgun while threatening to “blow [the] head off” the man at whom he was pointing it.
Dr. Lucas , but not Dr. Gilbertson, recommended civil commitment for s ecure,
inpatient treatment. Dr. Lucas had diagnosed Dickey with Antisocial Personality Disorder
(ASPD) and Paranoid Personality Disorder (PPD). Although Dr. Gilbertson concluded

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both that Dickey “presents a clear danger to the safety of others” and that “[t]here is a
substantial likelihood that [he] will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical
harm on another,” he declined to recommend civil commitment. He did so because he
disagreed that ASPD and PPD constituted a s ubstantial psychiatric disorde r, explaining
that he had “never seen the court commit someone as mentally ill with a personality
disorder beyond borderline personality disorder.” He acknowledged that his conclusion
rested only on his anecdotal experience in court proceedings rather than on any medical or
statutory basis.
The district court credited Dr. Lucas’s testimony that Dickey’s ASPD and PPD
diagnoses presented a substantial psychiatric disorder. It considered and rejected less -
restrictive alternatives to civil commitment, committing Dickey to the commissioner of
human services for treatment at a secure facility.
Dickey appeals.
DECISION
Dickey challenges the civil-commitment order, raising three arguments. He argues
first that his ASPD and PPD diagnoses were unsupported by the evidence and that, even if
this is not so, these are not substantial psychiatric disorders under the commitment statute.
He argues second that the district court erroneously found that his mental illness caused
him to be dangerous. And h e argues third that the district court’s findings are inadequate
for appellate review. His arguments fail.
We first address Dickey’s contentions arising from the district court’s reliance on
the ASPD and PPD diagnoses. The district court may civilly commit a person if clear and

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convincing evidence establishes that the person has a “mental illness and is dangerous to
the public.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a) (2024). A person is mentally ill i f he has a
“substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory that
grossly impairs [ his] judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or
understand.” Minn. Stat. § 253B. 02, subd. 17(1) (2024). The disorder must also be
demonstrated by “ faulty perceptions ” or “grossly disturbed behavior .” Id. Contrary to
Dickey’s argument, Dr. Lucas’s report and testimony support his ASPD and PPD
diagnoses. We will not disturb the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221–22 (Minn. 2021), and
we give substantial deference to its findings of expert-witness credibility, In re Knops, 536
N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). The findings on Dickey’s diagnoses have ample support
in the record based on Dr. Lucas’s testimony and thorough expert report. Although Dr.
Gilbertson saw no PPD symptoms unattributable to his stimulant use , Dr. Lucas testified
that Dickey manifested delusional beliefs and paranoia that sexual predators were
omnipresent, imminent threats . We will not revisit the district court’s weighing of
competing expert testimony or substitute it with our own.
We are also satisfied that the evidence supports the district court’s determination
that Dickey’s diagnoses met the statutory threshold for a substantial psychiatric disorder.
The commitment statute does not identify specific mental-health conditions that qualify as
substantial psychiatric disorders. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17(1). We interpreted a
previous version of the commitment statute to hold that a personality disorder, coupled
with a person’s loss of ability to control his actions, may constitute a substantial psychiatric

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disorder. In re El-Rashad, 411 N.W.2d 567, 569–70 (Minn. App. 1987). Dr. Lucas testified
that Dickey suffers from paranoia and delusions arising from his PPD , specifically
referencing Dickey’s fear that sexual predators are imminent threats to him. This testimony
and corroborative evidence support the finding that Dickey suffers from a substantial
psychiatric disorder.
We are similarly u nconvinced by Dickey’s argument that the evidence d oes not
show that his mental illness causes his dangerousness. The district court can civilly commit
a person with a substantial psychiatric disorder if the person also poses a clear danger to
others because of the disorder. Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17(2) (2024). A clear danger
is demonstrated by two elements—an “overt act” to cause serious physical harm to another
and the substantial likelihood of causing serious physical harm to others. Id. Only one overt
act is sufficient to support commitment. In re Hofmaster, 434 N.W.2d 279, 281–82 (Minn.
App. 1989). Whether an overt act is supported by the evidence is a question of law that we
review de novo. In re Civ. Commitment of Carroll , 706 N.W.2d 527, 530 (Minn. App.
2005). Our careful review of the law and record satisfies us that at least one alleged incident
constitutes an overt act and supports the district court’s conclusion that Dickey poses a risk
to the safety of others. The district court recounted the relevant evidence this way:
Both examiners agree that Respondent has made a recent
attempt or threats to physically harm self or others; that
Respondent presents a clear danger to the safety of others as
demonstrated by the fact that he has engaged in an overt act
causing or attempti ng to cause serious physical harm to
another. These acts include Respondent shooting an occupied
vehicle traveling on a city street in Alexandria on April 19,
2025; Respondent putting his son in a “bear hug” and stabbing
him on June 11, 2025; and Respondent displaying a firearm

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and threatening to kill a member of the public at a storage unit
on October 22, 2025. For contextual purposes, the court also
considered the ten felony criminal complaints attached to the
Petition -- the majority of which charge Respondent with
assaultive or domestic-related offenses dating back to 2019.

Both t he overt -act element and likelihood of future harm are well supported by the
evidence.
Dickey argues unconvincingly that the district court’s fact findings and legal
conclusions are insufficient for appellate review. In the context of civil commitments,
district courts must make fact findings specifically and state conclusions of law separately.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2(a) (2024). If it orders commitment, the district court must
also identify the person’s conduct that satisfies each element for commitment. Id . A
commitment order is not sufficient for appellate review if its findings are conclusory or not
meaningfully tied to its legal conclusions. In re Civ. Commitment of Spicer , 853 N.W.2d
803, 8 10–11 (Minn. App. 2014). We have carefully examined the district court’s fact
findings and see them as sufficiently developed for us to adequately review its commitment
decision. Contrary to Dickey’s assertions, the findings are not merely conclusory but are
supported by reason and reference to the evidence. And the commitment order
meaningfully ties his substantial psychiatric disorder to his dangerousness by identifying
the disorder and its manifestations.
Affirmed.