State of Minnesota v. Michael John Feehan

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0524

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Michael John Feehan,
Respondent.

Filed September 14, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Wheelock, Judge
Dissenting, Harris, Judge

Freeborn County District Court
File No. 24-CR-25-1389

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David J. Walker, Freeborn County Attorney, Albert Lea, Minnesota (for appellant)

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Wheelock , Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this pretrial appeal, appellant State of Minnesota argues that the district court
erred by applying the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence discovered by a private party
following an unlawful citizen’s arrest. Because the exclusionary rule does not apply absent
unlawful government conduct, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
On September 2, 2025, the state charged respondent Michael John Feehan with
first-degree possession of methamphetamine in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021,
subd. 2(a)(1) (Supp. 2025).1 Feehan filed motions to dismiss and to suppress the evidence
obtained as a result of an unlawful citizen’s arrest, and after a contested omnibus hearing,
the district court granted both motions in a March 18, 2026 order. The facts set forth here
are drawn from that order; the parties do not dispute these factual findings on appeal.
On August 29, 2025, Feehan attempted to enter a security checkpoint at the entrance
to a music festival at Harmony Park in Freeborn County. Security for the festival was
managed by Phoenix Security Contractors, a private company that provides security
services to music festivals around the country.2 Howard Johnston was serving as Phoenix’s
director of security for the event that day.

1 A person is guilty of this felony if “the person unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures
of a total weight of 50 grams or more containing cocaine or methamphetamine.” Id.

2 “Security guard” is defined in Minn. Stat. § 626.88, subd. 1(c) (2024), and a security
guard’s duties include the “prevention or detection of intrusion, unauthorized entry or
activity,” “control, regulation, or direction of the flow or movements of the public . . . to

3
As Feehan approached the checkpoint, security staff asked him to allow a bag search
before entering the park, and he “took off” in the opposite direction. Some of the security
staff pursued Feehan into the parking lot “to determine why he refused the search and to
ensure he would not throw his belongings over the fence or try to re-enter the park through
another gate,” and they called Johnston to assist. Johnston arrived at the parking lot and
asked to search Feehan’s bag, and Feehan eventually handed his backpack to Johnston.
Johnston later claimed that Feehan then tried to wrestle the backpack away and grabbed
Johnston’s genitalia and that Johnston saw narcotics in Feehan’s backpack during the
altercation. Johnston then took Feehan and the backpack to the security command center
and called police.
A Freeborn County sheriff’s deputy responded and arrived wearing a body camera
that recorded his interactions at the scene. The body-worn-camera footage was admitted
as an exhibit at the omnibus hearing. The footage shows that, as the deputy arrives and
exits his vehicle, he is met by Johnston, who directs him to an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on
which were displayed several bags that appeared to contain a large amount of narcotics and
Feehan’s backpack. Johnston said that, when he opened the bag, he found $2,000,
narcotics, and a large amount of marijuana. The deputy immediately recognized the
narcotics as methamphetamine and arrested Feehan.

assure protection of private property,” “protection of individuals from bodily harm,” and
“enforcement of policies and rules of the security guard’s employer related to crime
reduction insofar as such enforcement falls within the scope of [the] security guard ’s
duties.”

4
At the omnibus hearing, Johnston testified, but the district court did not find him
credible. Johnston testified that he never opened or took any items out of Feehan’s
backpack; however, the body-worn-camera footage shows that the drugs were laid out on
the ATV, outside of Feehan’s backpack, when the deputy arrived. The district court did
not credit Johnston’s testimony that he saw a felony amount of drugs in the backpack
during the alleged altercation between him and Feehan. Johnston also claimed that he
handcuffed Feehan, but in the deputy’s body-worn-camera footage, Feehan was not
handcuffed. The district court found that the inconsistencies in Johnston’s testimony
“weigh heavily against [his] reliability.”
The district court determined that Johnston did not lawfully arrest Feehan pursuant
to Minnesota’s citizen’s arrest statute, Minn. Stat. § 629.37 (2024), 3 because he did not
have probable cause to arrest Feehan for a felony-level drug offense and the district court
did not find Johnston’s testimony that Feehan assaulted him to be credible. The district
court also addressed Johnston’s search of Feehan’s backpack, determining that
section 629.37 does not allow for investigating or securing evidence and, thus, any
independent search of an arrestee’s belongings exceeds the citizen’s arrest power.

3 A private person may arrest another:
(1) for a public offense committed or attempted
in the arresting person’s presence;
(2) when the person arrested has committed a
felony, although not in the arresting person’s presence; or
(3) when a felony has in fact been committed,
and the arresting person has reasonable cause for believing the
person arrested to have committed it.
Id.

5
The district court then concluded that any subsequent search by the deputy was
lawful because the private-search doctrine applied. 4 However, because Johnston lacked
authority to arrest Feehan or investigate the contents of his backpack, the district court also
determined that the evidence must be suppressed and granted Feehan’s motion to suppress.
The state appeals.
DECISION
The state argues that the district court erred by suppressing the evidence because the
private-search doctrine applies and suppression is not a remedy for an unlawful private
search that was not conducted by the government. Feehan argues that suppression is the
proper remedy for a violation of the citizen’s arrest statute. Because the parties do not
dispute that Johnston was acting solely as a private citizen distinct from law enforcement,
that Johnston’s arrest of Feehan was unlawful, and that Johnston’s search of Feehan’s bag
was not authorized by the citizen’s arrest statute, the state’s appeal is focused on the narrow
issue of whether suppression is appropriate on these facts. We first set forth the standard
of review and address the threshold critical-impact requirement for the state’s appeal; we
then address the exclusionary rule; and finally, we turn to Feehan’s argument that the
proper statutory remedy for an unlawful citizen’s arrest is suppression of resulting
evidence.

4 The private-search doctrine allows for a government agent to duplicate searches
previously performed by private parties without violating the constitution. State v. Pauli,
979 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 2022).

6
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
(Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2007)). Whether the
exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evidence in a particular case is a question of
law. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn. 2004).
In a pretrial appeal, the state must first establish “clearly and unequivocally” that
the district court’s ruling will have a “critical impact” on the state’s ability to prosecute the
charge. State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). Because
the district court’s order resulted in dismissal of the charge, the state has demonstrated
critical impact on its ability to prosecute. See State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 684
(Minn. 2009) (concluding that dismissal of DWI charges demonstrated critical impact).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The exclusionary
rule prohibits evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure in violation of an
individual’s constitutional rights from being used in a criminal proceeding against the
individual. State v. Douglas, 29 N.W.3d 187, 191 (Minn. 2025). Evidence seized in
violation of the constitution generally must be suppressed. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d
163, 178 (Minn. 2007).
The United States Supreme Court appears to have limited the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to deterring police misconduct. State v. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d 566, 572
(Minn. 2024) (citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 246 (2011)). But Minnesota

7
precedent “does not limit us to considering whether exclusion deters only police
misconduct.” Id. at 577. Instead, “we recognize other purposes served by exclusion,
including the related goal of more generally deterring unlawful government conduct.” Id.
at 578.
Protections from warrantless searches and seizures “are intended as a restraint on
the activities of the government, not the actions of private parties.” Pauli, 979 N.W.2d at
46. And the state may use evidence obtained through a private search. State v. Dexter,
941 N.W.2d 388, 394 (Minn. 2020).5 Accordingly, “a private search, even if unreasonable,
will not result in evidence seized being suppressed because there is no constitutional
violation.” Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 617-18. “[N]o matter how egregious the conduct of
[the private party] in making these searches, the contraband [is] properly admitted into
evidence if, at the time, he enjoyed the status of a private citizen.” Id. at 617; see also State
v. LaRose, 174 N.W.2d 247, 248 ( Minn. 1970) (per curiam) (“We hold that the
exclusionary rule adopted in the Miranda case has no application with respect to a citizen’s
arrest.”).
There was no unlawful government conduct here. The parties do not dispute that
Johnston was acting as a private citizen and not on behalf of the government, his arrest of
Feehan was unlawful, and he did not have authority to search Feehan’s belongings. No
matter how unreasonable Johnston’s conduct as a private party, Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at

5 But if a private person acts as an agent of the state when conducting a search, then the
protections of the Fourth Amendment apply. State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Minn.
1990). Neither party argues that Johnston was acting as an agent of the state.

8
617-18, no constitutional violation occurred, and the exclusionary rule does not require
suppression of the evidence, see Pauli, 979 N.W.2d at 46; Dexter, 941 N.W.2d at 394. We
have previously rejected arguments for suppression of evidence obtained by a private
security guard not acting on behalf of the government. See State v. Jones, No. A04-841,
2005 WL 1088525, at *2 (Minn. App. May 10, 2005) (concluding that statements and
evidence obtained through a citizen’s arrest by private security were not subject to
suppression pursuant to the exclusionary rule), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2005).6
The district court relied on two opinions to support its decision to suppress the
evidence obtained by Johnston’s search of Feehan’s backpack: State, Lake Minnetonka
Conservation District v. Horner, 617 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2000), and State v. Stall,
845 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. App. 2014). We are not persuaded that these opinions are
apposite.
In Horner, special deputies of the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Department were
patrolling Lake Minnetonka for waterway violations. 617 N.W.2d at 791. The special
deputies were authorized by ordinance to issue citations and enforce laws and regulations
governing, among other things, “water, boat, vehicle or traffic safety.” Id. at 793 (quotation
omitted). The special deputies saw a boat that appeared to be missing the required
registration. Id. at 791. After pulling alongside the boat, the special deputies observed
open alcoholic beverages, noticed signs of intoxication, and ordered Horner, the boat’s
driver, to board the special deputies’ patrol boat. Id. The special deputies then

6 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but may be cited for their persuasive
value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

9
administered field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test before calling the deputy
sheriff. Id. The deputy sheriff, who was a licensed peace officer,7 arrived, arrested Horner,
and administered an implied-consent advisory and a breathalyzer test to him. Horner,
617 N.W.2d at 791.
The supreme court determined that the special deputies were not peace officers and
were not otherwise authorized to administer the tests. Id. at 794. It then explained that the
citizen’s arrest statute does not authorize investigating or securing evidence and that,
therefore, the special deputies were not authorized to investigate whether Horner was
intoxicated. Id. at 795. It concluded that the results of the field sobriety and preliminary
breath tests administered by the special deputies were properly suppressed. Id. at 796.
However, because the citizen’s arrest was supported by probable cause and “properly
effected” and the deputy sheriff was authorized to administer tests, the deputy sheriff’s
subsequent breathalyzer test was admissible. Id.
In Stall, a commercial vehicle inspector for the Minnesota State Patrol set up a
roadside inspection site to weigh potato trucks. 845 N.W.2d at 247. The inspector stopped
Stall’s vehicle, checked Stall’s driving record, learned that Stall’s driving privileges had

7 “Peace officer” is defined as follows:
an employee of a political subdivision or state law enforcement
agency who is licensed pursuant to sections 626.84 to 626.863
charged with the prevention and detection of crime and the
enforcement of the general criminal laws of the state and who
has full power of arrest, and shall also include Minnesota state
troopers, state conservation officers, park police, and
University of Minnesota police officers.
Minn. Stat. § 626.88, subd. 1(b) (2024).

10
been cancelled, and called a state trooper to assist. Id. The inspector then conducted a full
inspection of Stall’s truck and issued a citation. Id. The state trooper then arrested Stall
for driving after cancellation. Id. This court determined that no state statute authorized
non-peace-officer state-patrol employees to stop vehicles and reversed the district court
because Stall’s motion to suppress should have been granted. Id. at 248.
Here, the district court applied Horner and Stall after concluding that they are
factually similar to Feehan’s circumstances and suppressed the evidence found in Feehan’s
backpack after his unlawful arrest. But there is one critical distinction between Feehan’s
case and those cases. In Horner and Stall, the unreasonable searches and seizures were
conducted by the government. While both opinions analyzed the citizen’s arrest statute
because both cases involved actors who were not peace officers and did not otherwise have
authority for their actions, the actors were employed by the government and were acting
upon what they believed to be their governmental authority. Therefore, while
constitutional considerations were not addressed explicitly in either opinion, suppression
was appropriate because it was consistent with a recognized purpose served by the
exclusionary rule— deterring unlawful government conduct. See Malecha, 3 N.W.3d at
578. But, here, Johnston is a private individual who acted with no government
involvement. The distinction between Feehan’s case and Horner and Stall is significant
and renders them inapposite.
According to the undisputed facts, after Phoenix Security called the police to report
a crime, a deputy sheriff arrived, saw the narcotics, and arrested Feehan, the person
believed to have committed an offense . Rather than deterring unlawful government

11
conduct, application of the exclusionary rule here would punish proper government
conduct, based on the conduct of a completely unrelated private individual who acted
outside of his statutory authority. We conclude that there is no unlawful government
conduct to deter here and the exclusionary rule should not be applied because the purpose
of the rule is not served in this case.
Having determined that application of the exclusionary rule is not proper because
there was no unlawful government conduct, we address whether suppression is an
appropriate remedy for a violation of the citizen’s arrest statute.
Not all statutory violations require suppression of evidence. State v. Mike,
919 N.W.2d 103, 110 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. granted (Minn. Nov. 13, 2018) and ord.
granting rev. vacated (Minn. Aug. 20, 2019). “[V]iolation of a statute or rule does not
require suppression of evidence obtained as a result of the violation unless the violation
undermines the purpose of the statute or rule.” Id. at 111. Feehan does not cite any
authority to support his argument that exclusion of resulting evidence is a proper remedy
for a violation of the citizen’s arrest statute. Instead, Feehan relies entirely on Horner to
support his argument that the district court properly suppressed the evidence as a remedy
for Johnston’s violation of the citizen’s arrest statute. Feehan asserts that the case stands
for the proposition that, if the citizen’s arrest violated section 629.37, the evidence should
be suppressed.
Feehan’s reliance on Horner is misplaced, however, because Horner involved
unlawful conduct by government actors. The citizen’s arrest statute is silent on a remedy
for an unlawful citizen’s arrest, and we cannot “add words to the statute that the Legislature

12
did not supply.” Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted). Furthermore, we are reluctant to recognize a new remedy because
“determining public policy is a job better performed by the legislature.” Id. at 506
(quotation omitted).
We are not persuaded that exclusion of evidence is the remedy for an unlawful
citizen’s arrest when a private citizen who makes an unlawful arrest may be held civilly
liable in tort for claims such as false arrest, false imprisonment, battery, or assault. See,
e.g., Ward v. Nat’l Car Rental Sys., 290 N.W.2d 441, 442 (Minn. 1980) (tort liability
arising from false arrest when private citizen instigated the formal arrest of the plaintiff
without reasonable cause); Nelson v. Halvorson, 135 N.W. 818-19 (Minn. 1912) (false
imprisonment). The district court noted that “Johnston engaged in intimidating or
questionable tactics that required Mr. Feehan to involuntarily relinquish control of his
backpack to Mr. Johnston” and that Johnston’s actions pose “a particularly serious threat
to an individual’s privacy.” We conclude that these are public-policy concerns for which
the remedy appears to exist in common law and that the creation of a statutory exclusionary
rule in these circumstances is a task for the legislature. See Lake George Park, L.L.C. v.
IBM Mid-Am. Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 576 N.W.2d 463, 466 (Minn. App. 1998) (stating
that “[t]his court, as an error correcting court, is without authority to change the law”), rev.
denied (Minn. June 17, 1998).
In sum, we conclude that the exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress evidence
obtained from an unlawful citizen’s arrest when there was no unlawful government

13
conduct. Therefore, the district court erred by granting Feehan’s motion to suppress and
we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.

D-1
HARRIS, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent1. The district court properly suppressed the evidence because
Feehan was illegally arrested and investigated by a private citizen, in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 629.37 (2024), and suppression of the evidence is an
appropriate remedy for the violation of the statute.
Minnesota Statutes section 629.37 permits a private person to arrest another in
limited circumstances. These limited circumstances are:
(1) for a public offense committed or attempted in the
arresting person’s presence;
(2) when the person arrested has committed a felony,
although not in the arresting person’s presence; or
(3) when a felony has in fact been committed, and the
arresting person has reasonable cause for believing the person
arrested to have committed it.

Minn. Stat. § 629.37.
Furthermore, when a private person makes an arrest under section 629.37,
Minnesota law requires the private person to “take the arrested person before a judge or to
a peace officer without unnecessary delay.” Minn. Stat. § 629.39 (2024).
In State v. Horner, 617 N.W.2d 789, 794-96 (Minn. 2000), the Minnesota Supreme
Court interpreted the scope of section 629.37 and made clear that the authority granted to
private citizens is narrow. The supreme court held that section 629.37 does not authorize
private citizens to conduct criminal investigations after making a citizen’s arrest. Id. at
795. The supreme court expressly stated: “We therefore hold that citizens are not

1 I agree with the majority that because the district court’s order resulted in dismissal of the
charge, the state has demonstrated critical impact on its ability to prosecute.

D-2
authorized to conduct investigations after observing a public offense committed in the
citizen’s presence under Minn. Stat. § 629.37.” Id. It also recognized suppression as the
appropriate remedy for evidence obtained through conduct that exceeds the authority
granted by the statute. Id. at 796. Horner noted that evidence derived from the
unauthorized private investigation was suppressed, while evidence obtained by law
enforcement was admitted because the underlying citizen’s arrest itself was lawful. Id. at
794-96. Accordingly, Horner establishes three principles relevant here. First, private
citizens may not conduct criminal investigations beyond the authority granted by section
629.37. Id. at 795. Second, evidence obtained through such unauthorized investigations
is subject to suppression. Id. at 796. Third, where the citizen’s arrest itself violates section
629.37, suppression is also the appropriate remedy. Id.
The majority attempts to distinguish Horner by asserting that, although the supreme
court analyzed the citizen’s-arrest statute, the actors remained government employees who
believed they were exercising governmental authority and therefore conducted
governmental searches and seizures. That distinction misses a critical point. The supreme
court expressly analyzed the actors in Horner as private citizens. In Horner, the supreme
court held that special deputies were not “peace officers” under Minnesota law because
they did not have the necessary training and certification required by state law. Id. at 791,
794. It emphasized that state law does not explicitly recognize special deputies as peace
officers and does not contemplate that anyone other than peace officers will administer
tests for intoxication. Id. at 794. The supreme court concluded that the special deputies’
actions were equivalent to those of private citizens, stating: “Because we hold that special

D-3
deputies are not peace officers, we consider their actions as equivalent to those of private
citizens.” Id. Thus, the supreme court’s analysis turned on the legal authority the actors
possessed—not on their governmental employment or their subjective belief that they were
acting under governmental authority.
Here, the district court determined that Johnston, the private citizen, lacked probable
cause to arrest Feehan for a felony drug offense and that his subsequent inspection and
removal of items from the backpack exceeded any authority granted by section 629.37.
The district court expressly treated Johnston as a private citizen, rejected his account of an
assault,
2 found no credible basis that he observed a felony amount of narcotics before
opening and searching the backpack, 3 and concluded that his actions constituted an
unauthorized arrest and investigatory search beyond the statute’s limits.4 The district court
concluded that both the citizen’s arrest of Feehan and the subsequent private investigation
violated section 629.37. The district court found that Johnston lacked probable cause to
carry out a lawful citizen’s arrest and therefore acted outside the authority conferred by the

2 The district court found Johnston’s testimony not credible. It found that the Freeborn
county deputy’s testimony was credible and relied on a deputy’s body-worn camera (BWC)
footage. The district court also rejected Johnston’s testimony that there was any type of
physical altercation.

3 The district court rejected Johnston’s testimony that he did not take anything out of
Feehan’s backpack based on the BWC footage, which shows baggies of methamphetamine
already laid out on the hood of an ATV when the deputy arrived.

4 The district court excluded the drugs and dismissed the case, concluding that Johnston’s
conduct amounted to an unauthorized citizen’s arrest and illegal search of Feehan and that
it was therefore unnecessary to decide whether Johnston was acting as an agent or
instrument of the government at the time.

D-4
statute. The district court further determined that, under Horner, Johnston’s subsequent
investigation was independently unlawful because section 629.37 does not authorize a
private investigation following a citizen’s arrest. The state does not challenge the district
court’s findings of fact.
The state contends that suppression is unavailable absent police misconduct. The
district court concluded that suppression was appropriate to enforce section 629.37. The
district court’s order reasoned that citizens cannot conduct investigations after an arrest and
that evidence obtained from Johnston’s unauthorized investigatory search must be
suppressed. Having found both the arrest and investigation unlawful, the district court
suppressed the resulting evidence. In doing so, the district court correctly applied Horner.
Indeed, this case presents an even stronger basis for suppression than Horner. There,
evidence derived from an unauthorized private investigation following a citizen’s arrest
was suppressed. Id. at 794-96. But the supreme court concluded that the citizen’s arrest
was lawful and therefore declined to suppress evidence subsequently obtained by law
enforcement. Id. at 794-96. Here, by contrast, the district court found that the citizen’s
arrest itself lacked probable cause and was unlawful from the start. If suppression was
warranted for evidence derived from the unlawful private investigation following a
citizen’s arrest in Horner, it follows with even stronger reason that suppression is
warranted where both the arrest and the investigation violate the statute.
Within the posture of this case, where the state does not challenge the district court’s
factual findings on Johnston’s lack of authority, and where the district court separately
determined that law enforcement did not exceed the private search, the question is reduced

D-5
to whether the statutory violation requires suppression. On this record and under the
district court’s unchallenged findings, I would find no legal error in the court’s
determination that suppression and dismissal were warranted as the direct product of
Johnston’s unlawful arrest and investigation.
Next, the state argues that, because a private actor first conducted the search and
displayed the contents of the search in plain view, the deputy’s observation and subsequent
seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment and did not exceed the scope of the private
search.
The district court considered whether law enforcement’s subsequent conduct
violated the Fourth Amendment. Relying on the BWC footage and the deputy’s testimony,
the district court found that the methamphetamine had already been removed from Feehan
and was in plain view when the deputy arrived. Further, the district court found that the
deputy took no additional investigative steps that infringed on any reasonable expectation
of privacy beyond the scope of the prior private search. Applying the private-search
doctrine, it concluded that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because Johnston was
not acting as a government agent and law enforcement did not exceed the scope of the
antecedent private search.
That Fourth Amendment analysis, however, did not alter the district court’s
suppression ruling.
5 The district court did not suppress the evidence because law

5 The majority’s discussion of the exclusionary rule is misplaced. The majority concludes
that the exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress evidence obtained following an
unlawful citizen’s arrest when the arrest did not involve unlawful government con duct.
But the district court was neither presented with nor did it decide that issue. Rather, the

D-6
enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment. Rather, it suppressed the evidence because
it concluded that the evidence was obtained through a private person’s conduct that violated
Minnesota Statutes section 629.37 and exceeded the authority conferred by that statute
following Feehan’s arrest. The constitutional and statutory inquiries were distinct, and the
absence of a constitutional violation did not negate the statutory violation that the district
court determined required suppression. Accordingly, determining that suppression was
warranted on statutory grounds, the district court found it unnecessary to decide whether
Johnston acted as a government agent, because its suppression order rested solely on its
interpretation and application of Minnesota Statutes section 629.37, rather than on any
constitutional violation.
As stated above, the state does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the
citizen’s arrest and subsequent private investigation violated section 629.37. Nor does the
state contend that Horner is distinguishable or was wrongly decided. Instead, the state
argues only that suppression was improper because law enforcement’s conduct complied
with the private-search doctrine and therefore did not violate Feehan’s constitutional rights.
This argument fails because it does not address the actual basis for the district court’s
ruling. The suppression order rests on a statutory violation, not a constitutional one. The
state identifies no authority holding that suppression is unavailable when evidence is
obtained through a violation of section 629.37. To the contrary, Horner treated suppression

district court’s decision rested solely on whether suppression is an available remedy under
Minnesota Statutes section 629.37. Accordingly, whether the exclusionary rule applies in
the absence of unlawful government conduct was not before the district court and was not
necessary to its decision.

D-7
as the appropriate remedy for evidence derived from conduct exceeding the authority
granted by the citizen’s-arrest statute. Id. at 796. Thus, the question before us is not
whether law enforcement independently violated the Fourth Amendment. The question is
whether evidence obtained through an unlawful citizen’s arrest and unauthorized private
investigation may be suppressed under section 629.37. Horner answers that question in
the affirmative.
I would therefore conclude that the district court correctly determined that Johnston
lacked probable cause to arrest Feehan and that the subsequent private investigation
exceeded the authority granted by section 629.37. The district court then properly followed
controlling precedent and suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of those statutory
violations. Because the state has not challenged the district court’s statutory analysis and
has offered no persuasive basis for departing from Horner, I would affirm the suppression
order. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.