Robert E. Villanueva v. GEICO Casualty Company, et al

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0557

Robert E. Villanueva,
Appellant,

vs.

GEICO Casualty Company, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed October 12, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-25-17498

Robert E. Villanueva, Edina, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Matthew Beyer, Husch Blackwell LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant was involved in a car accident and reached a settlement with respondent
insurance company, the insurer for the other vehicle involved in the collision. Appellant
then sued the insurance company and two of its agents, alleging that it wrongfully
disregarded a repair estimate and considered improper factors when declaring his vehicle
a total loss. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon

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which relief can be granted, and the district court granted the motion. On appeal, appellant
contends that the district court erred because it failed to treat his amended complaint as the
operative pleading when deciding respondents’ motion to dismiss, and because it
misapplied the law by failing to accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true. We affirm.
FACTS
The following facts stem from the complaint and are taken as true, construing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Halva v. Minn. State Colls. &
Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 2021). Appellant Robert E. Villanueva’s vehicle was
damaged in a collision with another vehicle in July 2025. The other vehicle was insured
by respondent GEICO Casualty Company (GEICO). GEICO determined the actual cash
value (ACV) of the vehicle was $9,282.97 and the salvage value was $1,898.88.
Villanueva obtained a supplemental repair estimate from a licensed repair facility, which
estimated that it would cost $5,387.12 to fix Villanueva’s vehicle.
GEICO subsequently declared Villanueva’s vehicle a total loss and offered him a
settlement amount of $7,384.09 (ACV minus salvage). Villanueva believed that GEICO
improperly disregarded the supplemental repair estimate that he obtained and considered
improper factors when declaring his vehicle a total loss. During a recorded phone call with
a GEICO claims representative, the representative dismissed the repair estimate.
According to Villanueva, the representative stated, “We use our numbers,” and “I’m not
worried about the second estimate.” The representative also stated that “alignment issues”
and rental costs would be factored into the total loss determination, even though the
supplemental repair estimate ruled out alignment issues. During the phone call, the

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representative set the phone down and ignored Villanueva until prompted. Villanueva
interpreted the representative’s actions as “disregard[ing] [ Villanueva’s] statutory rights
and GEICO’s obligations to provide [a] fair explanation.”
Villanueva ultimately signed the settlement offer but felt coerced into doing so. The
representative threatened Villanueva that if he did not sign the settlement, “storage fees
would pile up,” and he would no longer have rental vehicle coverage, leaving him without
transportation. After Villanueva accepted the settlement, Villanueva’s vehicle was given
a salvage title . The salvage title “caus[ed ] permanent diminished value [and] financial
harm,” as well as “emotional distress” for Villanueva. Villanueva believes: “These
incidents are not isolated mistakes but part of a documented pattern of arbitrary and
coercive claims handling.” And he also believes that his case is not an isolated incident.
Instead, according to Villanueva, “GEICO engages in these practices systematically,
improperly inflating total-loss determinations for other consumers in Minnesota.”
Twenty days after signing the settlement, Villanueva sued GEICO and two of its
agents, respondents Chad Brozik and Dustin McHugh. The complaint sets forth six counts.
Count I alleges GEICO arbitrarily disregarded a valid repair estimate from an agreed
estimating system in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 72B.092, subdivision 1(7)
(2024). Count II claims GEICO engaged in unfair claims handling practices in violation
of Minnesota Statutes section 72A.201 (2024). Count III alleges that GEICO acted in bad
faith in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 604.18 (2024). Count IV alleges
that GEICO engaged in deceptive trade practices in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
325F.69 (2024). Count V claims GEICO coerced Villanueva into accepting the settlement

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agreement and salvage title. And count VI sets forth a claim for punitive damages under
Minnesota Statutes section 549.20 (2024) based on allegations that GEICO acted with a
willful indifference to Villanueva’s rights.
Before GEICO responded, Villanueva filed an amended complaint, setting forth two
additional counts.1 Count VII is labeled “Private Attorney General Action” and refences
Minnesota Statutes section 8.31, subdivision 3a (2024). The c ount VII states that
“[Villanueva’s] claims expose systemic insurer misconduct that affects Minnesota
consumers, satisfying the public benefit requirement.” Count VIII alleges that GEICO
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “by knowingly misapplying
Minnesota’s total-loss formula, coercing acceptance under duress, and terminating
coverage to pressure [Villanueva].”
GEICO moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 12.02(e). 2 After a hearing, the district court granted GEICO’s motion and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The district court’s analysis addressed only the six
counts in the original complaint. But in a footnote, the district court stated: “[Villanueva]
filed an Amended Complaint before a response to the original Complaint was even due.
The Court is limiting its inquiry to the original Complaint as the operative pleading, but
the result would be the same.”

1 The facts alleged in the amended complaint are almost identical to the facts alleged in the
original complaint. The amended complaint incorporated “all factual allegations and
exhibits” from the original complaint.

2 GEICO’s motion treated the amended complaint as the operative pleading and addressed
all eight counts.

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Villanueva appeals.

DECISION
Villanueva challenges the district court’s order dismissing his complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 12.02(e).
This court reviews whether a complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief
de novo. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014). In doing so, this
court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construes all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. But this court is “not bound by legal
conclusions stated in a complaint.” Herbert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235
(Minn. 2008). And we “must disregard any error or defect . . . which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be
ignored); see also Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2008) (citing this
aspect of Rule 61); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn. 1987) (“Although
error may exist, unless the error is prejudicial, no grounds exist for reversal.”).
Villanueva raises two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the district court
erred by failing to consider the amended complaint in granting GEICO’s motion to dismiss.
He next contends that the district court misapplied Rule 12.02(e) by failing to accept the
facts alleged in the complaint as true and misapplying the law. We address each argument
in turn and conclude that neither argument merits reversal of the district court’s decision.

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I. The district court erred by failing to consider the amended complaint, but this
error was harmless.

Villanueva asserts that the district court’s failure to consider the amended complaint
as the operative pleading constitutes reversible error. We agree that the district court erred
by not considering the amended complaint in deciding the motion to dismiss but conclude
the error did not affect Villanueva’s substantial rights.
Under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, Villanueva was permitted to amend
his complaint one time before the responsive pleading was served. See Minn. R. Civ.
P. 15.01. Here, Villanueva filed his amended complaint before GEICO served its answer
and before GEICO moved to dismiss. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 7.01 (designating an answer as
a type of pleading); see also Sharkey v. City of Shoreview, 853 N.W.2d 832, 835 (Minn.
App. 2014) (concluding that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading). And GEICO
responded to the amended complaint in its motion. Therefore, the district court should
have treated the amended complaint as the operative pleading in addressing the motion to
dismiss.
The amended complaint added two counts that the district court did not analyze.
Count VII is labeled “Private Attorney General Action” and references Minnesota Statutes
section 8.31, subdivision 3a. This statutory provision permits “any person injured by a
violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1 [to] bring a civil action and recover
damages, . . . and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court.” Minn. Stat.
§ 8.31, subd. 3a. Subdivision 1 refers to the laws of “this state respecting unfair,
discriminatory, and other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade” and includes

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a non-exclusive list of statutory provisions. Id., subd. 1 (2024). Count VII of Villanueva’s
amended complaint states that “[Villanueva’s] claims expose systemic insurer misconduct
that affects Minnesota consumers, satisfying the public benefit requirement.” But count
VII does not allege a violation of any of the laws specifically referenced in section 8.31,
subdivision 1, or any other Minnesota law respecting unfair, discriminatory, and other
unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade. 3 See id., subds. 1, 3a. We therefore
conclude that count VII fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
We similarly conclude that count VIII fails to state a claim. Count VIII alleges that
GEICO breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “by knowingly
misapplying Minnesota’s total-loss formula, coercing acceptance under duress, and
terminating coverage to pressure [Villanueva].” The covenant of good faith and fair
dealing requires a party to “establish bad faith by demonstrating that the adverse party
has an ulterior motive for its refusal to perform a contractual duty.” Minnwest Bank
Cent. v. Flagship Props. LLC, 689 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Minn. App. 2004). Villanueva is a
third-party claimant, and Villanueva’s complaint does not allege that he had a contract with
GEICO or that GEICO breached any specific contract term. Accordingly, count VIII also
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

3 To the extent that Villanueva’s claim is intended to be read in conjunction with count IV,
which alleges that GEICO engaged in deceptive trade practices in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 325F.69—a statute listed in section 8.31—that claim fails for the reasons
set forth below.

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Because counts VII and VIII are not viable, we conclude that any error by the district
court in failing to treat the amended complaint as the operative pleading is harmless. Minn.
R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored).
II. Villanueva did not plead sufficient facts to establish a claim for which relief
could be granted.

We next consider Villanueva’s arguments regarding the district court’s decision to
grant GEICO’s motion to dismiss. Villanueva contends that the district court erred because
it failed to accept his allegations as true and misapplied statutory interpretation principles.
And he argues that, when his allegations are accepted as true, he pleaded facts sufficient to
prove that GEICO violated the requirements of Minnesota Statutes sections 72B.092 and
72A.201 (2024), as alleged in counts I and II. He further argues that his consumer fraud
claim in count IV was improperly dismissed. Accordingly, it appears that Villanueva is
challenging the dismissal of only counts I, II, and IV and not counts III, V, or VI. 4 We
address his arguments in turn below.
Argument Regarding Notice Pleading Standard
As an initial matter, Villanueva asserts that, in dismissing his claims, the district
court, “reframed the case as a disagreement over valuation.” He maintains that the district

4 Villanueva does not specifically challenge the district court’s dismissal as to the other
counts. To the extent that Villanueva is challenging dismissal of the other counts, any
argument in this regard is forfeited. See Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co.,
187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) (stating a “mere assertion” in a brief is forfeited unless
prejudice is obvious); see also Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944)
(stating that “on appeal error is never presumed. It must be made [to] appear affirmatively
before there can be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who
relies upon it”).

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court’s analysis “conflicts with Minnesota’s notice-pleading standard, which requires
courts to accept well- pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor.”
“Minnesota is a notice-pleading state.” Halva, 953 N.W.2d at 500 (quoting Walsh,
851 N.W.2d at 604-05). Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 8.01 requires that a complaint
“contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” “A claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss if it is possible on any evidence
which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief
demanded.” Graphic Commc’ns Local 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS Caremark
Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682, 692 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). And when determining
whether a complaint is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the
facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 606. But the court is “not bound by legal
conclusions stated in a complaint.” Herbert, 744 N.W.2d at 235.
We discern no error by the district court in its application of the motion-to-dismiss
standard. Regardless, we are not bound by the district court’s analysis, as our review of
the district court’s decision is de novo. Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 606. We now turn to
Villanueva’s arguments regarding counts I, II, and IV.
Count I - Violation of Section 72B.092
Count I asserts a claim under section 72B.092, subdivision 1(7). This statutory
provision states: “[n]o adjuster or insurer . . . shall in collision cases . . . unilaterally and
arbitrarily disregard a repair operation or cost identified by an estimating system, which an

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insurer and collision repair facility have agreed to utilize in determining the cost of repair.”
Minn. Stat. § 72B.092, subd. 1(7). Villanueva asserts that GEICO violated section
72B.092, subdivision 1(7), because GEICO “arbitrarily disregarded” his repair estimate
and told Villanueva that GEICO uses its “numbers” and was “not worried about the second
estimate.” We conclude that Villanueva’s allegations in count I fail to state a claim under
the plain language of section 72B.092, subdivision 1(7).
Villanueva seems to interpret this provision to mean that GEICO was precluded
from rejecting the supplemental repair estimate obtained by Villanueva from the licensed
repair facility. The language of the statute does not support Villanueva’s interpretation.
Section 72B.092, subdivision 1(7), applies only to “a repair . . . cost identified by an
estimating system, which an insurer and collision repair facility have agreed to utilize.” Id.
(emphasis added). Villanueva did not plead facts, and no reasonable inferences can be
made based on the pleaded facts, demonstrating that GEICO and the repair facility “agreed
to utilize” a particular estimating system or that GEICO agreed to the repair facility’s cost
estimate. Additionally, this provision does not include language requiring an insurer to use
a particular repair estimate when it decides whether to deem a vehicle a total loss as GEICO
did in this case. Consequently, Villanueva’s allegations fail to state a claim under section
72B.092, subdivision 1(7). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly
dismissed count I.
Count II – Violation of Section 72A.201
We next consider count II in which Villanueva claims that GEICO violated section
72A.201. Section 72A.201 is entitled “Regulation of Claims Practices.” Section 72A.201

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grants the commissioner of the department of commerce authority to adopt rules and
impose administrative remedies, including fines, for violations of the standards set forth in
this statute. Minn. Stat. § 72A.201, subds. 1-9. The standards in section 72A.201 govern
insurance matters such as claim filing, claim handling, settlements, releases, and claim
denials. But there is no private cause of action under section 72A.201. See id., subds. 1-14;
Morris v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Minn. 1986) (holding that
a private person does not have a cause of action for violation of the Unfair Claims Practices
Act); Findling v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 998 N.W.2d 1, 13-14 (Minn. 2023) (explaining
reasoning in Morris). Consequently, we conclude that Villanueva has failed to state a claim
under section 72A.201 and the district court did not err by dismissing count II.
Count IV – Consumer Fraud in Violation of Section 325F.69
Relying on Minnesota Statutes section 325F.69, Villanueva claimed in count IV
that, “[GEICO] misrepresented settlement factors and falsely declared [his] vehicle a total
loss, constituting deceptive trade practices.” Section 325F.69 describes “unlawful
practices;” including “fraud, unfair or unconscionable practice, false pretense, false
promise, misrepresentation, misleading statement or deceptive practice, with the intent that
others rely thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise.” Minn. Stat.
§ 325F.69, subd. 1 (emphasis added). As the district court correctly concluded, section
325F.69 is inapplicable to Villanueva’s claim because it is a consumer protection statute
related to the sale of merchandise. The district court therefore properly dismissed count
IV.
Affirmed.