In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Lamont Cedric Woodley

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0570

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Lamont Cedric Woodley.

Filed September 8, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-MH-PR-26-73

Ethan Scrivner, Lauren E. Pockl, Hennepin County Adult Representation Services,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant Lamont Cedric Woodley)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany Lawonn, Scott R. Johnson,
Assistant County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County)

Considered and decided by Beane, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
On appeal from his commitment as a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental
illness, appellant Lamont Cedric Woodley argues that (1) the record lacks sufficient
evidence to show that his impairment was not solely due to his use of chemicals or chemical
dependence and (2) the district court failed to make findings of fact adequately addressing

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whether his impairment solely arises from his use of chemicals or chemical dependence.1
We affirm.
FACTS
On January 18, 2026, emergency medical services (EMS) responded to a 911 call
about a fire in Woodley’s apartment. According to EMS, Woodley told them that he
accidentally caused a fire in his laundry basket while attempting to test a broken lighter.
EMS reported that Woodley “refused to leave the apartment and was not oriented.” EMS
transported Woodley to Abbott Northwestern Hospital, where he was admitted.
Notes on Woodley’s clinical presentation indicated the following:
Patient is alert to self, place, and somewhat to situation. Patient
thoughts disorganized at times but organized at other times.
Patient speaks in metaphors and uses a condescending tone.
Patient mumbles to self at times. When asked about [suicidal
ideation] patient reports “no but I guess there is no real word
for that.” Patient denies [homicidal ideation]. When asked
about substance use patient reports “well maybe we don’t have
the same experiential metaphors.” Patient answers most
clinicians questions with “isn’t that personal information, how
is that related to my mental health? Your job is to ask about
mental health, no?”

. . . When asked with whom he lives patient reports “with
terrorists.” Patient reports “I guess you could say I live alone

1 Respondent Hennepin County’s brief contains a third issue arguing that the district court
did not err by authorizing the use of neuroleptic medications, but Woodley’s argument on
that question appears to be that, should his civil commitment be reversed, the order
authorizing the use of neuroleptic medications should also be reversed pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 253B.092, subdivision 1 (2024) (providing that “[n]euroleptic
medications may be administered, only as provided in this section, to patients subject to
civil commitment”). Woodley does not make an independent argument that the order
authorizing use of neuroleptic medication should be reversed. Accordingly, we d o not
address this issue separately.

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but partly with terror.” Patient then reports the people that rent
the apartment to him are terrorists.

Woodley was placed on a 72-hour hold. While hospitalized, Woodley called 911
twice, was found hiding under the desk in his room, defecated in the shower, repeatedly
visited the nursing station “rambling in mumbled fashion about various topics,” and
repeatedly requested to speak with the hospital administrators. Woodley entered another
patient’s room and resisted leaving. He was subsequently placed in seclusion where he was
“observed by camera undressing and redressing multiple times and talking out loud.” A
urine screen for drugs that was collected on January 20 indicated the presence of
methamphetamines and THC.
On January 22, the county filed petitions to commit Woodley as a person who poses
a risk of harm due to mental illness and for a Jarvis 2 order to authorize imposition of
neuroleptic medications.
Woodley declined to participate in an examination with the court-appointed
examiner, Dr. Larsen. Instead, Dr. Larsen relied on the court file and medical records to
prepare a report. Dr. Larsen’s report stated:
[Woodley] does not have a known history of mental illness.
There is a known history of chemical dependency and
[Woodley] was seen in the ED in 2021 for paranoia and
disorganization within the context of methamphetamine use. It
was also suspected that [Woodley] had some involvement with
starting a fire at his transitional housing (past-2021). On
1/18/2026, [Woodley] accidentally started a fire in his
apartment . . . . He was placed on a transportation hold and
brought to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. In the

2 See Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 150 (Minn. 1988) (holding that involuntary
administration of neuroleptic drugs requires judicial approval).

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hospital, he was declining all medications and required
seclusion due to being unable to follow directions and entering
another patient’s room. He continued to present as
disorganized, confused, and was responding to internal stimuli.
His drug screen was positive for methamphetamines and THC.
The hospital initiated a petition for civil commitment as a
person who poses a risk due to mental illness and chemical
dependency.

Dr. Larsen’s report identified Woodley’s “Current DSM-5 diagnosis”
3 as follows:
A. Per the medical records:
• Unspecified Psychosis
• Rule Out Substance Induced Psychosis
• Rule Out Psychosis Related to a Medical Condition
(i.e., HIV, Syphilis)
• Rule Out Schizoaffective Disorder vs Schizophrenia

B. Per the examiner:
• Defer to treatment physician(s)

Dr. Larsen’s report also stated that Woodley suffers from a “substantial psychiatric
disorder.” The report answered “No” to the question “Is the impairment solely due to . . .
brief periods of intoxication caused by alcohol, drugs, or other mind -altering substances;
or dependence upon or addiction to any alcohol, drugs, or other mind-altering substances.”
Dr. Larsen’s report noted that Woodley “appears too confused and disorganized to follow
through with treatment on a voluntary basis” and “lacks insight into his mental health
symptoms.” The report concluded that Woodley “meets criteria for civil commitment and
appears to require some degree of court oversight in order to fully stabilize and get

3 DSM stands for the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth
Edition.”

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connected with ongoing treatment and supports for his mental illness. He remains a risk to
himself and others and unable to care for himself presently.”
At an evidentiary hearing on the county’s petitions, Dr. Larsen and Woodley
testified, and Woodley’s hospital records and the Jarvis petition were admitted as exhibits.
Dr. Larsen testified that she was unable to observe Woodley’s mental status in real time
and acknowledged that “the treatment team has already recognized the diagnostic
uncertainty” with the multiple rule-out diagnoses. Dr. Larsen also agreed that
“methamphetamine is well known to cause paranoia, delusions, and disorganized
thinking.” Woodley testified that he had been diagnosed with psychosis at the hospital and
that he did not think he needed medications for that diagnosis. He also stated that he
“choose[s] to sustain [sic] from drugs and alcohol,” wished to continue to abstain in the
future, and was not in need of treatment.
The district court issued an order committing Woodley as a person who poses a risk
of harm due to mental illness and authorizing the administration of neuroleptic medication.
Woodley appeals.
DECISION
I. The record contains clear and convincing evidence th at Woodley poses a risk
of harm due to a mental illness.

In reviewing a civil commitment, appellate courts “are limited to an examination of
whether the district court complied with the requirements of the commitment act.” In re
Civ. Commitment of Janckila, 657 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. App. 2003). “[C]ommitment
must be justified by findings based upon evidence at the hearing,” viewing the record in

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the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620
(Minn. 1995). A finding is clearly erroneous when it is “manifestly contrary to the weight
of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “There
must be clear and convincing evidence that a person is mentally ill in order to commit that
person.” Janckila, 657 N.W.2d at 902; see also Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2024).
Appellate courts “review de novo the question of whether the evidence is sufficient to meet
the standard of commitment.” Janckila, 657 N.W.2d at 902.
Minnesota Statutes section 253B.09, subdivision 1(a), provides:
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
proposed patient is a person who poses a risk of harm due to
mental illness, or is a person who has a developmental
disability or chemical dependency, and after careful
consideration of reasonable alternative dispositions . . . , it
finds that there is no suitable alternative to judicial
commitment, the court shall commit the patient to the least
restrictive treatment program . . . .

Minnesota Statutes section 253B.02, subdivision 17a(a) (2024), defines a “person
who poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness” as
any person who has an organic disorder of the brain or a
substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception,
orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment,
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or
understand, that is manifested by instances of grossly disturbed
behavior or faulty perceptions and who, due to this impairment,
poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others
as demonstrated by:
(1) a failure to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter,
or medical care as a result of the impairment;
(2) an inability for reasons other than indigence to
obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care as a

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result of the impairment and it is more probable than not that
the person will suffer substantial harm, significant psychiatric
deterioration or debilitation, or serious illness, unless
appropriate treatment and services are provided;
(3) a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or
others; or
(4) recent and volitional conduct involving significant
damage to substantial property.

Minnesota Statutes s ection 253B.02, subdivision 17a(b) (2024), places a caveat on the
definition of a “person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness,” stating, in relevant
part:
A person does not pose a risk of harm due to mental illness
under this section if the person’s impairment is solely due to:

. . . .

(3) brief periods of intoxication caused by alcohol,
drugs, or other mind-altering substances; or
(4) dependence upon or addiction to any alcohol, drugs,
or other mind-altering substances.

Woodley argues that his symptoms were solely the product of a brief period of
methamphetamine intoxication or addiction and therefore that, pursuant to section
253B.02, subdivision 17a(b)(3) and (4), he falls outside of the statutory definition of posing
a risk of harm due to mental illness. Specifically, Woodley argues that the symptoms he
exhibited are “all strongly correlated with methamphetamine-induced psychosis” and that
his psychosis is attributable solely to “brief periods of intoxication” caused by

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methamphetamine or his “dependence upon or addiction to” methamphetamine and thus
cannot support a commitment for mental illness.4
As an initial matter, the parties disagree about the meaning of the “rule-out”
diagnoses included in Dr. Larsen’s report, which identified the “Current DSM-5” diagnosis
as unspecified psychosis, rule-out substance-induced psychosis, rule-out psychosis related
to a medical condition, and rule-out schizoaffective disorder versus schizophrenia.
Woodley contends that “[a] rule-out diagnosis indicates that it is one of the possible
causes of symptoms a provider is attempting to rule out before being able to make a more
definite diagnosis.” During the hearing, the county’s counsel stated that “[p]roviders
reached the diagnosis of unspecified psychosis and ruled out substance-induced psychosis
and ruled out medical -related psychosis.” But, based on Dr. Larsen’s testimony about

4 Woodley’s addendum contains an article “Methamphetamine-Associated Psychosis and
Criminal Responsibility.” This article was neither presented to nor considered by the
district court and therefore is not properly before us. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580,
582-83 (Minn. 1988) (“An appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the
record on appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence
below.”). Woodley contends that the article may be considered by this court because it is a
“publicly available article,” citing Fairview Hospital v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co., 535 N.W.2d 337, 340 n.3 (Minn. 1995) (stating that appellate courts may consider
“publicly available articles that were not previously presented to the district court ”). But
see In re Block, 727 N.W.2d 166 , 177 (Minn. App. 2007) (striking internet articles from
the record). “Appellate courts will make an occasional exception . . . by permitting gaps in
the record to be filled by documentary evidence of a conclusive nature in order to sustain
verdicts and judgments. But the production of such evidence is never allowed in an
appellate court for the purpose of reversing a judgment.” State v. Anderson, 733 N.W.2d
128, 139 n.4 (Minn. 2007) (citation and quotation omitted); see also Hebrink v. Farm
Bureau Life Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. App. 2003) (declining to admit new
evidence on appeal “because the letter is offered for the purpose of reversing the district
court”). Because Woodley seeks that the article be admitted to address a contested fact for
the purpose of reversing the district court’s orders, it is not properly before us.

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“diagnostic uncertainty” and her affirmation that “treatment providers didn’t . . . reach a
single definitive diagnosis,” the county’s representation that providers “ruled out”
substance-induced psychosis is likely inaccurate. See also In re Welfare of G.S.G.,
No. A09-0438, 2009 WL 3736134, at *1 n.1 (Minn. App. Nov. 10, 2009) (“A ‘rule out’
diagnosis is made when there are substantial signs that a disorder is present, but the
professional needs more information to rule out the existence of the disorder.”) rev. denied
(Minn. Jan. 19, 2010).5
With that background, the question is whether a “diagnosis” 6 of unspecified
psychosis, where substance-induced psychosis is a possibility that has not been ruled out,
can provide clear and convincing evidence that a person poses a risk of harm due to mental
illness.
We first observe that a finding that a person poses a risk of harm due to mental
illness may be supported by the evidence even if a person is also chemically dependent. In
In re Salkin, we affirmed the district court’s determination that the appellant was mentally
ill when expert testimony indicated appellant was suffering from a schizoaffective illness,
even though the appellant also had “a problem” with marijuana use. 430 N.W.2d 13, 16
(Minn. App. 1988), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 1988). We held that the evidence and
findings were sufficient to support appellant’s commitment as mentally ill despite his co-

5 We cite nonprecedential opinions in this opinion for their persuasive value. See Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

6 Woodley argues that unspecified psychosis is not technically a “diagnosis” according to
the DSM.

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existing substance abuse. Id. And in In re Evans, the appellant argued that “his impairment
arose solely from a drug-induced psychosis, making his commitment as mentally ill
improper,” but we rejected appellant’s argument because, while there was “some evidence”
supporting the appellant’s theory, “other evidence showed that he was mentally ill with
paranoid schizophrenia.” No. C5-98- 773, 1998 WL 566808, at *2 (Minn. App. Sept. 8,
1998), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1998). We noted that a “court may order commitment
as mentally ill even if [the] person may also be chemically dependent where evidence
supports commitment as mentally ill.” Id. (citing Salkin, 430 N.W.2d at 16). In sum, under
Salkin and Evans, evidence of mental illness not attributable to chemical dependency is
required for commitment as a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness. But
that requirement is consistent with section 253B.02, subdivision 17a(b), which provides
that a person does not pose a risk of harm due to mental illness if the impairment is solely
due to brief periods of intoxication or dependence upon drugs.
Here, the district court made the following findings: “[Woodley] is ill with
psychosis, unspecified, which is a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought and
perception that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, and
ability to reason or understand”; “[w]hile [Woodley] does not have a documented history
of mental illness, the totality of the record shows that he is experiencing acute mental
illness”; and “[Woodley] does not have sufficient insight into his mental illness and need
for medication when he is outside the hospital.” The district court did not address
substance-induced psychosis, cite section 253B.02, subdivision 17a(b), or reference

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Woodley’s methamphetamine and THC use aside from stating that Woodley tested positive
for those substances.
We see no clear error in the district court’s findings. This case is similar to In re
Civil Commitment of Salzl, No. A04-0428, 2004 WL 1925885 (Minn. App. Aug. 31, 2004).
In Salzl, the appellant argued that “the determination of the district court [was] flawed
because it fail[ed] to apply the requisite statutory analysis prior to reaching an opinion
regarding both mental illness and chemical dependency.” 2004 WL 1925885, at *2
(quotation omitted). The appellant was diagnosed with methamphetamine-induced
psychotic disorder and also psychosis disorder not otherwise specified. Id. at *3. We upheld
the district court’s determination that the appellant was mentally ill under the statutory
definition, noting that “[t]he record is replete with evidence indicating a substantial
psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory which grossly
impairs judgment.” Id. at *2 (quotation omitted). We pointed to the medical documentation
in the record which showed that the appellant had auditory hallucinations, including
“hearing voices telling him that people— including officers in the local police department
and the FBI —were conspiring against him ”; had suicidal ideations; “believed saline that
was used in his medical treatment was contaminated with HIV”; and “believed that
helicopters were circling his home, that someone was bugging his phone and leather jacket,
and that the police intended to plant a methamphetamine lab in his house.” Id. In affirming,
we explained, “The expert here could not affirmatively assert that [the appellant’s]
condition was caused solely by intoxication instead of ‘something that’s underneath.’ The
district court, therefore, did not err in determining that [appellant] was mentally ill under

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the statute.” Id. at *3. Similarly, here, though Dr. Larsen’s report includes rule out –
substance-induced psychosis, indicating a possibility that Woodley’s psychosis was solely
attributable to his methamphetamine use, the district court did not make a finding that
Woodley’s condition was caused solely by intoxication, and other evidence supported the
finding of mental illness.
Similarly, here, Dr. Larsen’s report stated that Woodley has a diagnosis of
“Unspecified Psychosis.” And the record is replete with evidence that Woodley suffers
from a substantial psychiatric disorder. Woodley experienced “psychosis in the form of
auditory hallucinations,” delusions, including “about terrorists, terrorism, and investigating
terrorists,” and responses to internal stimuli. Though Dr. Larsen stated that Woodley’s
diagnosis had not been confirmed, she also did not conclude that Woodley’s symptoms
were solely due to substance use.
Woodley also argues that the district court adopted the county’s explanation that
substance-induced psychosis was “ruled out.” But the arguments of counsel are not
evidence, State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 158 (Minn. 2004), and the district court’s order
does not repeat this inaccurate statement.
In sum, the record supports the district court’s determination that Woodley meets
the definition of a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness.
II. The district court did not err by failing to make specific findings that address
whether appellant’s impairment arises from his use of chemicals or addiction.

“Civil commitment and forced administration of neuroleptic medication, although
intended to protect and assist those suffering from serious mental illness, represent serious

13
constraints on an individual’s liberty interests.” In re Civ. Commitment of Lindquist,
No. A17-0676, 2017 WL 3687808, at *3 (Minn. App. Aug. 28, 2017). Reviewing courts
“must carefully consider whether the district court has made ‘a good faith attempt to isolate
the most important factors’ supporting civil commitment.” Id. (quoting In re Civ .
Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 2014)). Appellate courts “cannot conduct
a thorough review when the district court’s findings are conclusory and fail to address the
statutory bases for commitment.” Id. at *4. The civil-commitment statute provides that the
district court must “find the facts specifically, and separately state its conclusions of law”
and that, “[w]here commitment is ordered, the findings of fact and conclusions of law shall
specifically state the proposed patient’s conduct which is a basis for determining that each
of the requisites for commitment is met.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2 (2024).
Woodley argues that, because the district court’s findings did not address the
statutory substance-use exclusions outlined in section 253B.02, subdivision 17a(b), its
findings are inadequate. He asserts that the district court was required to “identify what
specific facts led it to conclude— by clear and convincing evidence—that Woodley’s
impairment was not solely attributable to methamphetamine use.”
As support for his argument, Woodley cites two nonprecedential cases in which we
remanded for further findings. In In re Commitment of Lynard, we remanded because the
district court’s order essentially repeated facts from the examiner’s report and “fail[ed] to
indicate which facts the district court relied on when making its decision.” No. A23-1067,
2023 WL 8889524, at *2 (Minn. App. Dec. 26, 2023). And in Lindquist, we remanded
because the district court made conclusory findings that did “not address the basis for

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commitment set forth in Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13(a),” and that “lack [ed] the
specificity required under the statute.” 2017 WL 3687808, at *4.
Woodley’s argument assumes that the district court is required to identify specific
facts regarding exceptions that it did not find applicable. While the cases he relies on
demonstrate that the bases for commitment require specific findings, they do not require
the district court to identify specific facts for exceptions that it did not find applicable. See
also Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2 (outlining the requirements for findings). Here the
district court considered—and implicitly rejected by not making such a finding—
Woodley’s argument that his conduct was solely due to his substance abuse. See Palladium
Holdings, LLC v. Zuni Mortg. Loan Trust 2006-OA1, 775 N.W.2d 168, 177-78 (Minn. App.
2009) (holding that appellate courts assume that the district court implicitly rejected an
argument rather than assuming that it erred by not addressing the argument), rev. denied
(Minn. Jan. 27, 2010). The district court did not err by not making an explicit finding about
whether Woodley’s impairment was solely due to substances under section 253B.02,
subdivision 17a(b).
Affirmed.