In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C. C. H., and H. A. H. S., Parents

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0636

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:

C. C. H., and H. A. H. S., Parents.

Filed October 5, 2026
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Pine County District Court
File No. 58-JV-25-151

Mackenzie Guptil, Pine City, Minnesota (for appellant C.C.H.)

Reese Frederickson, Pine County Attorney, Sydney Silko, Assistant County Attorney, Pine
City, Minnesota (for respondent Pine County Health & Human Services)

Erik Hughes, Stillwater, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant C.C.H. (mother) challenges the district court’s termination of her parental
rights to her son, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by determining that
(1) respondent Pine County Health and Human Services (the county) made reasonable

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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efforts to reunite the family, (2) statutory grounds exist for termination, and (3) termination
is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
The county has been involved with mother and the child since the child’s birth in
2019, when the hospital notified the county that mother tested positive for THC. 1 The
county thereafter received numerous child-protection reports about the child; conducted
multiple investigations , during which it learned that the child has special needs ; and
repeatedly offered mother services on a voluntary basis. Over the child’s first several years,
the county had recurring concerns, including neglect, soiled clothing, excessive trash in the
home, exposure to domestic violence, and inadequate supervision.
In February 2023, the county received a report that the child (then three years old)
was found walking alone down a street. After that incident, the county initiated a child in
need of protection or services (CHIPS) proceeding and undertook protective supervision
of mother and the child for several months. When mother’s home circumstances improved,
the district court terminated CHIPS jurisdiction in July 2023.
In August 2023, the county received a report that mother was seen throwing the
child outside and locking the door. In October 2023, mother threatened to leave the child
on other people’s doorstep because he was “just too much.”

1 The child’s father was not a custodial parent and largely did not participate in the
underlying child-protection matter. His parental rights to the child were also terminated
and he is not participating in this appeal.

3
In mid-August 2024, the county received a report that the child (then nearly five
years old) was seen alone, without shoes, and running on a roadway. When police
responded, mother was unaware the child was outside. On August 24, 2024, police
responded around 5:00 a.m. to a report that the child was alone at a gas station about a half
mile from where mother and the child were staying. Officers found the child wearing only
underwear and a T-shirt. The child was put into emergency protective care.
Days later, the district court conducted an emergency-protective-care hearing and
placed the child in the county’s custody. The county thereafter filed a CHIPS petition.
Mother admitted parts of the petition, acknowledging that the child lacks necessary care
because he had absconded from the home, and that she needs services to meet his needs
for safety. The district court adjudicated the child as in need of protection or services.
The county established a case plan for mother, which included requiring mother to
complete a psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations, to secure the home
to prevent the child from absconding, and to maintain contact with the case manager and
guardian ad litem. The district court approved the case plan.
Mother completed a psychological evaluation in March and April 2025. Mother
failed to attend the postevaluation session and, when contacted by phone, said that she
forgot to check her email and had to leave for work. The service sent mother a copy of the
evaluation report. The report indicated diagnoses of complex posttraumatic stress disorder
and multiple substance-use disorders and recommended psychotherapy to address her
mental health. The report noted that mother exhibited “poor” judgment and that she did
not take responsibility for the child absconding.

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The county updated mother’s case plan to require her to successfully complete the
recommendations from the psychological evaluation. The new case plan also reiterated
and expanded on many of the initial items, including the requirements for secure, safe, and
stable housing. The county also referred mother for individual therapy.
Mother began therapy in July 2025. Mother also began participating in parenting
education and coaching, which included a specific focus on the child’s history of
absconding. The service provider recognized some parenting strengths, but also detailed
concerns about mother not taking responsibility for the child’s removal. The provider also
noted multiple instances of mother leaving the child unsupervised outside even when a
parenting-education worker was present.
Mother participated in weekly supervised visitation with the child. Despite the
county’s ongoing concerns, mother began unsupervised visitations in early 2025 and a trial
home visit starting in August 2025. In a little over a month, the county documented that
the child absconded or was left unsupervised on four separate occasions. After the fourth
incident, the county ended the trial-home visit. In contrast, the child never tried to abscond
while in foster care from August 2024 to August 2025, or again after he was returned to
foster care at the end of September 2025.
In November 2025, the county filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental rights.
The petition alleged three statutory grounds for termination: failure to comply with parental
duties, palpable unfitness to parent, and the county’s reasonable efforts have failed to
correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (3), (4) (2024). The district court conducted a two-day trial on

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the petition, received 89 exhibits, and heard testimony from mother, two child-protection
case managers, the child’s foster mother, mother’s grandmother, and the guardian ad litem.
Following trial, the district court issued an order terminating mother’s parental
rights. The court made detailed findings recounting the county’s long involvement with
the family, noting the loving relationship between mother and the child, discussing the
child’s significant needs, and recognizing the pattern of the child absconding from mother.
The district court determined that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family,
that the county proved all three statutory grounds for termination, and that termination is
in the child’s best interests, and it ordered termination of mother’s parental rights.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
As relevant here, a district court may order the involuntar y termination of parental
rights if “(1) at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and
convincing evidence, (2) the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and
(3) termination is in the child ’s best interests.” In re Welfare of Child of J.H.,
968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). The county
bears the burden of proving grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.
See In re Welfare of Child of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d 861, 870 (Minn. 2021).
On appeal from a termination of parental rights, we review a district court’s findings
of fact for clear error. In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn.
App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). We review the court’s determination that a
statutory basis for termination exists for an abuse of discretion. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600.

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I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunite the family.

Mother principally challenges the district court’s determination that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. We review the district court’s factual
findings detailing the efforts that a county undertook to reunify a family for clear error. In
re Welfare of Children of J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d 653, 658 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied
(Minn. May 18, 2021). The district court’s determination that the county’s efforts were
reasonable is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. ,
865 N.W.2d 315, 321-23 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015).
In evaluating the reasonableness of the county’s reunification efforts, the district
court must consider whether the services offered were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and, if
appropriate, the child;

(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and child’s
family;

(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well- being of the
child;

(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the child and
family;

(5) culturally appropriate;

(6) available and accessible;

(7) consistent and timely; and

(8) realistic under the circumstances.

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Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). The district court must also consider how long the county
was involved and the quality of the county’s efforts. In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C.,
920 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn. App. 2018). But what constitutes “reasonable efforts”
depends on the facts of each case. Id. at 663.
Mother’s reasonable-efforts argument appears to have two parts, challenging the
district court’s: (1) findings as to the reunification efforts that the county undertook, and
(2) determination that the county’s efforts were reasonable. We address each in turn.
First, mother argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that the county’s
reunification efforts included “[c]ommunication with [her] service providers.” Mother
contends that the evidence showed the case manager who worked with the family in
mid-2025 had only a 15-minute discussion with the therapist’s scheduler and a few emails
with the therapist. Mother also cites testimony of the case manager who did not send the
therapist the report from mother’s psychological evaluation. While this testimony may not
reflect the level of communication that mother believes was appropriate, it does reflect
communication. The record also reflects that the case manager communicated with the
service that provided mother’s parenting education. With record evidence supporting the
district court’s finding that the county communicated with mother’s service providers, the
finding is not clearly erroneous. See J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d at 658.
Second, mother challenges the district court’s determination that the county made
reasonable reunification efforts. Mother contends that the county failed to provide
“significant coordination of services” because mother’s therapist did not receive the

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psychological evaluation report, which meant that the report could not be used to address
the principal concern that led to the child’s removal. We are not persuaded.
The county acted on the psychological evaluation report by providing a referral for
individual therapy, which was the report’s only specific therapeutic recommendation. The
county also referred mother to parenting-education services and coordinated with that
service provider to ensure that it worked with mother on her ability to supervise the child
and to prevent him from absconding.
Mother’s contentions about the county’s efforts overlook the numerous types of
services that the county provided. In addressing reasonable efforts, the district court found
that the county provided more than 20 different services, including a GPS tracking device
for the child; an alarm system for the child’s safety; referrals for mother’s psychological
evaluation, parenting education, and individual therapy; housing resources; various types
of transportation support; and communication with service providers for the child and
mother. With the exception of communication with the service providers, mother does not
dispute the findings related to the other 19 services that the county provided. Mother also
does not dispute that many of the services were focused on helping mother to safely
supervise the child and prevent him from absconding. The possibility that the county could
have done something more with the evaluation report does not indicate that the district
court abused its discretion in determining that the county’s reunification efforts were
reasonable.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that a statutory
ground for termination exists.

Mother challenges the district court’s determination that the county proved grounds
for termination. We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a determination
that a statutory ground for termination exists. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600.
The district court determined that the county proved all three of the grounds that it
alleged for terminating mother’s parental rights: mother has neglected her parental duties,
mother is palpably unfit to parent, and the county’s reasonable efforts have failed to correct
the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2), (3), (4). Because we only need to affirm one statutory basis to affirm a
termination of parental rights, J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 906, we focus on the last of these.
A district court may involuntarily terminate parental rights if, “following the child’s
placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed
to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4). A parent’s compliance with a case plan is relevant to determining whether
reasonable efforts have failed, but “[t]he critical issue is . . . whether the parent is presently
able to assume the responsibilities of caring for the child.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T.,
814 N.W.2d 76, 89 (Minn. App. 2012).
The district court noted the county’s numerous efforts to help mother address the
principal concern underlying the child’s out-of-home placement—her inability to provide
him appropriate supervision to keep him safe. After careful consideration, the court
determined that, despite those prolonged efforts, mother remained incapable of providing

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appropriate supervision for the child. Mother continued to leave the child unattended and
failed to exercise precautions to prevent the child from absconding.
Mother contends that the “lack of case coordination”—the focus of her reasonable-
efforts argument—also undermines the district court’s finding that mother is unable to
appropriately supervise the child. In short, mother’s argument as to statutory grounds is
contingent on her reasonable-efforts argument. Accordingly, it fails for the same reasons.
Mother’s argument recognizes that the principal concern leading to the child’s out-
of-home placement was her inability to supervise him and keep him safe. Our review of
the record confirms strong evidentiary support for the district court’s finding that this
concern was not corrected. The record demonstrates that the county provided numerous
services aimed at ensuring appropriate supervision, preventing the child from absconding,
and finding him if he did. Despite these services, the county documented four supervision
shortfalls during the child’s one-month trial home visit. Because the record supports the
findings about mother’s inability to safely supervise the child, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by determining that this statutory ground for termination exists.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination
is in the child’s best interests.

Mother challenges the district court’s determination that it is in the child’s best
interests to terminate mother’s parental rights. We review a best-interests determination
for an abuse of discretion. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600.
To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, a
district court must analyze “(1) the child’s interests in preserving the parent-child

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relationship; (2) the parent’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship; and
(3) any competing interests of the child.” In re Welfare of Child of R.V.M., 8 N.W.3d 680,
696 (Minn. App. 2024) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2024).
“Competing interests include health considerations, a stable environment, and the child’ s
preference.” Id. at 697 (quotation omitted).
Mother appears to contend that the county’s failure to provide reasonable efforts
means that termination was not in the child’s best interests. As discussed above, mother’s
reasonable-efforts argument fails. So does this related best-interests argument.
Moreover, our careful review of the record confirms that the district court’s best-
interests determination has strong support. The court noted that t he guardian ad litem
testified that termination is in the child’s best interests. The district court also carefully
addressed the pertinent considerations in weighing the child’s best interests. The court
acknowledged the “loving, affectionate” relationship between mother and the child, that
the child “has been observed seeking [mother] out for comfort,” and that mother also loves
the child “very much.” But the district court found that, “[d]espite this loving relationship,
Mother lacks the skills necessary to meet [the child’s] most basic needs for safety and
stability.” The court reasoned that the child’s “need for a caregiver who can meet his basic
needs [for] safety, stability, and security, along with the special needs made necessary by
his . . . diagnosis, outweighs the benefit of preserving the parent -child relationship.” On
this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination is
in the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.