In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Kevin Karsjens

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0917

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Kevin Karsjens.

Filed September 21, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Commitment Appeal Panel

Jennifer Thon, Jones Law Office, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant Kevin Karsjens)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Emily Kennedy, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Direct Care and Treatment Executive Board)

Brian J. Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent
Morrison County)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
Appellant Kevin Karsjens challenges the commitment appeal panel’s (the CAP’s)
dismissal of his petition for a full discharge from his indeterminate civil commitment as a
sexually dangerous person (SDP), arguing that the evidence he submitted shows that he no
longer suffers from a mental illness warranting civil commitment and that he is no longer
a danger to the community. Because Karsjens did not present sufficient competent
evidence showing that he no longer suffers from a mental illness needing treatment or that
he is no longer a danger to the community, we affirm.

2
FACTS
In early 2010, Karsjens was civilly committed as an SDP to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) at Moose Lake. While there, he was diagnosed with other
specified paraphilic disorder, non-consent, in a controlled environment; other specified
personality disorder, with antisocial and paranoid features; alcohol-use disorder, mild, in
sustained remission, in a controlled environment; and problems related to other legal
circumstances (civil commitment). Karsjens initially participated in treatment programs at
MSOP but declined further treatment in 2015, when he did not progress to the next
treatment level. He has since declined to participate in treatment programs offered at
MSOP.
In early 2022, Karsjens filed a petition with the Special Review Board (SRB)
requesting a transfer, provisional discharge, or discharge from civil commitment. The SRB
recommended that his request be denied. He then filed a petition with the CAP for
rehearing and reconsideration of his petition before the SRB. Hearings before the CAP
occur in two phases. In the first phase, the petitioner presents evidence in support of their
petition. Minn. Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2(c) (2024). Thereafter, the respondent may present
evidence or move to dismiss the petition under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b). Id.
At his first-phase hearing, Karsjens withdrew his requests for transfer and
provisional discharge, leaving his request for a full discharge for the CAP’s consideration.
Respondent Direct Care and Treatment Executive Board (the DCT) opposed Karsjens’ s
petition. At that hearing, Karsjens presented seven exhibits in support of his petition, and
the CAP heard testimony from Dr. Tyler Dority, whom the panel appointed to conduct a

3
focused review of Karsjens’s records; Dr. Jessica Blalock, who completed two mental-
health assessments of Karsjens in 2025; and Karsjens. The DCT submitted 16 exhibits in
opposition.
Dr. Dority reviewed Karsjens’s treatment and medical records, as well as other
records related to his petition. Dr. Dority testified that Karsjens’s current diagnosis of
unspecified paraphilic disorder remains justified because of a “lack of current evidence that
[the disorder] no longer exists,” and Karsjens has not participated in any physiological tests
of sexual arousal, so there is no information about whether his disorder is in remission.
While Dr. Dority testified that he was unaware of information showing that Karsjens acted
on his disorder while committed, Dr. Dority also opined that he cannot state “to a
reasonable degree of psychological certainty” whether Karsjens “harbors a persistent
interest in nonconsenting persons” because they “don’t have any . . . definitive evidence to
the contrary.”
In his report, Dr. Dority noted that Karsjens “does not attend any psychoeducation
modules nor does he participate in vocational or educational programming.” He also
opined that Karsjens remains in the first phase of treatment because “he has made almost
no treatment progress in the more than 14 years since he was committed to the MSOP.”
Following similar observations, Dr. Dority concluded that Karsjens has (1) “demonstrated
minimal treatment progress and he certainly has not exhibited the sustained level of
treatment progress and growth that could make him a candidate for transfer, provisional
discharge, or full discharge at this time”; (2) “significant treatment needs that would make
him a poor candidate” for discharge; (3) a “significant and foundational remaining need for

4
treatment and supervision in his current secure treatment setting”; and (4) a high risk of
recidivism according to recent risk assessments.
Dr. Dority reviewed the two risk assessments Karsjens completed in 2023. On the
Static-99R, which measures “risk of sexual offending recidivism,” Karsjens scored in the
“well above average risk category,” but accounting for Karsjens’s age during the first-phase
hearing, the same test would now place him in the “above average risk” category. Another
risk assessment did not show any deviant sexual interest as a concern for Karsjens, but it
did note that he still had “significant remaining criminogenic treatment needs.”
As to Karsjens’s personality disorder, Dr. Dority testified that Karsjens has not
engaged in violent or aggressive conduct at MSOP in the past five years; he is generally
rule-compliant; and he generally interacts respectfully with staff and peers. But Karsjens
displays a persistent and pervasive distrust of MSOP , and Dr. Dority could not state with
certainty whether Karsjens’s personality disorder has improved because “he won’t engage
with treatment.” Finally, as to Karsjens’s alcohol-use disorder, Dr. Dority testified that the
diagnosis seems irrelevant because no information showed that Karsjens consumed alcohol
in the years before his civil commitment or while civilly committed at MSOP.
In her first assessment of Karsjens, Dr. Blalock noted favorable findings in
Karsjens’s appearance, behavior, and mental status. But she also observed that Karsjens
“often makes comments that demonstrate barriers to developing and building rapport with
clinical staff” and he “has demonstrated an inconsistent pattern” of attending clinical
programming. She also confirmed Karsjens’s diagnoses of other specified paraphilic
disorder, non-consent, in a controlled environment; other specified personality disorder,

5
with antisocial and paranoid features; alcohol-use disorder, mild, in sustained remission, in
a controlled environment; and problems related to other legal circumstances. Dr. Blalock
testified that Karsjens did not disclose his sexual functioning related to his attraction to
non-consent, his diagnosis of other specific paraphilia disorder has remained unchanged,
and he has “remaining treatment needs . . . related to sex offender treatment.” Dr. Blalock
similarly testified to his personality disorder, opining that Karsjens experiences current
“clinically significant impairment” because he “was demonstrating kind of an aspect of—
not a willingness to participate in treatment due to the distrust of the facility as a whole.”
Karsjens declined to participate in the November assessment , so Dr. Blalock
completed that assessment based on historical records and after consulting his treatment
team at MSOP. Karsjens’s diagnoses remain unchanged between the two assessments.
Karsjens also testified. He explained that he participated in treatment at MSOP
beginning when he was initially civilly committed, but he stopped because he claimed that
treatment was “orientation and just doing the same thing.” But he testified that there were
no other options for classes at MSOP unless he participated in treatment. He now “spend[s]
a lot of time just sitting around in [his] room watching TV or movies, trying to cook some
different types of things.” Karsjens denies that he is guilty of the crimes leading to his civil
commitment and rejects his subsequent diagnoses of paraphilia and personality disorders.
Karsjens has a discharge plan, and when asked why he believes that he is ready for full
discharge, he testified that he “did enough time in here, 17 years,” and that he “know[s] for
a fact” that he “can live a great life out there, and do the things that are fun.” He later
testified that

6
proof shows that I am not somebody that’s a drinker, I’m not a
fighter, I’m not a sexual actor outer, none of that stuff. So
there’s nothing to treat me for.

I’m aged out at this point. I’m 62 years old. I can’t . . .
help any of my so-called numbers that they use, you know, for
your dangerousness or whatever. Everything is just going to
stay the same now, so there’s nothing to be treated for.

Karsjens also submitted an individual progress note, a discharge plan he prepared
in May 2023, a client request form he submitted, and his written statement in support of a
reduction in custody. The individual progress note observed that Karsjens “does not have
an interest” in participating in treatment or engaging with treatment staff, but the note also
stated that he does not engage in “negative behaviors[] or attention seeking.” The client
request form shows that Karsjens asked for a substance-abuse treatment program in
January 2026, but he was told that MSOP does not have such a program. His discharge
plan includes details about housing and his support system, should he be released from
MSOP.
Finally, Karsjens’s written statement offers reasons why he should be granted a
reduction in custody, followed by several attached exhibits. In that statement, Karsjens
contends that his treatment record is devoid of “any behavioral reports, current distress and
impairments in occupational, social or psychological functioning requiring
pharmacological therapy for a sexual related mental disorder” and that no records support
his continued commitment for a “sexual related mental disorder.” Karsjens then explains
that he engaged in treatment from 2010 to 2015, completed all psychoeducational modules,
attended therapy, and passed a polygraph, but stopped participating because he did not

7
progress to the next phase of treatment. In conclusion, Karsjens argues that his treatment
records show that he does not need further treatment for any disorder and that he “does not
have a serious difficulty in controlling his behavior due to a mental illness.”
Following the hearing, the DCT moved to dismiss the petition under Minn. R. Civ.
P. 41.02(b), and the CAP granted the motion. The CAP concluded that Karsjens presented
no competent evidence, viewed in his favor, showing that he is no longer in need of sexual-
offender treatment because he has refused to participate in treatment and the evidence
showed that he remains at a high risk of reoffending.
Karsjens appeals.
DECISION
Karsjens challenges the CAP’s dismissal of his petition for full discharge, arguing
that he met his burden to produce competent evidence that, if viewed in the light most
favorable to him, could show that he is entitled to be released from MSOP’s secure facility.
A person civilly committed as an SDP may petition for a reduction in custody by
seeking a transfer, provisional discharge, or full discharge. Minn. Stat. § 253D.29-.31
(2024). The committed person first files a petition with the SRB, which conducts a hearing
and issues a recommendation to the CAP . Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subds. 2, 4 (2024). If
the SRB recommends denying the petition, the committed person may petition the CAP for
rehearing and reconsideration of the SRB’s recommendations. Minn. Stat. § 253D.28,
subd. 1(a) (2024).
Proceedings before the CAP occur in two phases. At the first- phase hearing on a
petition for full discharge or provisional discharge, the petitioner must produce “sufficient,

8
competent evidence that, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief” under the statutory
criteria. Coker v. Jesson, 831 N.W.2d 483, 485-86 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted); see
also Minn. Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2(c). Following the first-phase hearing, the opposing
party may move to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioner failed to satisfy
their burden of production. Larson v. Jesson, 847 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App. 2014).
When deciding such a motion, the CAP may not weigh the evidence or make credibility
determinations and instead must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
petitioner. Coker, 831 N.W.2d at 490-91. If the CAP concludes that the petitioner failed
to establish a prima facie case, it dismisses the petition without proceeding to the second -
phase hearing. Larson, 847 N.W.2d at 535.
A person committed as an SDP may not be granted a full discharge unless the CAP
is satisfied that the committed person “is capable of making an acceptable adjustment to
open society, is no longer dangerous to the public, and is no longer in need of treatment
and supervision.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.31. In determining whether the petitioner has met
that burden, the CAP considers “whether specific conditions exist to provide a reasonable
degree of protection to the public and to assist the committed person in adjusting to the
community.” Id. If the petitioner does not meet that burden, the panel “shall not” grant a
full discharge. Id.
The statutory discharge criteria must also be applied consistently with the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution, which requires discharge “if no
reasonable relation exists between the original reason for commitment and the continued
confinement.” Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 318-19 (Minn. 1995). As such, a

9
committed person may remain confined only as long as they require inpatient treatment
and supervision for their sexual disorder and continue to pose a danger to the public. Id.
at 319.
We review the CAP’s dismissal of a petition under rule 41.02(b) de novo. Larson,
847 N.W.2d at 534. In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
petitioner, without weighing the evidence or assessing witness credibility. Foster v. Jesson,
857 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn. App. 2014).
Viewed in the light most favorable to Karsjens, the evidence he produced could not
establish that he is entitled to a full discharge under Minnesota Statutes section 253D.31.
Karsjens has not produced competent evidence showing that he is “capable of making an
acceptable adjustment to open society, is no longer dangerous to the public, and is no longer
in need of treatment and supervision,” Minn. Stat. § 253D.31, or that “no reasonable
relation exists between the original reason for commitment and the continued
confinement,” Call, 535 N.W.2d at 319.
The evidence Karsjens submitted with his discharge petition, viewed in his favor,
shows that he still needs treatment at least in part because he has refused to participate in
treatment. Karsjens submitted a written statement and also testified that he did not progress
in treatment and has not participated in treatment since 2015. Both Dr. Dority and
Dr. Blalock concluded in their respective reports that Karsjens has refused to participate in
treatment for either his paraphilic disorder or his personality disorder, and he remains
diagnosed with those disorders, justifying his continued commitment and need for
treatment. For example, Dr. Dority opined that Karsjens has “significant treatment needs

10
that would make him a poor candidate” for discharge; Karsjens “has [a] significant and
foundational remaining need for treatment and supervision in his current secure treatment
setting”; and, finally, Karsjens has a high risk of sexual-offense recidivism. And from
Dr. Blalock’s perspective, Karsjens’s diagnosis of other specific paraphilia disorder
remains unchanged, and he has “remaining treatment needs . . . related to sex offender
treatment.” The evidence therefore shows that Karsjens remains an untreated sex offender.
Karsjens’s testimony likewise does not support his discharge petition. He denies
that he committed a crime leading to his civil commitment and he disputes his paraphilic
and personality disorders. When asked what justifies his discharge, he testified that he has
been civilly committed for “enough time” and that “proof shows that I am not somebody
that’s a drinker, I’m not a fighter, I’m not a sexual actor outer, none of that stuff.” But that
self-serving assertion—that he believes that there is no continued basis for his continued
civil commitment—is insufficient on its own to support a discharge petition. See In re Civ.
Commitment of Poole, 921 N.W.2d 62, 69 (Minn. App. 2018) (declining to rule that “by
themselves, conclusory assertions by a committed person are sufficient to avoid dismissal
of a petition for discharge from MSOP”), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 2019).
The exhibits Karsjens submitted for the CAP’s consideration also do not support the
grant of a full discharge. His individual progress note states that he does not participate in
treatment but does comply with other institutional requirements. The client request form
seeking a substance-abuse program shows that MSOP does not have a substance-abuse
program. And his discharge plan includes no information related to his treatment progress
or whether he currently suffers from a present mental illness. Finally, his written statement

11
in support of discharge is inherently self-serving and, without more, is insufficient to
support his petition for discharge. See id.
Whether considered separately or together, none of Karsjens’s evidence could show
that he is amenable to a full discharge from civil commitment at MSOP. Aside from his
self-serving testimony, Karsjens failed to present sufficient evidence that, if proven, would
entitle him to a full discharge. We therefore conclude that the CAP properly granted the
DCT’s motion to dismiss Karsjens’s petition under rule 41.02(b) without proceeding to a
second-phase hearing.
To convince us otherwise, Karsjens contends that he produced sufficient competent
evidence that could show he no longer suffers from a mental illness and that he no longer
poses the degree of danger warranting continued commitment. He specifically argues that
Drs. Dority and Blalock testified that their diagnoses rely on historical conduct, rather than
evidence of his current symptoms. In other words, he argues that, because the record does
not include current diagnostic information that he presently suffers from paraphilic disorder
and personality disorder, the evidence he presented could show that he should be released.
And he argues that due process “requires that civil commitment remain tied to present
mental abnormality and present dangerousness—not institutional noncompliance.” To
support that proposition, Karsjens relies on In re Civ. Commitment of Harju, No. A25-2013,
2026 WL 1643961 (Minn. App. June 8, 2026), a nonprecedential opinion from this court
released nearly two months after the CAP denied Karsjens’s discharge petition. But this
nonprecedential, nonbinding authority is both inapposite and not persuasive. See Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

12
In Harju, Harju was civilly committed as an SDP in 2009 and later diagnosed with
paraphilic and personality disorders. 2026 WL 1643961, at *1. Harju engaged in treatment
until 2016, when he stopped attending treatment groups. Id. In 2022, he filed a petition
seeking transfer, provisional discharge, or full discharge from his civil commitment. Id. at
*2. The similarities to Karsjens’s case— treatment refusal, followed by a petition seeking
discharge—end here. Following the first- phase hearing, the CAP dismissed Harju’s
petition under rule 41.02(b) as it related to transfer, provisional discharge, and full
discharge under the statutory criteria, but did not dismiss his petition related to discharge
under due process. Id. The CAP found that ‘“there is sufficient competent evidence that
Harju’s sexual disorder may be in remission.’” Id. Following a second-phase hearing, the
CAP granted Harju’s discharge petition. Id.
On appeal, the DCT argued that the CAP erred because Harju’s disorder was not in
remission, as an MSOP psychologist removed the “in remission” specifier from his
paraphilic disorder diagnosis—the basis on which the CAP granted his discharge petition.
See id. at *4. We held otherwise, concluding that the CAP “did not clearly err in finding
that the [SRB] did not meet its burden to show that Harju’s mental illness was not in
remission.” Id. at *5. An MSOP psychologist diagnosed Harju with ‘“Other Specified
Paraphilic Disorder, Adolescent Pubescent Males, In Remission, In a Controlled
Environment”’ in 2023 and 2024, adding the “in remission” specifier because Harju had
“not engaged in any deviant sexual activity for an extended period of time.” Id. at *4. That
psychologist then removed the “in remission” specifier in a 2025 assessment because Harju
“did ‘not meet the criteria due to the fact that he has not spent time in the community that

13
is required.”’ Id. But as the CAP concluded, nothing in the 2025 assessment showed that
“anything changed factually or with regard to Harju’s presentation or behaviors” to warrant
the removal of the “in remission” specifier between that assessment and the 2024
assessment. Id. And the record showed that Harju’s behaviors had not changed between
the assessments and that the psychologist may have removed the “in remission” specifier
based on a more-informed understanding of the DSM-5 and a recommendation from a
senior MSOP psychologist. Id. at *5. Put differently, the record supported the CAP’s
finding that ‘“there was no clear and convincing evidence that Harju’s paraphilic disorder
that was considered”’ to be in remission was no longer in remission after the last
assessment. Id. at *4.
Here, Karsjens’s paraphilic disorder diagnosis lacks an “in remission” specifier—
and no information in the record shows that the “in remission” specifier ever applied to his
diagnosis—and the two mental- health assessments he has participated in show that h e
remains diagnosed with an active paraphilic disorder. While Harju and Karsjens each both
refused to participate in treatment for nearly a decade before seeking a full discharge,
Harju’s mental-health assessments showed that his disorder had changed while civilly
committed at MSOP, warranting the “in remission” specifier, and that a later modification
to remove that specifier was insufficient evidence to dispute that his disorder was no longer
in remission. Karsjens, on the other hand, has pointed to nothing in the exhibits he
submitted or the testimony he submitted at the CAP hearing to show that his behavior has
changed since he was committed to MSOP in 2010, nor anything undermining the
diagnoses he has received, aside from his own self- serving testimony. While Karsjens

14
correctly states that civil commitment must remain tied to present mental abnormality and
present dangerousness, nothing aside from his own testimony shows that he no longer
suffers from such a disorder. And a committed person’s “conclusory assertions,” without
more, are insufficient “to avoid dismissal of a petition for discharge from MSOP.” Poole,
921 N.W.2d at 69.
Instead, both Dr. Blalock and Dr. Dority testified that the paraphilic disorder and
personality disorder diagnoses remain applicable to Karsjens. As explained above,
Karsjens has refused treatment for nearly a decade and does not self-report any symptoms.
And Karsjens’s own submissions, through the reports from Drs. Dority and Blalock, show
that he is presently diagnosed with a paraphilic disorder and remains a danger to the public.
See In re Blodgett , 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 1994) (“It also seems somewhat
incongruous that a sexual offender should be able to prove he is untreatable by refusing
treatment.”).
We therefore conclude that the CAP did not err by dismissing Karsjens’s petition.
Affirmed.