City of Blaine Police Department v. John Mark Luedtke

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS

City of Blaine Police Department,

Respondent,

vs.

John Mark Luedtke,

Appellant.

SPECIAL
TERM
ORDER1
A26-1042
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Rasmusson,
Judge.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:
This appeal was filed on June 17, 2026. According to the notice of appeal, appellant
John Luedtke seeks review of an April 13, 2026 order. In a June 23, 2026 order, we
questioned (a) whether the April 13, 2026 order extending the extreme risk protection order
until a continued hearing granted temporary relief; (b) if so, whether the April 13, 2026
order is a final order; and (c) if not, whether this appeal must be dismissed as taken from a
nonappealable order. The parties filed informal memoranda.

1 Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order is nonprecedential, except
as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
2

The register of actions indicates that, on April 29, 2024, the district court filed an
order granting respondent City of Blaine Police Department’s petition for an extreme risk
protection order regarding appellant. In an April 18, 2025 order, the district court granted
respondent’s application for an extension of the extreme risk protection order, extending it
until April 17, 2026.
On March 31, 2026, respondent filed an application to extend the extreme risk
protection order a second time. In an April 13, 2026 order, the district court continued a
hearing on respondent’s application to extend the extreme risk protection order until May
12, 2026, and extended the order until the continued hearing.
2
1. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b)
Appellant contends that the April 13, 2026 continuance order is independently
appealable under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b), which allows an appeal “from an order
which grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to dissolve, an injunction.”
Appellant argues that an extreme risk protection order under Minn. Stat. § 624.7171,
subd. 4(a) (2024), is in the nature of an injunction because the order “enjoin[s] and
prohibit[s] the respondent from possessing or purchasing firearms for as long as the order
remains in effect.” Appellant asserts that the continuance order granted some of the
substantive relief sought by the application to extend the extreme risk protection order by
enjoining and prohibiting appellant from possessing or purchasing firearms for a defined

2 The district court subsequently continued the hearing until August 5, 2026.
3

period. Appellant argues that the continuance order did not preserve the status quo because
it extended the extreme risk protection order beyond its end date.
In Howard v. Svoboda, the supreme court ruled that we lack appellate jurisdiction
to consider a district court’s protective order under rule 103.03(b) because it “was neither
styled as, nor had the characteristics of, an injunction.” 890 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Minn.
2017). The supreme court reasoned that (1) the district court issued only what it styled as
a protective order and expressly declined to reach a motion for injunctive relief, (2) the
district court did not apply the equitable factors required for granting or denying a motion
for a temporary injunction, and (3) the merits of the underlying professional-negligence
claim were not at issue. Id. at 114-15.
Recently, in In re Trust by Johnson, 25 N.W.3d 880, 882 (Minn. 2025), the supreme
court held that an order requiring a trustee to restore real property, removing a trustee from
two family trusts, and appointing a successor trustee was not appealable under rule
103.03(b). The supreme court noted that “[j]ust because a court order directs one party to
affirmatively act does not create an injunction.” Johnson, 25 N.W.3d at 888 (quotation
omitted). The supreme court reasoned that the trust order was not in the nature of an
injunction because no party expressly requested an injunction, the district court did not
analyze the trust petition as a request for injunctive relief, and the district court’s order
decided the merits of part of the underlying petition. Id. at 889-90, 892-93.
Here, respondent filed an application to extend the extreme risk protection order for
an additional year. In the application, respondent requested a hearing on the request for an
4

extension. In the event that the district court found it appropriate to wait for our decision
in a related appeal before holding a hearing, respondent requested “a temporary extension
of the existing Order until a hearing can be convened following” our decision in the related
appeal. In the April 13, 2026 order, the district court continued a hearing on the request
for an extension and extended the extreme risk protection order until the continued hearing
because the court “ordered service by alternate means and the hearing must be continued
to allow time for completion of service.”
Respondent did not file a motion for a temporary injunction. The district court’s
April 13, 2026 order is not styled as an injunction, and the district court did not analyze
any of the equitable factors for an injunction under Dahlberg Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 137
N.W.2d 314, 321- 22 (Minn. 1965), including respondent’s likelihood of success on the
merits. We conclude that the April 13, 2026 order continuing the hearing and temporarily
extending the extreme risk protection order did not effectively grant an injunction. The
April 13, 2026 continuance order is therefore not appealable under Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
103.03(b) as an order granting an injunction.
2. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g)
Appellant contends that the April 13, 2026 continuance order is independently
appealable under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g).
An appeal may be taken from a “final order, decision or judgment affecting a
substantial right made in an administrative or other special proceeding.” Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 103.03(g). A decision is “final” under rule 103.03(g) when “the matter is
5

conclusively terminated so far as the court issuing the order is concerned, and the court
anticipates no further action on the matter.” In re Est. of Figliuzzi, 979 N.W.2d 225, 231
(Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). An order granting or denying temporary relief is
generally not appealable as of right. See Hennepin County v. Griffin, 429 N.W.2d 283,
283-84 (Minn. App. 1988) (dismissing appeal of order denying temporary custody).
Appellant argues that the April 13, 2026 continuance order is a final order because
it “decided one matter: whether appellant would remain enjoined from April 13, 2026 until
the continued hearing” and “[t]hat matter was conclusively terminated the moment the
order was issued.” Appellant asserts that respondent’s pending application to extend the
extreme risk protection order seeks different relief from the relief granted in the
continuance order and that respondent’s pending application therefore does not affect the
finality of the continuance order.
Respondent argues that the April 13, 2026 continuance order was “a temporary
order that maintained the status quo until the court could properly dispose of the substantive
issues.” Respondent asserts that the continuance order allowed the existing extreme risk
protection order, “which was already in place, to remain in place while the district court
addressed the substantive issues of [respondent’s] petition.” Respondent notes that
appellant is “guaranteed a hearing on the merits of [respondent’s] petition.
Respondent initiated a special proceeding by filing the application to extend the
extreme risk protection order. The April 13, 2026 continuance order temporarily extended
the extreme risk protection order until a continued hearing. Because the continuance order
6

did not resolve respondent’s application to extend the extreme risk protection order, the
April 13, 2026 continuance order is not a final order appealable under Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 103.03(g).
3. Discretionary Review
In the alternative, appellant requests that we grant discretionary review over the
April 13, 2026 order in the interests of justice.
“Upon the petition of a party, in the interests of justice the Court of Appeals may
allow an appeal from an order not otherwise appealable pursuant to Rule 103.03 except an
order made during trial . . . .” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 105.01. A petition for disc retionary
review must be filed within 30 days of the filing of the order. Id.
Appellant did not file a timely petition for discretionary review, and respondent has
not had an opportunity to respond to appellant’s request for discretionary review.
Appellant cites no binding authority that allows us to grant discretionary review over a
nonappealable order in the absence of a timely petition for discretionary review under
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 105.01. Because the April 13, 2026 order being appealed is not
appealable, we must dismiss this appeal.
On July 6, 2026, appellant filed a motion for an extension to order the transcript.
Because this appeal is being dismissed, we deny appellant’s motion as moot.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. This appeal is dismissed.
7
2. Appellant’s July 6, 2026 motion for an extension to order the transcript is
denied as moot.
3. This order shall not be construed as expressing an opinion on any matters
pending in district court.
4. The clerk of the appellate courts shall provide copies of this order to the
Honorable Karin McCarthy, the self-represented appellant, counsel for respondent, and the
district court administrator.
Dated: July 21, 2026
BY THE COURT
_________________________________
Michelle A. Larkin
Presiding Judge
_________________________________
Michelle A. Larkin