A26-1072 Nonprecedential Dismissed Processed

Reichel Foods, Inc., Stowaway Storage, LLC, et al v. Loretta Lynn Taylor, et al

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed July 14, 2026

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Opinion text

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS

Reichel Foods, Inc.,

Appellant,

Stowaway Storage, LLC, et al.,

Defendants,

vs.

Loretta Lynn Taylor, et al.,

Respondents.

SPECIAL
TERM
ORDER1
A26-1072
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:
This appeal was filed on June 24, 2026. According to the notice of appeal, appellant
Reichel Foods, Inc. (Reichel) seeks review of a May 21, 2026 judgment. In a June 25,
2026 order, we questioned (a) whether the May 21, 2026 judgment adjudicated the amount
of respondent Loretta Lynn Taylor’s attorney fees and costs; (b) if not, whether the May
21, 2026 judgment fully resolved Taylor’s indemnification counterclaim; (c) if not,

1 Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order is nonprecedential, except
as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
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whether the May 21, 2026 judgment is a final judgment; and (d) if not, whether this appeal
must be dismissed as premature. The parties filed informal memoranda.
The register of actions indicates that Reichel sued Taylor and respondent Tanner
Joe Young in 2022, asserting claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment
against Taylor and a claim of unjust enrichment against Young. Taylor asserted an
indemnification counterclaim requesting “fees, costs and disbursements.” In a May 21,
2026 order, the district court dismissed Reichel’s claims against Taylor and Young. The
district court determined that Taylor “established the required elements under Minn. Stat.
§ 302A.521, subd. 2[,] for indemnification” and stated that Reichel “must indemnify her
for all her reasonable expenses, including attorney fees and disbursements, incurred in
connection with this action.” On May 21, 2026, the district court entered judgment on the
May 21, 2026 order. On June 4, 2026, Taylor filed a motion requesting attorney fees and
costs.
An appeal may be taken from a final judgment. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(a).
A pending attorney-fee issue generally does not affect the finality of a judgment unless
(1) “the request for attorney fees is a separate claim, independent of the underlying claim
or claims that comprise the merits of the action,” or (2) “an award of attorney fees is part
of the damages that may be awarded on a claim.” Weiss v. Priv. Cap., LLC, 839 N.W.2d
106
, 109 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotations omitted).
Reichel contends that the May 21, 2026 judgment is a final judgment because it
fully resolved all the claims in this case. Reichel argues that the nature and extent of
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Taylor’s legal expenses “were elements of her claim for indemnification, not merely parts
of her damages nor issues that were collateral to or independent of her claim.” Reichel
asserts that Taylor was required to prove Taylor’s legal expenses at trial, not move for them
later. Reichel argues that by adjudicating Taylor’s indemnification counterclaim “without
awarding her any damages and then entering judgment, the district court implicitly found
that [Taylor] had not proven her damages at trial.”
Taylor and Young contend that the May 21, 2026 judgment is not a final judgment
because it did not fully adjudicate Taylor’s counterclaim. They argue that attorney fees
and costs are the “substantive relief the counterclaim exists to obtain” and that the district
court “could not fully adjudicate the counterclaim without determining both entitlement
and the amount of indemnification.” They assert that this appeal is premature because the
district court has not adjudicated the amount of Taylor’s attorney fees and costs.
In the May 21, 2026 order, the district court determined that Taylor was entitled to
indemnification but did not determine the amount of Taylor’s attorney fees and costs, the
damages for that claim. The May 21, 2026 judgment therefore did not fully resolve
Taylor’s indemnification counterclaim and is not a final judgment. See Weiss, 839 N.W.2d
at 109 (explaining that a pending attorney-fee issue renders a judgment nonfinal if an award
of attorney fees is part of the damages that may be awarded on a claim). This appeal is
premature.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. This appeal is dismissed as premature.
2. Reichel may seek review of the May 21, 2026 judgment in a timely appeal
from a final judgment fully resolving the indemnification counterclaim. Reichel’s filing
fee for that appeal shall be waived. Reichel shall file a copy of this order with the appeal
documents for any such future appeal, if filed.
3. The clerk of the appellate courts shall provide copies of this order to the
Honorable Pamela A.W. King, counsel of record, and the district court administrator.
Dated: July 14, 2026
BY THE COURT
_________________________________
Michelle A. Larkin
Presiding Judge
_________________________________
Michelle A. Larkin