Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440.

78 citing documents.

  • State v. Hawes 801 N.W.2d 659 Minn. 2011
  • State v. Hawes 801 N.W.2d 659 Minn. 2011
    covered evidence, a defendant must establish: “(1) that the evidence was not known to him or to his counsel at the time of trial, (2) that his failure to learn of it before trial was not due to the lack of diligence, (3) that the evidence is material ..., and (4) that the evidence will probably produce either an acquittal at a retrial or results more favorable to the petitioner.”
  • Scherf v. State 788 N.W.2d 504 Minn. 2010
  • Scherf v. State 788 N.W.2d 504 Minn. 2010
    “A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of establishing, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, facts which would warrant a reopening of the case.”
  • State v. Jenkins 782 N.W.2d 211 Minn. 2010
  • State v. Jenkins 782 N.W.2d 211 Minn. 2010
    See, (affirming two consecutive life sentences for the murder of two students); (holding that trial court abused its discretion in imposing concurrent sentences, as opposed to consecutive sentences, upon defendant who shot and killed three victims at close range); (holding that three consecutive life sentences were commensurate of de
  • State v. Yang 774 N.W.2d 539 Minn. 2009
  • State v. Yang 774 N.W.2d 539 Minn. 2009
    In determining whether a sentence has exaggerated the criminality of a defendant’s conduct, we take guidance from past sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants, McLaughlin, d at 715 , to consider whether “the sentences are commensurate with the defendant’s culpability,” -52 (Minn.1999).
  • Whittaker v. State 753 N.W.2d 668 Minn. 2008
  • Whittaker v. State 753 N.W.2d 668 Minn. 2008
    This test is also applicable when, as here, the petitioner’s claim is based on evidence that is technically “newly available,” rather than “newly discovered.”
  • State v. McLaughlin 725 N.W.2d 703 Minn. 2007
  • State v. McLaughlin 725 N.W.2d 703 Minn. 2007
    Citing State v. 'Warren, the court concluded that the mitigating and aggravating factors “balance each other” and that consecutive sentences were “proportional to other sentences given for *712 similar conduct.”
  • State v. Mogler 719 N.W.2d 201 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
  • State v. Mogler 719 N.W.2d 201 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
  • State v. Jones 678 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2004
  • State v. Jones 678 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2004
  • Meemken v. State 662 N.W.2d 146 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
  • Meemken v. State 662 N.W.2d 146 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
    The postconviction petitioner “has the burden of establishing, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, facts which would warrant a reopening of the case.” (quotation omitted).
  • Pierson v. State 637 N.W.2d 571 Minn. 2002
  • Pierson v. State 637 N.W.2d 571 Minn. 2002
  • State v. Myers 627 N.W.2d 58 Minn. 2001
  • State v. Myers 627 N.W.2d 58 Minn. 2001
  • State v. Fedor 628 N.W.2d 164 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
  • State v. Fedor 628 N.W.2d 164 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
  • State v. Law 620 N.W.2d 562 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
  • State v. Law 620 N.W.2d 562 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
    But the abuse of discretion standard is not “a *565 limitless grant of power to the trial court.”
  • State v. Franklin 604 N.W.2d 79 Minn. 2000
  • State v. Franklin 604 N.W.2d 79 Minn. 2000
    While this standard recognizes a district court’s broad discretion in sentencing, “it is not a limitless grant of power to the [district] court.”