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that if a suspect’s equivocal reference to counsel arguably may be considered to be a request for counsel, then further interrogation must cease until the police have clarified the earlier comment to determine whether the suspect truly wants counsel before submitting to further interrogation.

The trial court suppressed the confession because during the interrogation defendant indicated he wanted to see his attorney and Detective Williams did not clarify defendant’s

Subsequent to the interrogation and confession in this case, we held that when a suspect who is in custody “arguably” invokes the right to counsel, all questioning by the police must cease except to “clarify the earlier comment and to ascertain the ac *711 cused’s true desires respecting the aid of counsel.” see also Comment, The Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation: Equivocal References to an Attorney — Determining What Statements or Conduct Should Constitute an Accused’s Invocation

1880, 1884-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)

Illustrative Minnesota cases include: -31 (Minn.1988) (erroneous failure to caution jury not to base verdict of guilt on conduct occurring outside period of statute of limitations); (erroneous admission of in-custody statement given by accused after he had requested but been denied his constitutional right to counsel); (prosecutor’s failure to disclose evidence that might have been used to impeach key prosecution witness); State v.

824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)

2174, 2175, 2177-78 , 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (“Assuming, arguendo, that the challenged testimony should have been excluded” as being obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel, “any error in its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); -26 (Minn.1988) (erroneous admission of in-custody statement obtained in violation of the Edwards rule was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).