Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State Ex Rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490.

159 citing documents.

State Ex Rel. Sviggum v. Hanson 732 N.W.2d 312 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
(linking standing to availability of relief); (noting that case is moot if courts cannot “grant effectual relief’); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 , 82 S.Ct.
In Re Petition for Decertification 730 N.W.2d 300 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
Petition for Decertification of an Exclusive Representative Certain Employees of the University of Minnesota, Unit 9, Crookston v. … 730 N.W.2d 300 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
Petition for Decertification of an Exclusive Representative Certain Employees of the University of Minnesota, Unit 9, Crookston v. … 730 N.W.2d 300 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
The goal of this requirement “is to ensure that issues before the courts will be ‘vigorously and adequately presented.’ ” State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., (citation omitted).
In Re Petition for Decertification 730 N.W.2d 300 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
The goal of this requirement "is to ensure that issues before the courts will be `vigorously and adequately presented.'" State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., (citation omitted).
In Re Block 727 N.W.2d 166 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
In Re Block 727 N.W.2d 166 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
Toth v. Arason 722 N.W.2d 437 Minn. 2006
Toth v. Arason 722 N.W.2d 437 Minn. 2006
Lorix v. Crompton Corp. 720 N.W.2d 15 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Lorix v. Crompton Corp. 720 N.W.2d 15 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
To have standing, a party must have “a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy.” (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 , 92 S.Ct.
Liabo v. Wayzata Nissan, LLC 707 N.W.2d 715 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Liabo v. Wayzata Nissan, LLC 707 N.W.2d 715 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Groups, Inc., (discussing policy and purpose underlying the MCFA); State by Humphrey v. Phillip Morris, Inc., (stating that the DTPA is broadly construed to enhance consumer protection).
Hanson v. Woolston 701 N.W.2d 257 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
Hanson v. Woolston 701 N.W.2d 257 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
The purpose of the standing requirement is to ensure that issues before *262 the court will be “vigorously and adequately presented.” State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., (quotation omitted).
Pollard v. Southdale Gardens of Edina Condominium Ass'n 698 N.W.2d 449 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
Pollard v. Southdale Gardens of Edina Condominium Ass'n 698 N.W.2d 449 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
“Standing is the requirement that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.” State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 , 92 S.Ct.
In Re Estate of Mealey 695 N.W.2d 143 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
In Re Estate of Mealey 695 N.W.2d 143 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
“Standing is a requirement that a party has sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.”
Gale v. Rittenhouse 686 N.W.2d 50 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Gale v. Rittenhouse 686 N.W.2d 50 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
“Standing is the requirement that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.”
Rukavina v. Pawlenty 684 N.W.2d 525 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Rukavina v. Pawlenty 684 N.W.2d 525 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
“Standing is the requirement that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.”
State Ex Rel. Hatch v. Allina Health System 679 N.W.2d 400 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
State Ex Rel. Hatch v. Allina Health System 679 N.W.2d 400 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
“Standing is the requirement that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.” State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc.
Edina Community Lutheran Church v. State 673 N.W.2d 517 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Edina Community Lutheran Church v. State 673 N.W.2d 517 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc.
Alliance for Metropolitan Stability v. Metropolitan Council 671 N.W.2d 905 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
Alliance for Metropolitan Stability v. Metropolitan Council 671 N.W.2d 905 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
6 “Standing, is the requirement that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.” State v. Philip Morris, Inc., (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 , 92 S.Ct.
Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church 672 N.W.2d 13 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church 672 N.W.2d 13 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
Wiegand v. Walser Automotive Groups, Inc. 670 N.W.2d 449 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
Nash v. Wollan 656 N.W.2d 585 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
Nash v. Wollan 656 N.W.2d 585 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
the supreme court addressed the issue of whether the State of Minnesota and Blue Cross had standing under Minnesota’s antitrust statute as well as consumer-protection statutes relating to consumer fraud, unlawful and deceptive trade practices, and false advertising.
Schiff v. Griffin 639 N.W.2d 56 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
Schiff v. Griffin 639 N.W.2d 56 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
Standing is an aspect of justicia-bility that requires a party to have “a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.” (citation omitted).
Conwed Corp. v. Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Co. 634 N.W.2d 401 Minn. 2001
Improvement of County Ditch No. 86, Branch 1 v. Phillips 625 N.W.2d 813 Minn. 2001
Improvement of County Ditch No. 86, Branch 1 v. Phillips 625 N.W.2d 813 Minn. 2001
Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc. 621 N.W.2d 2 Minn. 2001
Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc. 621 N.W.2d 2 Minn. 2001
(Humphrey), where we held that Blue Cross Blue Shield of Minnesota (Blue Cross), a nonprofit health care organization similar in many respects to the HMOs, had standing to bring substantially identical claims against the tobacco companies under the same statutes, even though there was no allegation that Bl
Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp. 615 N.W.2d 397 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp. 615 N.W.2d 397 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
Louis Park, (finding municipality’s duty of care with regard to fire code violations when municipality assumes to act for the protection of others, as distinguished from acting merely for itself when it inspects property for fire-code violations); see also State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., (“[Ojne who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.”).
Hoang Minh Ly v. Nystrom 615 N.W.2d 302 Minn. 2000
Hoang Minh Ly v. Nystrom 615 N.W.2d 302 Minn. 2000
See State v. Philip Morris, Inc., (stating consumer protection statutes “are generally very broadly construed to enhance consumer protection”).
In Re the Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minnesota 606 N.W.2d 697 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
In Re the Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minnesota 606 N.W.2d 697 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
-97 (Minn.1996) (concluding that, in enacting Minn.Stat.
Conant v. Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P. 603 N.W.2d 143 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Conant v. Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P. 603 N.W.2d 143 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
(addressing specific statutory and common law requirements of claims in analyzing standing issue).
Dennis Simmons D.D.S., P.A. v. Modern Aero, Inc. 603 N.W.2d 336 Minn. Ct. App. 1999