Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Coley, 468 N.W.2d 552.

18 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2026
(“The victim’s uncontradicted testimony constituted direct evidence of [the] crimes.”).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
-92 (Minn. 1993) (“At trial, the state’s only direct evidence that the child was abused came from the child herself.”); see also State v. Coley , (“The victim’s uncontradicted testimony constituted 8 direct evidence of his crimes.”).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
-92 (Minn. 1993) (“At trial, the state’s only direct evidence that the child was abused came from the child herself.”); State v. Coley , (“The victim’s uncontradicted testimony constituted direct evidence of his 7 crimes.”).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
(stating that the “only direct evidence presented by the state was the testimony of the alleged victim” of criminal sexual conduct); (“The victim’s uncontradicted testimony constituted direct evidence of [the defendant’s] crimes.”).
Dean Robert Hoversten, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
(), rev. granted (Minn. Mar.
State of Minnesota, Respondent Minn. Ct. App. 2022
This supports the district court’s conclusion that Vanengen’s offense was more serious than typical because “the victim’s home [was] no longer the island of security upon which the victim has previously relied, thereby making the offense particularly cruel.” 7 For these reasons, we conclude that the jury and the district court did not err because an aggravated sentence for criminal sexual conduct against a sleeping victim may be based on the offense occurring within the victim’s zone of privacy
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
The “[v]iolation of a restraining order is a valid reason for an upward departure.” State v. Coley
State v. Martinson 671 N.W.2d 887 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
State v. Martinson 671 N.W.2d 887 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
State v. Copeland 656 N.W.2d 599 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
State v. Copeland 656 N.W.2d 599 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
(affirming zone-of-privacy departure where “[t]he victim’s home [was] no longer the ‘island of securi *604 ty’ upon which the victim has previously relied.”).
State v. Butterfield 555 N.W.2d 526 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State v. Butterfield 555 N.W.2d 526 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
(district court properly relied on elements of assault to depart on kidnapping sentence when defendant was not sentenced for assault); (district court improperly used conduct that resulted in murder conviction and sentence to justify aggrav
State v. Davis 546 N.W.2d 30 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State v. Davis 546 N.W.2d 30 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
See, -56 (Minn.App.1991) (recognizing death threats and violation of the victim’s zone of privacy as aggravating factors); Gaines, d at 917-18 (recognizing gratuitous infliction of pain and multiple forms of penetration as aggravating factors); (citing death t
State v. Rodriguez 505 N.W.2d 373 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
State v. Yanez 469 N.W.2d 452 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
State v. Yanez 469 N.W.2d 452 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
*457 In Garcia, d at 647 , the court held that in sentencing on a kidnapping conviction, the trial court “should be permitted to consider what happened during the kidnapping.” (Minn.App.