Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70.

69 citing documents.

Matter of Welfare of A. J. B. 929 N.W.2d 840 Minn. 2019
Matter of Welfare of A. J. B. 929 N.W.2d 840 Minn. 2019
76 (Minn. 1996) ; Act of May 6, 1997, ch. 96, § 7, 1997 Minn. Laws 694 , 700 (adding subdivision 1a to the stalking statute).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
State v. Orsello , superseded by statute Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
In State v. Orsello , , the supreme court stated “that Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (1993), which defines the crime of stalking, requires specific intent.” Id.
State of Minnesota v. Gary Lee Hanson, Jr. Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Gary Lee Hanson, Jr. Minn. Ct. App. 2017
superseded by statute, 1997 Minn. Laws ch. 96, § 7, at 700.
State of Minnesota v. Donald Joseph Hall, Jr. 887 N.W.2d 847 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
1993 Minn. Laws, ch. 326, art. 2, § 22 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (1994)); (noting that the murder of a celebrity by an obsessed fan precipitated a nationwide effort to enact stalking statutes), superseded by statute on other grounds, Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd.
State of Minnesota v. Renee Anita Vasko Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Renee Anita Vasko Minn. Ct. App. 2016
The rule of lenity exists for one reason: “to ensure fair public notice of what action is prohibited by the criminal statutes.” (emphasis added) (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427, 105 S. Ct. 2084, 2089 (1985)), as amended on reh’g (Oct.
State v. Wenthe 845 N.W.2d 222 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State v. Wenthe 845 N.W.2d 222 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
(noting that parallels between existing criminal statutes requiring specific intent and stalking statute “militate toward finding that the stalking statute also requires specific intent”), review denied (Minn. July 16,1
State v. Wilson 830 N.W.2d 849 Minn. 2013
State v. Wilson 830 N.W.2d 849 Minn. 2013
(observing the absence of mental state language codified at section 609.02, subdivision 9, but interpreting statutory language at issue to determine whether the statute required general or specific intent), superseded by statute on other grounds; see also Minn.Stat.
State v. Ndikum 815 N.W.2d 816 Minn. 2012
State v. Ndikum 815 N.W.2d 816 Minn. 2012
State v. Fleck 810 N.W.2d 303 Minn. 2012
State v. Fleck 810 N.W.2d 303 Minn. 2012
(explaining that "[t]he meaning of the word 'intent' in criminal law is, given its use in so many similar terms, at the very least, confusing”), superseded by statute on other grounds; LaFave, supra, § 5.2(e) (explaining that "[m]uch of the existing uncertainty as to the precise meaning of the word 'in
State v. Pegelow 809 N.W.2d 245 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
State v. Pegelow 809 N.W.2d 245 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
See 1993 Minn. Laws ch. 326, art. 2, § 22, at 2010-11; -72 (Minn.1996) (noting that many states enacted anti-stalking laws following the 1989 murder of a television actress), superseded by statute on other grounds, Minn. Stat. § 609.749 , subd.
State v. Netland 762 N.W.2d 202 Minn. 2009
State v. Vance 734 N.W.2d 650 Minn. 2007
State v. Vance 734 N.W.2d 650 Minn. 2007
(superseded by statute on other grounds).
Auringer v. State 695 N.W.2d 640 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
Auringer v. State 695 N.W.2d 640 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
A reviewing court’s goal in statutory interpretation is “to give effect to the intention *644 of the legislature in drafting the statute.”
State v. Al-Naseer 678 N.W.2d 679 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
State v. Al-Naseer 678 N.W.2d 679 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
“[A] criminal state of mind, or a criminal intent, is a necessary element of any crime having its origin in common law.” ().
State v. Arkell 672 N.W.2d 564 Minn. 2003
State v. Arkell 672 N.W.2d 564 Minn. 2003
State v. Wohlsol, Inc. 670 N.W.2d 292 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
State v. Wohlsol, Inc. 670 N.W.2d 292 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
State v. Iverson 664 N.W.2d 346 Minn. 2003
State v. Iverson 664 N.W.2d 346 Minn. 2003
“Our goal in cases involving statutory interpretation is, of course, to give effect to the intention of the legislature in drafting the statute.” (alternate holding superceded by statute).
Education Minnesota-Chisholm v. Independent School District No. 695 662 N.W.2d 139 Minn. 2003
Educ. Mn-Chisholm v. Ind. Sch. Dist. 662 N.W.2d 139 Minn. 2003
Education Minnesota-Chisholm v. Independent School District No. 695 662 N.W.2d 139 Minn. 2003
see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2002) (“The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”).
Educ. Mn-Chisholm v. Ind. Sch. Dist. 662 N.W.2d 139 Minn. 2003
see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2002) ("The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.").
State v. Jones 649 N.W.2d 481 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
State v. Jones 649 N.W.2d 481 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
King v. State 649 N.W.2d 149 Minn. 2002
King v. State 649 N.W.2d 149 Minn. 2002
and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct.
State v. Compassionate Home Care, Inc. 639 N.W.2d 393 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
State v. Compassionate Home Care, Inc. 639 N.W.2d 393 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
State v. Stevenson 637 N.W.2d 857 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
State v. Stevenson 637 N.W.2d 857 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
State v. Larkin 620 N.W.2d 335 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
State v. Larkin 620 N.W.2d 335 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
Because the district court believed “it is ambiguous whether a brief period of unconsciousness can be charac *338 terized as ‘substantial bodily harm,’ ” it applied the rule of lenity, under which “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity towards the defendant.” (quotation and citations omitted).
In Re Welfare of C.R.M. 611 N.W.2d 802 Minn. 2000
In Re Welfare of C.R.M. 611 N.W.2d 802 Minn. 2000
Our determination that the legislature intended to create a strict liability crime can only be reached after a careful and close examination of the statutory language, and we are to apply the “rule of lenity” requiring penal statutes to be strictly construed -in favor of a criminal defendant.
State v. Loge 608 N.W.2d 152 Minn. 2000
State v. Loge 608 N.W.2d 152 Minn. 2000
§§ 645.16, 645.17(2) (1998); -76 (Minn.1996).