Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Nusbaum v. County of Blue Earth, 422 N.W.2d 713.

181 citing documents.

Olmanson v. Le Sueur County 673 N.W.2d 506 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Zaske Ex Rel. Bratsch v. Lee 651 N.W.2d 527 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
Zaske Ex Rel. Bratsch v. Lee 651 N.W.2d 527 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
Fear v. Independent School District 911 634 N.W.2d 204 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
Fear v. Independent School District 911 634 N.W.2d 204 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
Conlin v. City of Saint Paul 605 N.W.2d 396 Minn. 2000
Conlin v. City of Saint Paul 605 N.W.2d 396 Minn. 2000
In addition, each case must be analyzed by focusing on “whether the legislature intended to immunize the particular government activity that is the subject of the tort action.”
Fisher v. County of Rock 596 N.W.2d 646 Minn. 1999
Fisher v. County of Rock 596 N.W.2d 646 Minn. 1999
Doe v. Park Center High School 592 N.W.2d 131 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Doe v. Park Center High School 592 N.W.2d 131 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Bloss v. University of Minnesota Board of Regents 590 N.W.2d 661 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Bloss v. University of Minnesota Board of Regents 590 N.W.2d 661 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
(first step in statutory immunity analysis is to identify precise governmental conduct in question).
Christensen v. Mower County 587 N.W.2d 305 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Christensen v. Mower County 587 N.W.2d 305 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
S.W. v. Spring Lake Park School District No. 16 580 N.W.2d 19 Minn. 1998
S.W. v. Spring Lake Park School District No. 16 580 N.W.2d 19 Minn. 1998
Gerber v. Neveaux 578 N.W.2d 399 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Gerber v. Neveaux 578 N.W.2d 399 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Statutory immunity Rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers, statutory immunity is intended to prevent courts from second-guessing “policy-making activities that are legislative or executive in nature.”
Angell v. Hennepin County Regional Rail Authority 578 N.W.2d 343 Minn. 1998
Angell v. Hennepin County Regional Rail Authority 578 N.W.2d 343 Minn. 1998
Berg v. Hubbard County 578 N.W.2d 12 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Berg v. Hubbard County 578 N.W.2d 12 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
The supreme court has held: Statutory immunity exists to prevent- the courts from conducting an after-the-fact review that second-guesses “certain policy-making activities that are legislative or executive in nature.”
Riedel v. Goodwin 574 N.W.2d 753 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Riedel v. Goodwin 574 N.W.2d 753 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Additionally, the supreme court has held that: Statutory immunity exists to prevent the courts from conducting an after-the-fact review which second-guesses “certain policy-making activities that are legislative or executive in nature.”
Landview Landscaping, Inc. v. Minnehaha Creek Watershed District 569 N.W.2d 237 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Landview Landscaping, Inc. v. Minnehaha Creek Watershed District 569 N.W.2d 237 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
6, is “to prevent courts from passing judgment ‘on policy decisions entrusted to coordinate branches of government.’ ” Waste Recovery, d at 332 ()
S.W. v. Spring Lake Park School District No. 16 566 N.W.2d 366 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
S.W. v. Spring Lake Park School District No. 16 566 N.W.2d 366 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Angell v. Hennepin County 565 N.W.2d 475 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Angell v. Hennepin County 565 N.W.2d 475 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
It is intended to prevent courts from second-guessing “ ‘policy-making activities that are legislative or executive in nature.’ ” Watson, d at 412 (Minn.1996) ().
Gleason v. Metropolitan Council Transit Operations 563 N.W.2d 309 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Gleason v. Metropolitan Council Transit Operations 563 N.W.2d 309 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
The purpose of statutory immunity is rooted in the separation of powers — to prevent courts from second guessing ‘“policy-making activities that are legislative or executive in nature.’ ” Watson, d at 412 ().
Ai Viet Thi Nguyen v. Phu Chau Nguyen 565 N.W.2d 721 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Ai Viet Thi Nguyen v. Phu Chau Nguyen 565 N.W.2d 721 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
To determine whether discretionary immunity applies, the courts must “identify the precise government conduct being challenged.”
Norton v. County of Le Sueur 565 N.W.2d 447 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Cousin v. Hennepin County Medical Center 565 N.W.2d 443 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Cousin v. Hennepin County Medical Center 565 N.W.2d 443 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Norton v. County of Le Sueur 565 N.W.2d 447 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Terwilliger v. Hennepin County 561 N.W.2d 909 Minn. 1997
Terwilliger v. Hennepin County 561 N.W.2d 909 Minn. 1997
Accordingly, when “determining whether particular conduct is protected, we have interpreted the discretionary function exception narrowly and have focused on the purpose underlying [the statute].” Holmquist, d at 231 ; -22 (Minn.1988); Larson v. Independent Sch.
In Re Alexandria Accident of February 8, 1994 561 N.W.2d 543 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
In Re Alexandria Accident of February 8, 1994 561 N.W.2d 543 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Davis v. Hennepin County 559 N.W.2d 117 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Davis v. Hennepin County 559 N.W.2d 117 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Its intent is to prevent courts from second- *121 guessing “‘policy-making activities that are legislative or executive in nature.’ ” Watson v. Metropolitan Transit Comm’n, ().
Zank v. Larson 552 N.W.2d 719 Minn. 1996
Zank v. Larson 552 N.W.2d 719 Minn. 1996
The issue is not whether the government action involved the exercise of discretion in a general sense, because almost every government function does involve some exercise of discretion, but rather whether the challenged activity “involved a balancing of policy objectives.”
Watson v. Metropolitan Transit Commission 553 N.W.2d 406 Minn. 1996
Johnson v. State 553 N.W.2d 40 Minn. 1996
Janklow v. Minnesota Board of Examiners for Nursing Home Administrators 552 N.W.2d 711 Minn. 1996