Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1.

27 citing documents.

Jane Doe 271, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
Kemp, the supreme court “view[ed] the language” of a previous version of the statute as “simply a legislative pronouncement that ‘personal injury caused by sexual abuse,’ as opposed to personal injury caused by any other activity, is entitled to a different limitation period because of its uniqueness and because of the difficulties atte ndant on the victim’s often repressed recollections.”
Doe v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis 817 N.W.2d 150 Minn. 2012
Doe v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis 817 N.W.2d 150 Minn. 2012
John Doe 76C v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis 801 N.W.2d 203 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
John Doe 76C v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis 801 N.W.2d 203 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
l abuse or negligently permitting sexual abuse “must be commenced within six years of the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse.” Because “concepts of sexual abuse and injury within the meaning of this statute are essentially one and the same, not separable[,] as a matter of law one is ‘injured’ if one is sexually abused.”
Lickteig v. Kolar 782 N.W.2d 810 Minn. 2010
Lickteig v. Kolar 782 N.W.2d 810 Minn. 2010
(internal quotation marks omitted).
D.M.S. v. Barber 645 N.W.2d 383 Minn. 2002
D.M.S. v. Barber 645 N.W.2d 383 Minn. 2002
we observed that “as a matter of law one is ‘injured’ if one is sexually abused,” and stated that the “ultimate question” posed by the delayed discovery statute is “the time at which the complainant knew or should have known that he/she was sexually abused.” Id.
D.M.S. v. Barber 627 N.W.2d 369 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
D.M.S. v. Barber 627 N.W.2d 369 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
“[A]s a matter of law one is ‘injured’ if one is sexually abused.” Id at 681 ( , (Minn.1996)).
Brett v. Watts 601 N.W.2d 199 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Brett v. Watts 601 N.W.2d 199 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
See, (considering a civil suit for personal injury based on sexual abuse); see also Smith v. St.
Bertram v. Poole 597 N.W.2d 309 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Bertram v. Poole 597 N.W.2d 309 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
is instructive, the supreme court rejected that reasoning again in W.J.L.
Nolde v. Frankie 964 P.2d 477 Ariz. 1998
J.J. v. Luckow 578 N.W.2d 17 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
J.J. v. Luckow 578 N.W.2d 17 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
This standard has been adopted by the supreme court in recognition that “[w]hile the manifestation and form of the injury is significant to the victim, it is simply not relevant to the ultimate question of the time at which the complainant knew or should have known that he/she was sexually abused.”
W.J.L. v. Bugge 573 N.W.2d 677 Minn. 1998
W.J.L. v. Bugge 573 N.W.2d 677 Minn. 1998
7 In Blackowiak v. Kemp, we said that “concepts of sexual abuse and injury within the meaning of this statute are essentially one and the same, not separable — as a matter of law one is ‘injured’ if one is sexually abused.” (emphasis added).
Nolde v. Frankie 949 P.2d 511 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
Redeemer Covenant Church of Brooklyn Park v. Church Mutual Insurance Co. 567 N.W.2d 71 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Redeemer Covenant Church of Brooklyn Park v. Church Mutual Insurance Co. 567 N.W.2d 71 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
holding that as a matter of law one is injured if one is sexually abused and that it is knowledge of *82 the abuse, not knowledge that the abuse caused an injury, that triggers an action for sexual abuse.
Scheffler v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis 563 N.W.2d 767 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Scheffler v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis 563 N.W.2d 767 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
(Blackoiviak II), which was decided after the denial of their posttrial motions.
Doe v. Redeemer Lutheran Church 555 N.W.2d 325 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
Doe v. Redeemer Lutheran Church 555 N.W.2d 325 Minn. Ct. App. 1996