Cited by

State v. Bailey , –04 (Minn. 2004).

“[P]rosecutors must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant.”

The district court compared this case to Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (holding that “a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings”) (holding that “where a suspect is apprehended under coercive circumstances, is subjected to lengthy custodial interrogation before being given a Miranda warning, does not have the benefit of a significant paus

2006), shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, McDaniel, d at 750, commenting on the defendant’s failure to call a witness, McDaniel, d at 750, expressing personal opinions, as indicated by the use of “I” 32 statements, and disparaging the defense, 4 We are not persuaded by Foster’s assertions that the prosecutor plainly erred by calling Foster a liar, by shifting the burden of proof to Foster, see McDaniel, d at 750-51; by commenting on the defense’s failure to call a

The second case involved a prosecutor who, in their opening statement, described the DNA probability evidence and posed the rhetorical question, “Is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt?” -03 (Minn. 2004).

(citing State v. Bailey, 8 ).

a prosecutor commented in the opening statement that a defense expert “continues to walk around the country advocating” for a particular theory “because he gets paid for it,” and the prosecutor reiterated in closing argument that “in fact, all he is, is a paid witness by the Defense in criminal cases.

“Admissibility should not depend on the prosecution negativing all possibility of tampering or substitution, but rather only that it is reasonably probable that tampering or substitution did not occur.” (quotation omitted).

the supreme court stated that a prosecutor engaged in misconduct in an opening statement by equating a high probability of a DNA match with proof beyond a re asonable doubt.

901(a) ; see also State v. Bailey , , 394 (Minn. 2004).

And prosecutors “must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendants.” State v. Bailey , d 380, 404 (Minn. 2004).

d 380, 404 (Minn. 2004) (concluding “that it was improper for the prosecutor to go beyond the testimony of the expert witness by making .

the prosecutor commented in opening statements that a defense expert “continues to walk around the country advocating” for a particular theory “because he gets paid for it” and reiter ated in closing arguments that “in fact, all he is, is a paid witness by the Defense in criminal cases.” Id.

Similarly, in State v. Bailey, the supreme court held that it was not misconduct for the prosecutor to tell the jurors they were “truth seekers” and to argue that they should “search for the truth in the evidence.”

Search for the truth in the evidence, but give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt.”

B. Belittling the defense “[P]rosecutors must avoid inflaming the jury's passions and prejudices against the defendant.”

“[P]rosecutors must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant.”

(applying rationale from Youngblood); -37 (Minn.2010) (same); (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.Ct.

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.Ct.