Cited by

(granting judgment for city on appeal, reasoning that a Minneapolis city employee’s act in “issuing the building permit in a doubtful case involved an exercise of discretion” because the employee “had to make a judgment as to whether plans submitted in support of the application for the permit constituted a permissible use of the property in the area involved”); -93 (Minn. 1984) (affirming that, “as a matter of law[,] .

Instead, we have held that the doctrine allows surface water to be drained “onto another’s land.” Goerke, d at 54; (“A landowner has the right to make a reasonable disposition of surface water.

-95 (Minn. 1984) (stating that at the pretrial stage, a plaintiff should not be denied the right to proceed with an inverse-condemnation action where the pleadings set out the requisite facts for a taking and plaintiff has simply neglected to supply the proper label for the remedy sought).

is a different theory than ‘reasonable care,’ a negligence concept.”

-95 (Minn. 1984) (construing the plaintiffs pleadings liberally even where the plaintiff misconstrued the nature of his claim).

In Wilson v. Ramacher, we held that landowners may divert excess surface water to neighboring property as long as doing so constitutes a “reasonable use” based on balancing “whether the benefit to the diverter’s land outweighs the harm to the land receiving the surface waters.” -94 (Minn.1984).

29, 1986); -95 (Minn.1984) (allowing landowner to amend complaint to include inverse condemnation claim where landowner claimed the city’s diversion of surface waters rendered his land unfit to use).

For example, the supreme court held that the issuance of permits to put fill on land was a discretionary act because it resembled in process the issuance of building permits held to be discretionary in Anderson .

2 -95 (Minn.1984) (failure to specifically allege inverse condemnation did not deny right to raise claim); State v. McAndrews, 286 Minn. 115, 117 , (failure to consolidate all property in one condemnation proceeding does not waive right to initiate new proceeding); Stenger v. State, 449 *3

Fourteen years later, the supreme court applied Anderson in a case involving the issuance of a permit authorizing landowners to put fill on their property and held that issuance of the permit was a protected discretionary function.

See, (decision to approve proposed development of subdivision protected even though it “created a danger” of water damage to plaintiff’s property).

(city council’s decision to make land improvements was protected by the discretionary function exception because it involved planning and policy judgments qualifying as discretionary acts).

(discretionary immunity allows accomplishment of public services which could be chilled by second-guessing).