Cited by

See In re Sklar , (rejecting a laches defense because there were “no concerning gaps in the procedural history” of the case and because the attorney had not “articulated any specific prejudice” from the delays); (“Our concern, however, is not directed so much at the length of the delay itself but at whether the delay has resulted in prejudice to the attorney being investigated.

393 (Minn. 1985) (refusing to dismiss attorney-discipline charges for unreasonable delay because the attorney failed to show prejudice).

d 386, 394 (Minn. 1985).

does not require that a rule contain an explicit definition of every term.”

(refusing to dismiss a disciplinary investigation based on an unreasonable delay because the attorney failed to show prejudice from the delay); (concluding that due process may be violated if a preaccusation delay causes actual and substantial p

In In re N.P., we stated that although there was no question that the Director committed a technical violation of a Rule on Lawyers Professional Responsibility, “[njothing in that rule mandate[d] * * * that the sanction for a violation be dismissal of the charges under investigation.”

I. “There is no question that attorneys subject to disciplinary investigations are entitled to due process.” (citing In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 , 88 S.Ct.

appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 976 , 106 S.Ct.

1, 1986 (Minn.1986); Perl v. St.

reh’g denied, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 976 , 106 S.Ct.

appeal dismissed, — U.S.—, 106 S.Ct.

The procedure we adopted to facilitate the bringing of good faith challenges to requests provides “an adequate safeguard against encroachment on constitutionally protected conduct and against other unreasonable requests.” , 394-95 Minn. (1985) appeal dismissed, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct.

“Due process * * ⅝ does not require that a rule contain an explicit definition of every term.”