Cited by

ed by the trial court” to determine whether “there was insufficient evidence to support a judgment of conviction”) (emphasis added); (concluding that “[a] reviewing court considers all of the evidence admitted by the trial court, whether erroneously admitted or not,” to determine whether the evidence was legally sufficient); n.3 (Minn. 14 1991) (“In reviewing sufficiency of evidence, courts should include any erroneously admitted evidence.”).

Roth insists, however, the district court was required to consider “(i) whether the material [would] aid the 11 jury in proper consideration of the case; ( ii) whether any party [would ] be unduly prejudiced by submission of the material; and (iii) whether the material may be subjected to improper use by the jury.”

See Vick, d at 691 (noting that the location, duration, and repetition of the touching “ negate[d] the possibility of an innocent explanation such as accidental 7 touching”); (affirming finding of sexual intent even though father claimed any touching occurred only in the context of caregiving where five-year-old child testified he touched her vagina “with his hands in his bed and in her bed”); Crego, d at 141 (affirming second-degree criminal sexual conduct c

-17 (Minn. 1991) (reversing and reinstating judgment of conviction because any error the district court made was non - prejudicial).

See, (evidence of appellant’s actions was sufficient to support element of sexual intent); d 509, 510–11 (Minn. 1991) (same); (same).

In determining whether to allow the jury to review specific evidence, the district court “should” consider “(i) whether the material will aid the jury in proper consideration of the case; (ii) whether any party will be unduly prejudiced by submission of the material; and (iii) whether the material may be subjected to improper use by the jury.”

In determining whether to grant a jury’s request to review evidence, the district court should consider the following factors: “ (i) whether the material will aid the jury in proper consideration of the case; (ii) whether any party will be unduly prejudiced by submission of the material; and (iii) whether the material may be subjected to improper use by the jury.” (quotation omitted).

DECISION I. The supreme court has recognized that the harmless-error analysis applies “where evidence which was not admitted in evidence somehow wrongly makes its way into the jury room for deliberations.”

(concluding that nature of touching, specifically two instances of rubbing victim’s buttocks for minutes at a time accompanied by vaginal touching, negates possibility of innocent explanation and permits inference that defendant touched victim with sexual intent); –12 (Minn. 1991) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to support conviction, despite defendant’s denial that he touched victim with sexual or aggressive intent, where five-year-old victim told same story to several adults and she w

When making this determination, the district court should consider “(i) whether the material will aid the jury in proper consideration of the case; (ii) whether any party will be unduly prejudiced by submission of the material; and (iii) whether the material may be subjected to improper use by the jury.”

Our observations in State v. Kraushaar are apt here: “at worst, the replaying of the tape allowed the jury to rehear what it had already heard,” and “it is extremely unlikely that the replaying of the tape by the jury affected the verdict as *587 by prompting the jury to convict where it otherwise would not have done so.”

3 In State v. Kraushaar, we specifically declined to decide “whether expert psychological evidence should be scrutinized under the Frye standard.”

n. 3 (Minn.1991), “In reviewing sufficiency of evidence, courts should include any erroneously admitted evidence; otherwise the state would have an incentive to ‘over-try’ cases.” See, among other cases explaining this, Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 , 109 S.Ct.

affirmed a second degree criminal sexual conduct conviction despite some vagueness in the child-victim’s testimony.

(suggesting a defendant may waive Frye issue on appeal by failing to request a hearing).