Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Johnson, 450 N.W.2d 134.

20 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
(aggravating factors of particular vulnerability and invasion of zone of privacy); (aggravating factors of particular vulnerability and particular cruelty).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
While there is no “easy-to-apply test” to determine whether an aggravating circumstance is severe, Dillon, d at 596 (quotation omitted), we look to the “collective, collegial experience” gathered from “reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts” to guide our analysis, (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
See, (reducing a greater-than-double durational sentencing departure to double the maximum presumptive sentence).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2021
It is a “rare case” when aggravating factors are so severe as to justify a greater-than-double departure, and a decision to impose such sentence “mus t be based on our collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.”
Minn. 2020
(modifying an upward durational departure to double the high end of the presumptive sentencing range).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
Grampre, d at 353; State v. Hart , , review denied (Minn. Jan.
State v. Robideau 796 N.W.2d 147 Minn. 2011
State v. Robideau 796 N.W.2d 147 Minn. 2011
at 393 (citing Profit, d at 36 ; ).
Dillon v. State 781 N.W.2d 588 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
Dillon v. State 781 N.W.2d 588 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
But the supreme court has also stated and demonstrated that it “has discretion in individual cases” and that despite the district court’s discretion, the supreme court will use its own discretion on appeal from upward sentencing departures to alter a sentence “in the interests of fairness and uniformity.” (reducing sentence without explanation except that “we believe that this is not such an extraordinary case that a greater-than-double durational departure is justified”); (reducing sentence and
State v. Grampre 766 N.W.2d 347 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
State v. Grampre 766 N.W.2d 347 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
(concluding that departure was justified by multiple factors, including victim’s inability to flee because she was babysitting two infants); (reasoning that presence of children during home invasion and sexual assault of children’s mother increased vu
State v. Vance 765 N.W.2d 390 Minn. 2009
State v. Vance 765 N.W.2d 390 Minn. 2009
(concluding that a double durational departure was justified by a number of factors, including that the 14-year-old sexual assault victim was particularly vulnerable due to the fact that she was babysitting two infants and “she was not free to try to flee because she had a responsibility to the infant
State v. Collins 580 N.W.2d 36 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
State v. Collins 580 N.W.2d 36 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Guidelines II.D.2.b(l); (allowing departure based in part on age of 14- *46 year-old rape victim); (upholding departure where burglary and rape took place while children asleep in another room but defendant knew <f their presence), review denied (Minn. Jan.
State v. Bates 507 N.W.2d 847 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
State v. Bates 507 N.W.2d 847 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
(departure justified by the fact that defendant invaded victim’s zone of privacy); (departure justified by fact that defendant abused a position of trust and victim suffered severe psychological injury).
State v. Weaver 474 N.W.2d 341 Minn. 1991
State v. Weaver 474 N.W.2d 341 Minn. 1991
As we said last year, in a “very limited number of cases * * * we have concluded that severe aggravating circumstances were present justifying a durational depar *343 ture of greater than two times the presumptive sentence.”