Cited by

No. 16, ( Pletan, d at 43), aff’d

at 66-67; see 23 -72 (Minn. 1993) (determining that a county social worker’s creation of a case plan “required the exercise of judgment” and involved “professional planning at the operational level in the discharge of an assigned governmental duty”).

We have recognized that s ome duties of a child protection worker require “the exercise of judgment in determining what services should be provided, who should provide them, their frequency, and the nature and extent of agency supervision.”

ory authority] to examine plaintiff and report to the court as to her mental condition,” actions that were “in the scope of their duties” and therefore “within the protection of the rule and immune from suit”); -93 (Minn. 2006) (applying official immunity to the discretionary decisions of a police officer in a high-speed pursuit); (recognizing official immunity for the discretionary decisions of a social worker).

A. Approximately a quarter century ago, Justice Simonett wrote that, in determining whether the doctrine of official immunity applies, “it is essential to identify the precise governmental conduct at issue.” (emphasis added) ().

Official immunity is a common-law doctrine which, in the absence of a willful or malicious wrong, protects a public official who is “charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion.” Olson v. Ramsey County

(holding that vicarious official immunity for a government-entity employer is essential to protect the purposes of official immunity enjoyed by an employee).

(holding that a social worker protected by official immunity when determining level of services to provide to protect her client from child abuse); Pletan, d at 41 (holding that a police officer protected by official immunity for decision to engage in and to continue high-speed car chase).

(holding that a social worker protected by official immunity when determining level of services to provide to protect her client from child abuse); Pletan, d at 41 (holding that a police officer protected by official immunity for decision to engage in and to continue high-speed car chase).

(concluding that implementation of case plan developed by individual social worker ministerial); Williamson v. Cain, 310 Minn. 59, 61 , (finding demolition of house ministerial); Larson, d at 121 (concluding that spotting and teaching a student’s gymnastic exercise

(granting vicarious official immunity to county because to grant immunity to a county social worker but deny vicarious official immunity would deter county social worker’s performance by focusing “stifling attention” on the social worker’s performance “to the serious detriment of that performance”); P

The supreme court has justified extending immunity vicariously on the ground that “to grant immunity to the [employee] while denying it to the [employer] would still leave the focus of a stifling attention on the [employee’s] performance, to the serious detriment of that performance.”

We apply vicarious official immunity when failure to grant it would focus “stifling attention” on the official’s performance “to the serious detriment of that performance;”

-72 (Minn.1993); Larson, d at 120 .

(county social worker’s formulation of a case plan for a mother and an abused child was protected by official immunity because it involved judgment at more than a ministerial level); Rico, d at 106-07 (official immunity applied in a breach of employment contract action to protect the Commissioner

(social worker protected by official immunity when determining level of services to provide to protect her client from child abuse); Pletan, d at 41 (police officer protected by official immunity for decision to engage in and to continue high-speed car chase).

(citing Pletan, d at 42 ).

(holding that although formulation of a social worker’s case plan was protected by official immunity, implementation of the plan was protected neither by official immunity nor by discretionary immunity).