Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881.

40 citing documents.

  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
  • Explained State of Minnesota, Minn. 2020
    We explained that we had “rejected that contention [in State v. Gartland , ], holding that ‘[t]he fact that defendant may not have intended to hurt anyone should not make a difference’ as to whether that defendant could be sentenced once per victim.” Id.
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
  • State v. Ferguson 808 N.W.2d 586 Minn. 2012
  • State v. Ferguson 808 N.W.2d 586 Minn. 2012
    as "refut[ing] the contention that lack of intent to kill or injure renders a crime victimless.” Gartland does not stand for the proposition that intent is irrelevant to whether a crime has victims.
  • State v. Williams 771 N.W.2d 514 Minn. 2009
  • State v. Williams 771 N.W.2d 514 Minn. 2009
    (affirming the use of *523 the Hernandez method to calculate a defendant’s criminal-history score when he was sentenced for two counts of criminal negligence, based on the same car accident, under the multiple-victims exception to Minn.Stat.
  • State v. Skipintheday 717 N.W.2d 423 Minn. 2006
  • State v. Skipintheday 717 N.W.2d 423 Minn. 2006
    See, -47 (Minn.1979) (multiple murders merited multiple sentences); (an aggravated assault and a sex crime merited multiple sentences); -06 (Minn.1977) (three sentences merited for defendant who fired 20 bullets at three victims); -83 (Minn.1983) (where multiple deaths were a reasonably foreseeable consequence, a vehicular homicide killing two people merited two sentences).
  • State v. Pelawa 590 N.W.2d 142 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
  • State v. Pelawa 590 N.W.2d 142 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
    (upholding multiple sentences for two counts of criminal vehicular homicide); (upholding multiple sentences for three counts of criminal vehicular homicide), review denied (Minn. Feb.
  • State v. Lundberg 575 N.W.2d 589 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
  • State v. Lundberg 575 N.W.2d 589 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
  • State v. Kissner 541 N.W.2d 317 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
  • State v. Kissner 541 N.W.2d 317 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
  • State v. Anderson 463 N.W.2d 551 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
  • State v. Schenk 427 N.W.2d 12 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
  • State v. Schenk 427 N.W.2d 12 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
    (where defendant’s conduct “was aggravated in the extreme,” disposi-tional departure was justified).
  • Walker v. State 394 N.W.2d 192 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • Walker v. State 394 N.W.2d 192 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • State v. Finn 391 N.W.2d 55 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • State v. Finn 391 N.W.2d 55 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • State v. Vogel 385 N.W.2d 35 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
  • State v. Vogel 385 N.W.2d 35 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
    (approving execution of a presumptively-stayed prison term imposed because defendant’s conduct was more serious than that usually associated with the offense in question).
  • State v. Loitz 366 N.W.2d 744 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • State v. Loitz 366 N.W.2d 744 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • State v. Presley 364 N.W.2d 420 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • State v. Presley 364 N.W.2d 420 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • State v. Finbraaten 363 N.W.2d 473 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • State v. Finbraaten 363 N.W.2d 473 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • State v. Anderson 361 N.W.2d 896 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • State v. Anderson 361 N.W.2d 896 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • State v. Hagen 361 N.W.2d 407 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • State v. Hagen 361 N.W.2d 407 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
    However, the supreme court upheld the trial court’s dispositional departure because the defendant’s conduct was more serious than that usually associated with the offense in question.
  • State v. Zeigler 356 N.W.2d 736 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • State v. Anderson 356 N.W.2d 453 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • State v. Anderson 356 N.W.2d 453 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • State v. Zeigler 356 N.W.2d 736 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
    the court upheld the dispo-sitional departure of a presumptively stayed prison term.
  • State v. Fischer 354 N.W.2d 29 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • State v. Fischer 354 N.W.2d 29 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
    § 609.035 (1982) (), appellant argues that separate sentences unfairly exaggerated the criminality of his conduct because at the time he made the threats he was depressed, in a disturbed state of mind, suicidal and had been drinking.