Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Leubner v. Sterner, 493 N.W.2d 119.

42 citing documents.

Cynthia Pitchford as Trustee for the Heirs and Next-of-Kin of D-Angelo Pitchford, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2026
r practices in responding to reported child abuse and submit 8 In concluding that the expert reports did not establish an outline of the chain of causation, the dissent hews too closely to the detailed chain-of-causation requirement expressly rejected by the supreme court in Rygwall, and in doing so, cites two cases that predate Rygwall: Maudsley, d at 14, and Leubner v. Sterner
Brindalyn P. Foster, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
for the defendant.” d 119, 121 (Minn. 1992).
Jay Maurice, as Trustee for the next-of-kin of Jon Maurice, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
(cautioning that a jury should not be permitted to speculate as to possible causes of a plaintiff ’s injury in a medical- malpractice action).
Richard Nichols, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
“Causation, by definition, is something producing a certain effect or result.”
Angie M. Barsness, et al., Appellants, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
Judith Rygwall, as Trustee for the Heirs and Next of Kin of Amy Rygwall v. ACR Homes, Inc. … 6 N.W.3d 416 Minn. 2024
Judith Rygwall, as Trustee for the Heirs and Next of Kin of Amy Rygwall v. ACR Homes, Inc. … 6 N.W.3d 416 Minn. 2024
Makenzie Moore, a minor, by and through her Conservator, First Fiduciary Corporation, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
A plaintiff in a medical-malpractice action must make a prima facie showing of medical negligence by establishing “that it is more probable than not that his or her injury was a result of the defendant health care provider’s negligence.” d 119, 121 (Minn. 1992).
Judith Rygwall, as Trustee for the Heirs and Next of Kin of Amy Rygwall, deceased, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
(stating that expert testimony on causation “must be more than consistent with plaintiff’s theory of causation” and must “show that it was more likely that death occurred from de fendant’s negligence than from anything else.”).
Daniel J. Cafferty, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
“The guiding principle behind this rule is that a jury should not be permitted to speculate as to possible causes of a plaintiff’s injury or whether different medical treatment could have resulted in a more favorable prognosis for the plaintiff.” Leubner v. Sterner
Phillip Musselman, et al., Appellants, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
“Legal causation cannot be discussed intelligently without reference to the injury claimed to be caused.”
Cindy Ly, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
The 14 plaintiff must still prove “that it is more probable than not that his or her injury was a result of the defendant health care provider’s negligence.”
Mary Beth Davidson v. North Memorial Health Care, d/b/a North Memorial Medical Center, and d/b/a North Memorial Ambulance … Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Mary Beth Davidson v. North Memorial Health Care, d/b/a North Memorial Medical Center, and d/b/a North Memorial Ambulance … Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(“The primary purpose of an expert affidavit is to illustrate ‘how’ and ‘why’ the alleged malpractice caused the injury.”); (concluding that a prima facie case of medical malpractice requires causation, shown “normally in the form of expert testimony,” because “a jury should not be permitted to speculate as to possible causes of a plaintiff’s injury”).
Kimberly Shierts, Trustee for the Heirs of Jodie Shierts v. University of Minnesota Physicians, Regents of the University … Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Kimberly Shierts, Trustee for the Heirs of Jodie Shierts v. University of Minnesota Physicians, Regents of the University … Minn. Ct. App. 2014
9 Causation In order to prove causation, appellant must prove “that it is more probable than not that his or her injury was a result of [Dr. Dunn’s] negligence.”
Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green 836 N.W.2d 321 Minn. 2013
Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green 836 N.W.2d 321 Minn. 2013
Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green 811 N.W.2d 109 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green 811 N.W.2d 109 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
MacRae v. Group Health Plan, Inc. 753 N.W.2d 711 Minn. 2008
MacRae v. Group Health Plan, Inc. 753 N.W.2d 711 Minn. 2008
Rowe v. Munye 702 N.W.2d 729 Minn. 2005
Rowe v. Munye 702 N.W.2d 729 Minn. 2005
Maudsley v. Pederson 676 N.W.2d 8 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Maudsley v. Pederson 676 N.W.2d 8 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
See, (holding that something more than conclusion that delay in diagnosis “invariably results in a more serious prognosis” is needed to make out a prima facie case).
Rowe v. Munye 674 N.W.2d 761 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Rowe v. Munye 674 N.W.2d 761 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
(noting that “damages for aggravation of a [pre-existing] condition are simply a means to assure that the defendant pays only for the harm he causes, not the harm plaintiff already had”).
Heine v. Simon 674 N.W.2d 411 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Heine v. Simon 674 N.W.2d 411 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Parr v. Gonzalez 669 N.W.2d 401 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
Parr v. Gonzalez 669 N.W.2d 401 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
Because causation is an element of a prima facie case of negligence, see, the issue of causation in this case involves a defense extending to the merits of appellants’ negligence claim in the underlying action.
Morlock v. St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. 650 N.W.2d 154 Minn. 2002
Pususta v. State Farm Insurance Companies 632 N.W.2d 549 Minn. 2001
Pususta v. State Farm Insurance Companies 632 N.W.2d 549 Minn. 2001
Co., , 275 n. 2 (Minn.1995) (stating compensatory damages are the “natural, necessary and usual result of the * * * occurrence in question.”); (stating aggravation damages ensure that defendant pays only for the harm he causes, not the harm plaintiff already had); Nelson v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 239 Minn. 276, 280
Blatz v. Allina Health System 622 N.W.2d 376 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
Blatz v. Allina Health System 622 N.W.2d 376 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
(concluding that while plaintiff must prove that accident caused injury and aggravated a pre-existing condition, the measure of damages is the pain and disability over and above pre-accident pain and disability); Schore v. Mueller, 290 Minn. 186, 189-90 , (concluding that pl
Haile v. Sutherland 598 N.W.2d 424 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Haile v. Sutherland 598 N.W.2d 424 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
-20 (Minn.App.1992) (recognizing technical distinction from left breast and left chest wall in medical procedures by using terms interchangeably), rev’d
Fabio v. Bellomo 504 N.W.2d 758 Minn. 1993
Fabio v. Bellomo 504 N.W.2d 758 Minn. 1993
Hempel v. Fairview Hospitals & Healthcare Services, Inc. 504 N.W.2d 487 Minn. Ct. App. 1993