Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Cummings v. Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418.

81 citing documents.

N.H., Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
See Kolton v. County o f Anoka, , 410 (Minn. 2002) (concluding similarity of purpose and language of Minn. Stat. § 363A.03 and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) allows ADA to be used to analyze MHRA); n.5 (Minn. 1997) (“[W]e have looked in the past to federal cases interpreting Title VII for guidance in interpreting the MHRA because the statutes are similar in many respects.”).
Assata Kenneh, Minn. 2020
2d 404, 408 (Minn. 2004) (recognizing “ significant differences” between the Human Rights Act and Title VII); n.5 (Minn. 1997) (observing that “Title VII’s statutory prohibition turns on discrimination, while Minnesota’s statutory language includes the specific definition of sexual harassment”).
Assata Kenneh, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Shawn R. Dooling, Bruce Polikowsky v. Caeasar Investment, LLC, (Intervenor). Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Shawn R. Dooling, Bruce Polikowsky v. Caeasar Investment, LLC, (Intervenor). Minn. Ct. App. 2016
The key questions are “whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the [district court] erred in [its] application of the law.”
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co. 832 N.W.2d 790 Minn. 2013
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co. 832 N.W.2d 790 Minn. 2013
the court of appeals questioned the continued applicability of Title VII jurisprudence in the context of MHRA sexual harassment claims.
Aase v. Wapiti Meadows Community Technologies & Services, Inc. 832 N.W.2d 852 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
Aase v. Wapiti Meadows Community Technologies & Services, Inc. 832 N.W.2d 852 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
The key questions are “whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the [district court] erred in [its] application of the law.”
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co. 817 N.W.2d 189 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co. 817 N.W.2d 189 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
Title VII’s statutory prohibition turns on discrimination, while Minnesota’s statutory language includes the specific definition of sexual *197 harassment.” 4 , 422 n. 5 (Minn.1997).
LaMont v. Independent School District 728 814 N.W.2d 14 Minn. 2012
LaMont v. Independent School District 728 814 N.W.2d 14 Minn. 2012
367 , the standard is one that presents “a high threshold.”
Taylor v. LSI Corp. of America 796 N.W.2d 153 Minn. 2011
Taylor v. LSI Corp. of America 796 N.W.2d 153 Minn. 2011
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider two questions, “whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the lower courts erred in their application of the law.”
Edwards v. HOPKINS PLAZA LTD. PARTNERSHIP 783 N.W.2d 171 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
Edwards v. HOPKINS PLAZA LTD. PARTNERSHIP 783 N.W.2d 171 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
Krueger v. Zeman Construction Co. 781 N.W.2d 858 Minn. 2010
Krueger v. Zeman Construction Co. 781 N.W.2d 858 Minn. 2010
Krummenacher v. City of Minnetonka 768 N.W.2d 377 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
Krummenacher v. City of Minnetonka 768 N.W.2d 377 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
Krueger v. Zeman Construction Co. 758 N.W.2d 881 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
Krueger v. Zeman Construction Co. 758 N.W.2d 881 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
Second, “[t]he legislature has indicated that the MHRA should be liberally construed for the accomplishment of its purposes.” *885 (citing earlier version of statute); see Minn.Stat.
Frieler v. Carlson Marketing Group, Inc. 751 N.W.2d 558 Minn. 2008
Frieler v. Carlson Marketing Group, Inc. 751 N.W.2d 558 Minn. 2008
C & M Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Thondikulam 739 N.W.2d 725 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
C & M Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Thondikulam 739 N.W.2d 725 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
Gagliardi v. Ortho-Midwest, Inc. 733 N.W.2d 171 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
Gagliardi v. Ortho-Midwest, Inc. 733 N.W.2d 171 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
43 (defining sexual harassment as “unwelcome” conduct); *178 (emphasizing that conduct alleged as sexual harassment must be unwelcome).
County of Morrison v. Wheeler 722 N.W.2d 329 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
County of Morrison v. Wheeler 722 N.W.2d 329 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Doe v. Lutheran High School of Greater Minneapolis 702 N.W.2d 322 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
Doe v. Lutheran High School of Greater Minneapolis 702 N.W.2d 322 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
Stengel v. East Side Beverage 690 N.W.2d 380 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Stengel v. East Side Beverage 690 N.W.2d 380 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Twin City Pipe Trades Service Ass'n v. Peak Mechanical, Inc. 689 N.W.2d 549 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Twin City Pipe Trades Service Ass'n v. Peak Mechanical, Inc. 689 N.W.2d 549 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Wright Electric, Inc. v. Ouellette 686 N.W.2d 313 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Wright Electric, Inc. v. Ouellette 686 N.W.2d 313 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Fedke v. City of Chaska 685 N.W.2d 725 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Fedke v. City of Chaska 685 N.W.2d 725 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Ray v. Miller Meester Advertising, Inc. 684 N.W.2d 404 Minn. 2004
Ray v. Miller Meester Advertising, Inc. 684 N.W.2d 404 Minn. 2004
For example, we rejected the federal standard for proof in a same-sex harassment claim because “the MHRA is not similar to Title VII in its treatment of sexual harassment.” , 422 n.5 (Minn.1997) (emphasis added).
City of Elko v. Abed 677 N.W.2d 455 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
City of Elko v. Abed 677 N.W.2d 455 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
On appeal from summary judgment, we examine two questions: “whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the lower courts erred in their application of the law.”
WDSI, INC. v. County of Steele 672 N.W.2d 617 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
WDSI, INC. v. County of Steele 672 N.W.2d 617 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
Ulstad v. Brenny 645 N.W.2d 767 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
Ulstad v. Brenny 645 N.W.2d 767 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
Kolton v. County of Anoka 645 N.W.2d 403 Minn. 2002