Cited by

McCloskey, d at 703; State v. Wiley, 366

Whether an informant’s tip can “establish probable cause to search depends on the totality of the circumstances of the particular case, including the credibility and veracity of the informant.”

Although an investigatory traffic stop must not be “the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity,” (quotation omitted), the supreme court has held that an investigatory stop was proper when an officer arrived “within moments” of an offense and stopped a vehicle in a position that was consistent with it being the vehicle used in the offense, even though “the officer did not have any idea what t

“The question of the legality of 2 We recognize that the Minnesota Supreme Court has cautioned against automatically equating the use of handcuffs with an arrest, stating that “briefly handcuffing a suspect while the police sort out the scene of an investigation does not per se transform an investigatory detention into an arrest.”

Evidence obtained from an illegal search is also inadmissible as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”

10 Reliability Whether information from an informant is sufficient to establish probable cause “depends on the totality of the circumstances of the particular case, including the credibility and veracity of the informant.” (stating that “[i]n evaluating an informant’s tip, [an appellate] court looks at the commonsense totality of the circumstances, including the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge” (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213

The credibility of an informant is not assumed, and 7 a warrant affidavit must do more than assert that the informant is credible and reliable in a conclusory fashion, but providing specific details of the informant’s past veracity is not required

d 128, 138-39 (Minn. 1999).

Whether information from an informant is sufficient to establish probable cause “depends on the totality of the circumstances of the particular case, including the credibility and veracity of the informant.” see also U.S. v. Stevens, 530 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Although ‘an informant’s veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant’ in determining whether probable cause exists when an affidavit is based on hearsay information, they are not ‘entirely separate and ind

d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999).

A proven track record is “one of the primary indicia of an informant’s veracity.”

But caselaw makes it clear that in assessing probable cause for a warrantless seizure, the measure is whether it is based on “objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate.” (quotation omitted).

d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983) (adopting “the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations” and stating, “We are convinced that this flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the ac

(citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154, 45 S. Ct. at 285).

3 (noting that probable cause is measured objectively).

Probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a motor vehicle “must be based on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith of the police officers.” (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 , 102 S.Ct.

2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (holding that interrogation must cease if the suspect unambiguously asserts his right to counsel); , 139 n. 1 (Minn.1999) (stating that the court need not address whether an officer clarified the defendant’s request for counsel as required by state law because the invocation “was sufficiently clear to meet even Davis’ more stringent requirements”).