Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Mortland, 399 N.W.2d 92.

63 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
A district court may impose a greater -than-double durational sentence only when there are “severe aggravating circumstances.” d 92, 94 (Minn. 1987).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
Barthman, (recognizing that a criminal-sexual-conduct offense involving multiple forms of penetration is “particularly cruel” and a sufficient reason to justify a durational 13 departure); (noting the aggravating factor of committing a crime as part of a group of three or more individuals); (noting the aggravating factor of the defendant’s use of death threats).
Minn. 2020
–96 (Minn. 1987) (affirming a greater-than-double durational departure in first-degree criminal sexual conduct case when the victim was vulnerable, the victim was treated with particular cruelty, the offense happened in the victim’s zone of privacy, and the victim suffered serious psychological damage); State
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
Specifically, he contends that J.J.’s psychological injuries are not sufficiently “severe.”
State of Minnesota v. Dakari Michael Coles 862 N.W.2d 477 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. David Eugene Nelson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. David Eugene Nelson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
ctors are present[,] the only limit is the maximum sentence provided by the legislature.” review denied (Minn. June 19, 1996); -99 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010) (greater- than-double departure justified where severe aggravating factors present); & n.1 (Minn. 1987) (providing that only in cases of “severe aggravating circumstances” may the district court impose a greater-than-double departure from the presumptive sentence).
Taylor v. State 670 N.W.2d 584 Minn. 2003
Taylor v. State 670 N.W.2d 584 Minn. 2003
See, (child snatched from neighborhood park); (young child snatched from own yard).
State v. Thao 649 N.W.2d 414 Minn. 2002
State v. Thao 649 N.W.2d 414 Minn. 2002
Although the court of appeals emphasized that it did not equate a public playground with a crime victim’s home, appellant as *422 serts that the court’s
State v. Williams 608 N.W.2d 837 Minn. 2000
State v. Williams 608 N.W.2d 837 Minn. 2000
Perkins v. State 559 N.W.2d 678 Minn. 1997
Perkins v. State 559 N.W.2d 678 Minn. 1997
*692 This court has held that when “severe aggravating circumstances” exist, “the only absolute limit on sentence duration for the offense is that provided by the legislature in the statutory definition of the offense.” ( , 94 n. 1 (Minn.1987)).
State v. Butterfield 555 N.W.2d 526 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State v. Butterfield 555 N.W.2d 526 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
(threats to kill victim provided support for greater than double durational departure).
State v. Sebasky 547 N.W.2d 93 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State v. VanZee 547 N.W.2d 387 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State v. Sebasky 547 N.W.2d 93 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
(crimes generally warrant only double departures); , 94 n. 1 (Minn.1987) (maximum sentence is that proscribed by law).
State v. VanZee 547 N.W.2d 387 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State v. Smith 541 N.W.2d 584 Minn. 1996
State v. Smith 541 N.W.2d 584 Minn. 1996
State v. Yanez 469 N.W.2d 452 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
State v. Yanez 469 N.W.2d 452 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
95 n. 2 (Minn.1987), the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to extend the zone of privacy concept to a public park.
State v. Hayes 456 N.W.2d 275 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
State v. Hayes 456 N.W.2d 275 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
See Glaraton, d at 834 (gun stuck in victim’s orifices, victim subjected to multiple penetrations, and victim permanently scarred); *278 (Minn.1987) (victim subjected to multiple penetrations, permanently injured, threatened with death, and suffered psychological damage); Norton, d at 146 (victim threatened with death and psychologically damaged, victim’s zone of privacy invaded); -35 (Minn.1982
State v. Johnson 450 N.W.2d 134 Minn. 1990
State v. Johnson 450 N.W.2d 134 Minn. 1990
In a very limited number of cases — see, — we have concluded that severe aggravating circumstances were present justifying a durational departure of greater than two times the presumptive sentence.
State v. VanWert 438 N.W.2d 416 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
State v. VanWert 438 N.W.2d 416 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
State v. Lomax 437 N.W.2d 409 Minn. 1989
State v. Lomax 437 N.W.2d 409 Minn. 1989
-66 (Minn.1983), we held that the Evans doubling rule prevents the trial court from doing what the trial court did in this case unless it can be said that this is one of those rare cases —see, —where severe aggravating circumstances are present justifying a departure of greater than two times the presumptive sentence duration.
State v. Bicek 429 N.W.2d 289 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
State v. Bicek 429 N.W.2d 289 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
-75 (Minn.Ct.App.), aff'd as modified
State v. Glaraton 425 N.W.2d 831 Minn. 1988
State v. Glaraton 425 N.W.2d 831 Minn. 1988
94 n. 1 (Minn.1987), we made it clear that when, as here, severe aggravating circumstances are present, the only absolute limit on sentence duration for the offense is that provided by the legislature in the statutory definition of the offense.
State v. Holscher 417 N.W.2d 698 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
State v. Holscher 417 N.W.2d 698 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
State v. Frank 416 N.W.2d 744 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
State v. Frank 416 N.W.2d 744 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
State v. Dixon 415 N.W.2d 414 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
State v. Dixon 415 N.W.2d 414 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
The supreme court has held that “the only absolute limit on sentence duration is that provided by the legislature in the statute defining the offense.” , 94 n. 1 (Minn.1987).
State v. Dircks 412 N.W.2d 765 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
State v. Dircks 412 N.W.2d 765 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
*768 ANALYSIS A greater-than-double durational departure requires “severe aggravating circumstances.”
State v. Strommen 411 N.W.2d 540 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
State v. Strommen 411 N.W.2d 540 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
vacy surrounding and including the victim’s home; defendant dragged victim outside which heightened her fear); (triple the presumptive sentence where victim was particularly vulnerable due to age (5) and where defendant acted with particular cruelty; victim was terrorized, put at great risk of death and suffered psychological injury); pet.
State v. Hatton 409 N.W.2d 854 Minn. 1987
State v. Hatton 409 N.W.2d 854 Minn. 1987
State v. Gaines 408 N.W.2d 914 Minn. Ct. App. 1987