Cited by

” Davis, d at 539; (stating that “[c]umulative error exists when the cumulative effect of the errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased jury” (quotation omitted)); (M

“Cumulative error exists when the cumulative effect of the errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales , operate to the defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased jury.” (quotation omitted).

“Cumulative error exists when the cumulative effect of the errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s 7 prejudice by producing a biased jury.” State v. Penkaty , ().

(“Defendants do not have an appeal as of right from an order denying the dismissal of an indictment.”).

errors and indiscre.-tions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendants prejudice by producing a biased [grand] jury,’” ( (internal quotation marks omitted)).

errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased jury.’” d 185, 200 (Minn. 2006) ().

“Cumulative error exists when the ‘cumulative effect of the * * * errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased jury.’ ” (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 1979)).

(noting the tendency for prosecutors to view the grand jury as “a tool for their own convenience,” and stating that they “must exercise extreme caution to ensure that the grand jury retains its independent role”).

“Cumulative error exists when the ‘cumulative effect of the * * * errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased jury.’ ” (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir.1979)).

“Cumulative error exists when the ‘cumulative effect of the * * * errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased jury.’ ” (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir.1979)).

We have established that in cases where the cumulative effect of various errors operate to produce a biased jury, errors may require a new trial even though “ ‘none of [the errors] alone might have been enough to tip the scales.’ ” (quoting United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir.1979)).

(first alteration in original).

Thus, -66 (Minn.1989), where this court dismissed defendants’ indictments because of cumulative error in the grand jury proceedings, based in part on the county attorney’s reference to newspaper coverage of pending homicide cases without discouraging the grand jurors from exposing themselves to that media coverage.

The supreme court reached a where it upheld dismissal of several indictments because of numerous improper prosecutor comments regarding newspaper coverage, errors in the prosecutor’s instructions, subversion of the independence of the grand jury, and unauthorized contact between the grand jury foreperson and a former foreperson.

We have observed that prosecutors “must exercise extreme caution to ensure that the grand jury retains its independent role in our legal system.”

ANALYSIS This court may grant discretionary review of an order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment in “extraordinary circumstances.”

(introduction of former grand jurors into grand jury process is presumptively prejudicial); (presence of unauthorized person during grand jury presentation taints indictment), pet.

-67 (Minn.1989) (dictum).

We have also said that pretrial review of a motion to dismiss is discretionary and is reserved for “extraordinary circumstances.”

the supreme court reversed and ruled that certain actions of the Henne-pin County Attorney had tainted the grand jury proceedings and prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendants.