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Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Nelson v. Engineered Polymers Corp., 598 N.W.2d 642.

19 citing documents.

  • State of Minnesota v. Gary John Bogatz, Jr. Minn. Ct. App. 2023
    (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)).
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
  • State of Minnesota, Minn. 2021
    But the erroneous admission of a statement can be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when it does not amount to a confession , and other evidence of guilt is strong, ; ( holding that erroneously admitted statements, including a reference to “my victim,” were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the statements did not amount to a confession and there was overwhelming independent evidence of guilt), or when the impact of the statement is merely “cumulative”
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
  • Theodore Pierre Jerry, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
  • Ernesto Reyes-Alcazar, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
    (“[N]ot every mention of the word ‘lawyer’ or ‘counsel’ or ‘att orney’ by a suspect ‘arguably’ suggests that the sus p e c t w a n t s a l a w y e r b e f o r e s u b mitting to further questioning.” (quotation omitted)); State v. Hale , (concluding that a de
  • State of Minnesota, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
  • State v. Johnson 915 N.W.2d 740 Minn. 2018
    See, e.g. , State v. Risk , , 650 (Minn. 1999) (holding that, under the state constitution, "when an accused makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement that can reasonably be interpreted as a request for counsel, the police must stop all questioning at that time except for narrow questions designed to clarify the accused's intentions").
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    “If a statement, viewed in the context in which it is made, does not even arguably suggest that the accused is asserting that he or she does not wish to continue the custodial interroga tion without the aid of counse l, then continuation of the interrogation is proper.”
  • State v. Ortega 798 N.W.2d 59 Minn. 2011
    (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 , 101 S.Ct.
  • State v. Chavarria-Cruz 784 N.W.2d 355 Minn. 2010
    (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 86 S.Ct.
  • Distinguished Morris v. State 765 N.W.2d 78 Minn. 2009
    at 97 -98 (-49 (Minn.1999)).
  • State v. Medrano 751 N.W.2d 102 Minn. 2008
    The court ruled that the confession was admissible because when Medrano asked Trihey when he would be able to obtain an attorney if he asked for one, and Medrano subsequently agreed to speak to Trihey.
  • State v. Farrah 735 N.W.2d 336 Minn. 2007
  • Deegan v. State 711 N.W.2d 89 Minn. 2006
  • State v. Al-Naseer 678 N.W.2d 679 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
    In State v. Risk, the police told appellant he could call his attorney at “any time.”
  • State v. Staats 658 N.W.2d 207 Minn. 2003
    Under Minnesota’s rule of law, police must stop interrogating an accused even if the accused makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement regarding counsel, so long as the statement is one “that could reasonably be construed as an invocation of the accused’s right to counsel, except for narrow questions designed to clarify the accused’s true desires regarding counsel.” -49 (Minn.1999).
  • State v. Wiegand 645 N.W.2d 125 Minn. 2002
  • State v. Hannon 636 N.W.2d 796 Minn. 2001
    However, we have continued to hold that the “stop and clarify” approach articulated in Robinson, , is “an appropriate prophylactic measure to protect an accused’s rights against compelled self-incrimination under the Minnesota Constitution.” (citations omitted).