Cited by

(stating that pre- award interest is “an element of damages awarded to provide full compensation by converting time -of-demand (either by written settlement offer or commencement of action) damages into time- of-verdict damages”).

Preverdict interest is “not conventional interest on a sum of money[,] [r]ather, it is an element of damages awarded to provide full compensation by converting time-of- demand (either by written settlement offer or commencement of action) damages into time- of-verdict damages.”

As Sabri notes in his reply brief, preverdict interest is not “a separate and actionable claim for relief”; it is “a component of damages.” (concluding “that pre-verdict interest is an aspect of compensatory damages”).

damages into time-of-verdict damages.” Lienhard v. State

is compensation for the loss of use of money as a result of the nonpayment of a li quidated sum, for which liability has already been determined, not compensation for the injury giving rise to liability.” (observing that post-verdict interest is not “simply a penalty but is rather payment of a reasonable sum for the loss of the use of money to which plaintiff has been 9 entitled since the time the verdict was rende red”).

see also Lockley, 66 A.3d at 327 (“Post[-]judgment interest is designed 4 In Monessen, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded , in the second step of the analysis, that because the common law when FELA was enacted in 1908 did not allow

damages into time-of-verdict damages.”

First, to argue that he is entitled to interest from the time of the verdict until the entry of judgment under state law.

By contrast, “pre-verdict interest is an aspect of compensatory damages.”

-65 (Minn.1988) (distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is “directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant,” from costs and disbursements, which “are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury”); see also State ex rel.

where the amount of damages depended upon contingencies or jury discretion.”

section 549.09 was amended to allow pre-verdict interest irrespective of a defendant’s ability to ascertain the amount of damages for which he might be held liable.” d 861, 865 (Minn. 1988); see Skifstrom, d at 296–97 (following Lienhard); see also Myers v. Hearth Techs., Inc., (following Lienhard and Skifstrom), review denied (Minn. Mar.

“[T]he protection of a governmental entity’s financial stability is a legitimate public purpose.”

(“[Pjrotection of a governmental entity’s financial stability is a legitimate public purpose.”).

to conclude that the State is no longer immune from the taxation of costs and disbursements.

It is the legislature’s responsibility “to balance myriad competing interests and to allocate the State’s resources for the performance of those services important to the health, safety, and welfare of the public.”

25, 1995); (finding in dictum that prejudgment interest is allowed “irrespective of a defendant’s ability to ascertain the amount of damages”).

It is “awarded to provide full compensation by converting time-of-demand * * * damages into time-of-verdict damages.” (citations omitted).

In Snyder , this court held that a liability cap on municipal liability is “rationally related to the legitimate government objective of insuring fiscal stability to meet and carry out the manifold responsibilities of government.” Snyder, d at 789 ()

1898 , 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977)

where we acknowledged that based on the myriad functions of government, “public entities are exposed to far greater risks and liability than a private individual.” Not all tort claims are covered under the cap; for example, a city remains immune from liability for claims in connection with the assess