Cited by

(concluding that the suggestion that the jury would have to “believe the impossible” to accept the defendant’s argument was not belittlement because the prosecutor highlighted evidence why the jury should reject the defendant’s theory), (concluding that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing, “Do you believe that?

(noting that at least 20 pages of the prosecutor’s 80-page cross examination showed prosecutorial misconduct); -66 (Minn. 1995) (stating that several inappropriate remarks by the prosecutor in his closing warranted a new trial, including suggesting that no salve exists for the conscience of the jury 13 members should they acquit and referring seven times to “[defendant’s] S

We “pay special attention to statements that may inflame or prejudice the jury where credibility is a central issue.”

(“The ‘affects substantial rights’ language of the third plain error factor is the same language used to define harmless error.”).

(concluding that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making statements that “permeated the entire closing argument” and “suggested to the jurors that they would be suckers if they acquitted Porter and there would be no sedative or salve to make them feel better”).

A prosecutor’s arguments “must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.”

“We have generally found prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct only in extreme circumstances, and not when a prosecutor’s comments are merely likely to confuse.” d 739, 752 (Minn. 2010); see, -64 (Minn. 1995) (finding misconduct where the prosecutor told the jury that they would be “suckers” if they believed a defense witness and would need a sedative if they acquitted the defendant); -09 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that

Prosecutors must also “avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant.”

C. Inflaming passions of jury A “prosecutor must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant.”

ent deprived Sharp of a fair trial because it was contrary to L.W.’s testimony, not supported by evidence in the record, and “inflamed the prejudices of the jury against Sharp by suggesting that he has a violent character.” “While the state’s argument need not be ‘colorless,’ it must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.”

(holding that prejudicial remarks including those commenting on defendant’s failure to put on a defense or testify require a new trial).

And our concern over convicting an innocent defendant has led us to say that “a prosecutor may not seek a conviction at any price.” Ramey, d at 300 (-63 (Minn.1995)); (“ ‘[Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ ” (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 , 75 S.Ct.

See, -64 (Minn.1995) (finding misconduct where the prosecutor told the jury that they would be “suckers” if they believed a defense witness and would need a sedative if they acquitted the defendant); -09 (Minn.1985) (concluding that misconduct occurred when the prosecutor repeatedly

A “prosecutor must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant.” -87 (Minn.2006) (stating prosecutor must not appeal to passions of jury).

“It is improper for a prosecutor in closing argument to personally endorse the credibility of witnesses.”

The state’s closing argument “ ‘must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.’ ” ().

-36 (Minn.App.2003) (stating that the prosecutor must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant).