Cited by
Opinions in Minnesota that cite Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437.
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McDonough v. State
827 N.W.2d 423
Minn. 2013
442 & n. 2 (Minn.2002) (citing Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928)).
- Bobo v. State 820 N.W.2d 511 Minn. 2012
- State v. Caldwell 803 N.W.2d 373 Minn. 2011
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State v. Caldwell
803 N.W.2d 373
Minn. 2011
must be resolved in order to determine the issues raised on the merits.’ ” (alteration in original) ().
- Dobbins v. State 788 N.W.2d 719 Minn. 2010
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Dobbins v. State
788 N.W.2d 719
Minn. 2010
-85 (Minn.1982); see also, (“A three-prong test, known as the Larrison test, is applied to claims of newly-discovered evidence of falsified testimony.”).
- Ferguson v. State 779 N.W.2d 555 Minn. 2010
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Ferguson v. State
779 N.W.2d 555
Minn. 2010
under the Larrison test, the postconviction court must determine that the following three prongs are met: “(1) the court must be reasonably well-satisfied that the trial testimony was false; (2) without the false testimony, the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and (3) the petitioner was taken by surprise at trial or did not know of the falsity until after trial.”
- Doppler v. State 771 N.W.2d 867 Minn. 2009
- Doppler v. State 771 N.W.2d 867 Minn. 2009
- Chambers v. State 769 N.W.2d 762 Minn. 2009
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Chambers v. State
769 N.W.2d 762
Minn. 2009
Similarly, we ordered an evidentiary hearing based on newly-discovered evidence because the petitioner produced a “potentially admissible notarized statement” that a key witness had falsified his testimony.
- Jama v. State 756 N.W.2d 107 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
- Jama v. State 756 N.W.2d 107 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
- Hannon v. State 752 N.W.2d 518 Minn. 2008
- Hannon v. State 752 N.W.2d 518 Minn. 2008
- State v. Gauster 752 N.W.2d 496 Minn. 2008
- State v. Gauster 752 N.W.2d 496 Minn. 2008
- Lynch v. State 749 N.W.2d 318 Minn. 2008
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Lynch v. State
749 N.W.2d 318
Minn. 2008
The Knaffla rule “‘applies even in postconviction proceedings raising constitutional issues of criminal procedure.’” ().
- Martin v. State 748 N.W.2d 294 Minn. 2008
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Martin v. State
748 N.W.2d 294
Minn. 2008
“A petitioner seeking postconviction relief has the burden of establishing, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, facts that would warrant relief.”
- Wayne v. State 747 N.W.2d 564 Minn. 2008
- Wayne v. State 747 N.W.2d 564 Minn. 2008
- State v. Ferguson 742 N.W.2d 651 Minn. 2007
- State v. Ferguson 742 N.W.2d 651 Minn. 2007
- Gail v. State 732 N.W.2d 243 Minn. 2007
- Gail v. State 732 N.W.2d 243 Minn. 2007
- State v. Turnage 729 N.W.2d 593 Minn. 2007
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State v. Turnage
729 N.W.2d 593
Minn. 2007
(citing Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir.1928), overruled by United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir.2004) (modifying test)).
- State v. Ferguson 729 N.W.2d 604 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
- State v. Ferguson 729 N.W.2d 604 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
- Wilson v. State 726 N.W.2d 103 Minn. 2007
- Wilson v. State 726 N.W.2d 103 Minn. 2007
- Schleicher v. State 718 N.W.2d 440 Minn. 2006
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Schleicher v. State
718 N.W.2d 440
Minn. 2006
“This procedural bar applies even in post-conviction proceedings raising constitutional issues of criminal procedure.”
- Williams v. State 692 N.W.2d 893 Minn. 2005
- Williams v. State 692 N.W.2d 893 Minn. 2005
- Hooper v. State 680 N.W.2d 89 Minn. 2004
- Hooper v. State 680 N.W.2d 89 Minn. 2004
- Opsahl v. State 677 N.W.2d 414 Minn. 2004
- Opsahl v. State 677 N.W.2d 414 Minn. 2004
- Dukes v. State 660 N.W.2d 804 Minn. 2003
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Dukes v. State
660 N.W.2d 804
Minn. 2003
We stated in Ferguson v. State, however, that “Larrison’s third prong should not be an absolute condition precedent to granting a new trial.”
- Johnson v. State 654 N.W.2d 126 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
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Johnson v. State
654 N.W.2d 126
Minn. Ct. App. 2002
(stating that arguments raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered).
- King v. State 649 N.W.2d 149 Minn. 2002
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King v. State
649 N.W.2d 149
Minn. 2002
(concluding that in case where newly-discovered evidence is falsified trial testimony, the traditional requirement that a petitioner be taken by surprise at trial or not have known of the falsity of the testimony until after trial is not an absolute condition precedent for granting a new trial).