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“The defendant has the right ‘to present the defendant’s version of the facts through the testimony of witnesses.’” ().

use of bare suspicion and safeguards the [alleged alternative perpetrator]' from indiscriminate use of past differences with the deceased.” Jones, d at 16 ().

We therefore review the trial-rights waiver in this case for harmless error.2 On review for harmless error, we will not reverse Pierce’s conviction unless “‘there is a reasonable possibility that the [failure to obtain Pierce’s waiver of the right to require any favorable witnesses to testify for the defense in court] may have contributed to the conviction.’” (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827 (1967)).

murder is not required to have predicted that a companion would murder the victim.”

We determine whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by analyzing “whether the error reasonably could have impacted upon the jury’s decision.” Juarez, d at 292 ; (stating error warrants reversal if “there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of may have contributed to the conviction.” (alteration in original) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct.

The right to present a complete defense includes “the right to present the defendant’s version 4 of the facts through the testimony of witnesses.”

Appellant argues that his exclusion from the courtroom was not harmless because he was deprived of his right to present his side of the story, and his testimony was necessary on the issue of whether he “acted intentionally.” Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to testify in their defense.

(explaining a defendant should not “be allowed to throw strands of speculation on the wall and see if any of them will stick” (quotation omitted)); (“[E]vidence tending to incriminate another is inadmissible in the absence of proof of facts to co

“An appellate court looks to past sentences imposed on other offenders when determining the propriety of consecutive sentencing.”

“Consecutive sentencing of multiple felonies with multiple victims is permissive and within the broad discretion of the [district] court.” see also Minn.Stat.

The defendant has the right “to present the defendant’s version of the facts through the testimony of witnesses.”

This right “does not mean that the defendant’s testimony is unrestricted” because the criminal defendant must still “comply with the evidentiary rules.”

Due process requires only that “every defendant be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct.

-78 (Minn.2003) (citing Minn.Stat.

While he lists other parties that had conflicts with Cady in his brief, Larson made no showing that any of this evidence had “an inherent tendency to connect the alternative party with the commission of the crime.” Vance, d at 436 ; (explaining a defendant should not “be allowed to throw strands of speculation on the wall and see if any of them will stick” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Hawkins, d at 159 (“[EJvidence tending to incriminate another is inadmissibl

The Right to Present a Defense and Reverse-Spreigl Evidence We have said, “Due process requires that every [criminal] defendant be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see U.S. Const, amend.

The purpose of this foundational requirement is to “avoid[ ] the use of bare suspicion and safeguard^ a third person from indiscriminate use of past differences with the deceased.” ().