Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525.

111 citing documents.

State v. Stallman 519 N.W.2d 903 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
State v. Stallman 519 N.W.2d 903 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
see also Kolen-der v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct.
State v. Christie 506 N.W.2d 293 Minn. 1993
State v. Christie 506 N.W.2d 293 Minn. 1993
Skeen v. State 505 N.W.2d 299 Minn. 1993
State v. Kimmons 502 N.W.2d 391 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
State v. Kimmons 502 N.W.2d 391 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
State v. Clausen 493 N.W.2d 113 Minn. 1992
State v. Clausen 493 N.W.2d 113 Minn. 1992
In Minnesota, due process “ ‘requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct.
In Re Blodgett 490 N.W.2d 638 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
In Re Blodgett 490 N.W.2d 638 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
State v. Poole 489 N.W.2d 537 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
State v. Poole 489 N.W.2d 537 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)
State v. Brown 486 N.W.2d 816 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
State v. Brown 486 N.W.2d 816 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)
State, City of Minneapolis v. Reha 483 N.W.2d 688 Minn. 1992
State, City of Minneapolis v. Reha 483 N.W.2d 688 Minn. 1992
1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)
State v. Davidson 481 N.W.2d 51 Minn. 1992
State v. Davidson 481 N.W.2d 51 Minn. 1992
State v. Ellis 476 N.W.2d 662 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
State v. Ellis 476 N.W.2d 662 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
The ordinances are unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ellis’ conduct if they fail to “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discretionary enforcement.” (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 , 103 S.Ct.
State v. Reha 474 N.W.2d 360 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
State v. Reha 474 N.W.2d 360 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
The ordinance is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Reha’s conduct if it fails to “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct.
State v. McKown 475 N.W.2d 63 Minn. 1991
State v. McKown 475 N.W.2d 63 Minn. 1991
See, (concluding that statute requiring non-public school teachers hold qualifications "essentially equivalent” to those of public school teachers was unconstitutionally vague).
State v. Davidson 471 N.W.2d 691 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
State v. Davidson 471 N.W.2d 691 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
Minnesota Chamber of Commerce v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 469 N.W.2d 100 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
Minnesota Chamber of Commerce v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 469 N.W.2d 100 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
In discussing criminal statutes, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, “Persons of common intelligence must not be left to guess at the meaning of a statute nor differ as to its application.” (citing Connally v. General Constr.
State v. McKown 461 N.W.2d 720 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
State v. McKown 461 N.W.2d 720 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
Ruzic v. Commissioner of Public Safety 455 N.W.2d 89 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
Ruzic v. Commissioner of Public Safety 455 N.W.2d 89 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
City of Edina v. Dreher 454 N.W.2d 621 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
City of Edina v. Dreher 454 N.W.2d 621 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
State v. Willenbring 454 N.W.2d 268 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
State v. Willenbring 454 N.W.2d 268 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
State v. Merrill 450 N.W.2d 318 Minn. 1990
State v. Merrill 450 N.W.2d 318 Minn. 1990
State v. Christensen 439 N.W.2d 389 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
State v. Christensen 439 N.W.2d 389 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
State v. Grover 437 N.W.2d 60 Minn. 1989
State v. Grover 437 N.W.2d 60 Minn. 1989
nge to Minnesota’s statutory requirement for the reporting of maltreatment of minors, we observe at the outset the fundamental principle that a penal statute must “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited [or mandated] and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct.
State v. Hyland 431 N.W.2d 868 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
State v. Hyland 431 N.W.2d 868 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
State v. Moore 431 N.W.2d 565 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
State v. Moore 431 N.W.2d 565 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)
State, Department of Public Safety v. ELK River Ready Mix Co. 430 N.W.2d 261 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
State, Department of Public Safety v. ELK River Ready Mix Co. 430 N.W.2d 261 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
(quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct.
State v. Krawsky 426 N.W.2d 875 Minn. 1988