Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Campbell, 367 N.W.2d 454.

72 citing documents.

  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
    24, 1987); 607 (Minn. 2009) (upholding upward departure where defendant fired seven times at or toward a group of nine people); -57, 460-61 (Minn. 1985) (upholding upward departure where victim was maced, her throat was cut ear-to-ear, and she was stabbed 17 times); (upholding upward departure because murder was “not just an unintentional killing resulting from a single blow but was one r
  • Crow v. State 923 N.W.2d 2 Minn. 2019
  • Crow v. State 923 N.W.2d 2 Minn. 2019
    1 (2018) ; see State v. Campbell , , 461 (Minn. 1985) ("[A]s a participant [the defendant is] legally responsible for [the principal's] actions under Minn. Stat. § 609.05 .").
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    –60 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that evidence established opportunity by showing that defendant possessed and utilized mace five days before alleged offense in which defendant also used mace).
  • State v. Stempfley 900 N.W.2d 412 Minn. 2017
  • State v. Stempfley 900 N.W.2d 412 Minn. 2017
  • A15-1255 Minn. 2017
  • Ronald James Kettle v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • Ronald James Kettle v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    See, (affirming a durational departure based, in part, on the factor of violation of a position of trust where the defendant community leader sexually assaulted two women); (affirming a durational departure based, in part, on the factor of violation of a position of trust where the codefendants knew the victim as neighbors and convinced the victim to open her door to them); –41 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating that “we have found
  • State v. Leja 684 N.W.2d 442 Minn. 2004
  • State v. Rourke 681 N.W.2d 35 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
  • State v. Rourke 681 N.W.2d 35 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
    -61 (Minn.1985); Cermak, d at 839 .
  • Rairdon v. State 557 N.W.2d 318 Minn. 1996
  • Rairdon v. State 557 N.W.2d 318 Minn. 1996
    D.2.b.(l) (stating that departures may be based on particular vulnerability “due to age, infirmity, or reduced physical or mental capacity, which was known or should have been known to the offender”); State v. Campbell, *327 -61 (Minn.1985) (concluding that vulnerability was a valid factor when the defendant knew or should have known the victim had below-normal mental capabilities, which helped the defendant gain entry to the victim’s home)
  • State v. Ostrem 535 N.W.2d 916 Minn. 1995
  • State v. Ostrem 535 N.W.2d 916 Minn. 1995
    Nonetheless, subsequent cases refer to the statute as "aiding and abetting.” See, e.g., State v, Lucas
  • State v. Williams 535 N.W.2d 277 Minn. 1995
  • State v. Williams 535 N.W.2d 277 Minn. 1995
    See, (holding that defendant’s "fleeting, off-hand comment in mid-sentence about his future need for a good attorney * * * was not even arguably an invocation of his Miranda right to counsel”), reh'g denied (Minn., May 23, 1990); (evaluating whether defendant’s statement "if I’m going to be charged with murder maybe I should talk to an attorney,” was sufficient to invoke right to counsel); (requiring custodial interrogations conducted at the police station to be recorded in their
  • State v. Harwell 515 N.W.2d 105 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
  • State v. Harwell 515 N.W.2d 105 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
  • State v. Bock 490 N.W.2d 116 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
  • State v. Bock 490 N.W.2d 116 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
    (rape days prior to murder and coming back to victim’s apartment consid *122 ered “psychological terror which [preceded] and [was] part of the murder”).
  • State v. Pilcher 472 N.W.2d 327 Minn. 1991
  • State v. Pilcher 472 N.W.2d 327 Minn. 1991
    1880, 1884-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)
  • State v. Barsness 473 N.W.2d 325 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
  • State v. Barsness 473 N.W.2d 325 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
    (issue whether defendant played a passive role).
  • State v. Carpenter 459 N.W.2d 121 Minn. 1990
  • State v. Carpenter 459 N.W.2d 121 Minn. 1990
  • Jackson v. State 447 N.W.2d 430 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
  • Jackson v. State 447 N.W.2d 430 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
  • State v. Morrison 437 N.W.2d 422 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
  • State v. Morrison 437 N.W.2d 422 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
    See State v. Campbell, *427 (whether the defendant played a passive role in the offense is a factual issue best decided at the trial court level).
  • Holmes v. State 437 N.W.2d 58 Minn. 1989
  • Holmes v. State 437 N.W.2d 58 Minn. 1989
    Relevant cases include: -61 (Minn.1985) '(departure upheld in brutal murder of retarded woman to prevent her from testifying against accomplice in rape case; victim’s throat was cut from ear to ear and there were 17 stab wounds to chest and back of victim; victim’s trust was used to gain entry to her house)
  • State v. Robinson 427 N.W.2d 217 Minn. 1988
  • State v. Robinson 427 N.W.2d 217 Minn. 1988
    1336, 1342-43 , 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963)
  • State v. Volk 421 N.W.2d 360 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
  • State v. Volk 421 N.W.2d 360 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
  • State v. Dixon 415 N.W.2d 414 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • State v. Dixon 415 N.W.2d 414 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • State v. Brinston 415 N.W.2d 40 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • State v. Brinston 415 N.W.2d 40 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
    Campbell argued the court, in sentencing her to double the presumptive sentence, should have considered her passive participation in the murder of S.K.
  • State v. Bobo 414 N.W.2d 490 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • State v. Bobo 414 N.W.2d 490 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • State v. Dircks 412 N.W.2d 765 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • State v. Dircks 412 N.W.2d 765 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
    (double departure where victim maced, her throat cut ear-to-ear and stabbed 17 times); (victim hit on head eight times with two different hammers; sentence was IV2 times the presumptive sentence); (Minn.Ct.Ap
  • State v. Strommen 411 N.W.2d 540 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • State v. Strommen 411 N.W.2d 540 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
    § 609.05 which holds “a person * * * criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” See