Cited by

(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).

When reviewing the probable cause determination, we consider only “whether the judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed,” -23 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted), and, under the totality of the circumstances, we are “careful not to review each component of the affidavit in isolation,”

791 n. 1 (Minn.1999); , 864 n. 4 (Minn.1991); , 701 n. 1 (Minn.1990); , 269 n. 2 (Minn.1985); , 929 n. 7 (Minn.2006) (resolving the issue on statutory grounds and declining to consider the good-faith exception articulated in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 , 126 S.Ct.

State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 105

Probable cause exists if there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (quotation omitted).

A warrant is supported by probable cause if, on the totality of the circumstances, there is a “ ‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” ().

See id.; d 265, 269 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that the affidavit’s statement that the informant had “been used over several years successfully” provided sufficient evidence of the informant’s reliability).

“Recent personal observation of incriminating conduct has traditionally been the preferred basis for an informant’s knowledge.”

“Recent personal observation of incriminating conduct has traditionally been the preferred basis for an informant’s knowledge.” see also U.S. v. Kattaria, 553 F.3d 1171, 1178 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that “[t]here is an inherent indicia of reliability in the richness and detail of a first hand observation” (quotation omitted)).

Probable cause exists when there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).

Probable cause to search an automobile exists where “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (quotation omitted).

As to the second factor, the only indication that the CI gave past reliable information to police is SA Woolever’s single testimonial reference to “a confidential reliable informant.”3 The state argues that this reference is sufficient to satisfy the second factor and cites, inter alia, Ross, d at 304

(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).

e,5 effects identifying the defendant were found near or on the items,6 the defendant admitted possession of the items,7 or there was testimony at trial accusing the defendant of possessing the items.8 By contrast, no direct evidence tied appellant to possession of 5 See, -88 (Minn. 1985) (finding drugs in the defendant’s apartment); (finding drugs in the defendant’s home); (finding drugs in bedroom of defendant’s home); State v. Carr, 311 Minn. 161, 163, (finding drugs in the defendant’s home);

Probable cause is established “if there is a ‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” ().

“In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit under the totality of the circumstances test, [issuing judges] must be careful not to review each component of the affidavit in isolation.”

(determining that evidence was sufficient to establish appellant’s constructive possession of marijuana found in bedroom containing mail addressed to appellant and inside boxes with appellant’s name on them).

See, n.7 (Minn. 2004); State v. 5 Robinson, -29 (Minn. 1982).

To determine whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause, we look to the “totality of the circumstances.”

“In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit under the totality of the circumstances test, courts must be careful not to review each component of the affidavit in isolation.”

“Recent personal observation of incriminating conduct has traditionally been the preferred basis for an informant’s knowledge.”

4 “In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit under the totality of the circumstances test, [issuing judges] must be careful not to review each component of the affidavit in isolation.”

9 As to the lack of personal observations, it is true that “[r]ecent personal observation of incriminating conduct has traditionally been the preferred basis for an informant’s knowledge.”

He asserts that the CI’s tip was not reliable because the 4 affidavit contains “no allegation of first-hand, personal observations by the informant,” (“Recent personal observation of incriminating conduct has traditionally been the preferred basis for an informant’s knowledge.”).