Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d 875.

57 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. Michael Patrick Daly Minn. Ct. App. 2026
State of Minnesota v. Michael Patrick Daly Minn. Ct. App. 2026
1(2) (providing that a 13 person is guilty of obstructing legal process if he or she intentionally “obstructs, resists, or interferes with a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties”); (stating that the language of the obstruction-of-legal-process “statute is directed solely at physical acts” and “forbids intentional physical obstruction or interference with a police officer in the performance of his official duties”).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
A person physically obstructs or interferes when they “substantially frustrat[e] or hinder the officer in the performance of his duties.”
In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. A. S., Child Minn. Ct. App. 2024
In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. A. S., Child Minn. Ct. App. 2024
obstruct[ed], hinder[ed], or prevent[ed] the lawful execution of any legal process, civil or criminal, or apprehension of another on a charge or conviction of a criminal offense.” Physically obstructing or interfering is conduct that “frustrate[s] or hinder[s] the officer in the 3 performance of his duties.”
State of Minnesota v. Justin Patrick Allen Weston Minn. Ct. App. 2024
State of Minnesota v. Justin Patrick Allen Weston Minn. Ct. App. 2024
Because the statute implicates the freedom of speech, it must be construed narrowly and the language of the statute “is directed solely at physical acts” and “forbids intentional physical obstruction or interference with a police officer in the performance of his official duties.” (concluding that a previous version of statute prohibited conduct that included fighting words, which could have the effect of physically obstructing or interfering with a police officer’s performance of their duties).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
Id.; (“[P]hysically obstructing or interfering with a police officer involves not merely [verbally] interrupting an officer but substantially frustrating or hindering the officer in the performance of [the officer’s] duties.”).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Paula Jean Yackel Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Paula Jean Yackel Minn. Ct. App. 2016
The language of the statute “is directed solely at physical acts” and “forbids intentional physical obstruction or interference with a police officer in the performance of his official duties.” d 875, 877 (Minn. 1988).
State of Minnesota v. Robin Lyne Hensel 874 N.W.2d 245 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Robin Lyne Hensel 874 N.W.2d 245 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
298 Minn. at 88, d at 615; -79 (Minn. 1988) (holding that statute prohibiting interference with peace officer performing duties was not vague and noting that “given the wide variety of circumstances in which the type of conduct [the statute] legitimately seeks to proscribe can occur, it seems unlikely that a substantially more precise s
State of Minnesota v. Tondalia Dubose Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Tondalia Dubose Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“[P]hysically obstructing or interfering with a police officer involves not merely interrupting an officer but substantially frustrating or hindering the officer in the performance of his duties.”
State v. Pederson 840 N.W.2d 433 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
State v. Pederson 840 N.W.2d 433 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
(concluding that a previous version of the obstructing-legal-process statute, Minn.Stat.
State v. Wiseman 816 N.W.2d 689 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
State v. Wiseman 816 N.W.2d 689 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
(holding that obstruction-of-legal-proeess statute may be used to punish “any ...
State v. Vance 734 N.W.2d 650 Minn. 2007
State v. Vance 734 N.W.2d 650 Minn. 2007
But 13 years before we decided Ihle , we had given a concluding that the statute prohibits only acts and words “that have the effect of physically obstructing * * * a police officer.” Ihle, d at 915 (emphasis added).
State v. Morin 736 N.W.2d 691 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
State v. Kelley 734 N.W.2d 689 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
State v. Morin 736 N.W.2d 691 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
The supreme court rejected an overbreadth challenge to that language, construing it narrowly as “directed solely at physical acts.”
State v. Kelley 734 N.W.2d 689 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
“As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” (quotation omitted).
State v. Hager 727 N.W.2d 668 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
State v. Hager 727 N.W.2d 668 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
State v. Mogler 719 N.W.2d 201 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
State v. Mogler 719 N.W.2d 201 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)
State v. Ihle 640 N.W.2d 910 Minn. 2002
Followed State v. Ihle 640 N.W.2d 910 Minn. 2002
1 On appeal he argues that his conviction must be reversed and a new trial granted because (1) the district court failed to instruct the jury that the obstruction statute prohibits only words or acts that physically obstruct an officer, and (2) because the district court did not require all jurors to agree upon which of appellant’s acts satisfied the elements of the offense.
State v. Tomlin 622 N.W.2d 546 Minn. 2001
State v. Tomlin 622 N.W.2d 546 Minn. 2001
The court of appeals reversed the conviction holding that Tomlin’s and, therefore, there was not sufficient evidence for a conviction.
State v. Tomlin 609 N.W.2d 282 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
State v. Tomlin 609 N.W.2d 282 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
State v. Patch 594 N.W.2d 537 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
State v. Patch 594 N.W.2d 537 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
At the end of the state’s case, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal, a physical act was required in order to commit obstruction of legal process.
State v. Occhino 572 N.W.2d 316 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
State v. Occhino 572 N.W.2d 316 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
(holding that the obstruction statute may be used when a defendant uses words that by themselves have the effect of physically obstructing or interfering with a police officer in the performance of his or her official duties).
State v. Miner 556 N.W.2d 578 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State v. Miner 556 N.W.2d 578 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
In Re the Welfare of L.J.S. 539 N.W.2d 408 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
In Re the Welfare of L.J.S. 539 N.W.2d 408 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
State v. Holmberg 527 N.W.2d 100 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
State v. Holmberg 527 N.W.2d 100 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
See, (interpreting the obstructing legal process statute as directed solely at physical acts to preserve it from overbreadth challenge).
In Re the Welfare of R.A.V. 464 N.W.2d 507 Minn. 1991
In Re the Welfare of R.A.V. 464 N.W.2d 507 Minn. 1991
see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768-69 , 102 S.Ct.
State v. Fan 445 N.W.2d 243 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
State v. Fan 445 N.W.2d 243 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
State v. Christensen 439 N.W.2d 389 Minn. Ct. App. 1989