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When a district court declares a mistrial, “the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.” (quoting Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 (1973)).

A “manifest necessity” means “[a] high degree of necessity—not absolute necessity.”

“When a mistrial has been declared, ‘the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.’ ” (quoting Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 (1973)).

“[W]hen a mistrial is declared without the defendant’s consent, the manifest necessity standard controls.” (quotation omitted).

must exist before a mistrial is appropriate.”

State v. Long , , 296 (Minn. 1997).

However, “[w]hen a mistrial has been declared, the conclusion that jeopardy has at tached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.” (quotation omitted).

(stating that when a mistrial is ordered without the defendant’s consent, the mistrial must be necessitated by “the ends of public justice,” or “manifest necessity” (quotations omitted)).

d 292, 296 (Minn. 1997) .

See State v. Long , (noting that in such a situation, the district court examines whether a “manifest necessity” existed—in other words, an error had occurred that was so significant that it could not be cured with an intervention less drastic than granting a mistrial).

See, (motion to dismiss a juror); (motion to declare a mistrial); (motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct).

Although caselaw has not established “clear-cut guidelines as to what constitutes manifest necessity,” one consideration on review is “whether the court adequately 8 assessed less drastic alternatives.”

A district court has the discretion to determine “whether, for compelling reasons, ‘the ends of substantial justice cannot be attained without discontinuing the trial.’ ” (quoting Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 , 81 S.Ct.

We have stated, “A high degree of necessity — not absolute necessity — must exist before a mistrial is appropriate.” habeas corpus granted by Long v. Humphrey, 184 F.3d 758 (8th Cir.1999).

State v. Long , , 296 (Minn. 1997).

In cases where a mistrial has been declared, “ ‘the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether- [the] Double Jeopardy [Clause] bars retrial.’ ” (quoting Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 , 93 S.Ct.