State of Minnesota v. Charlene Marie Waldron

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1844

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Charlene Marie Waldron,
Appellant.

Filed December 26, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-20-39

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Tyler Kenefick, Assistant County Attorney,
Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and

Wheelock, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

GAÏTAS, Judge

Appellant Charlene Marie Waldron challenges her convictions for fourth-degree

driving while impaired following a jury trial. She argues that the district court erred in

denying her motion to suppress her statements to law enforcement officers on
constitutional grounds, abused its discretion in denying her motion to exclude the

statements from evidence at trial under the rules of evidence, and violated Minnesota law

by entering two convictions for the same criminal conduct. Because Waldron’s statements

to police did not implicate her constitutional rights, and the district court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the statements at trial over Waldron’s evidentiary objection, we

affirm in part. But, because the district court erred in entering two DWI convictions for

the same criminal act, we reverse in part and remand for vacation of one conviction.

FACTS

At 2:00 a.m. on a cold January morning, Waldron approached a house in Hibbing

looking for help after a single-car rollover crash. Waldron was injured and smelled of

alcohol, and the homeowners summoned emergency assistance. A state trooper was the

first emergency worker to arrive. The trooper located the car, which was in a ditch about

40 yards away from the road, and he confirmed that it was unoccupied. Then, the trooper

went to the house to meet with Waldron.

Waldron was lying on the entryway floor, bloodied, and crying, and the

homeowners were nearby. The trooper called for an ambulance. When the trooper asked

Waldron for her name, she did not respond and moaned in pain. The homeowners told the

trooper that Waldron had told them her name and had said her boyfriend was the driver.

When the trooper asked Waldron what she had been doing at the time of the crash and

whether she had been wearing a seatbelt, Waldron said she was not driving and asked about

her boyfriend’s whereabouts. The trooper radioed for assistance in locating the missing

boyfriend.

2
 Another officer arrived at the home, and asked Waldron for the name of the

boyfriend they should be looking for. This officer asked Waldron whether the boyfriend

had been driving. Waldron responded that her boyfriend was not the driver.

The ambulance arrived. As Waldron was being loaded into the ambulance, she

became combative with the paramedics and another officer at the scene. The ambulance

transported her to the hospital. There, Waldron’s blood was drawn pursuant to a search

warrant. The blood draw revealed that she had an alcohol concentration of 0.188.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Waldron with two counts of fourth-degree

DWI—one count for driving with an alcohol concentration over the legal limit as measured

within two hours of driving and one count for operating a motor vehicle while under the

influence of alcohol. Additionally, the state charged Waldron with one count of

misdemeanor obstructing legal process based on her combative conduct once the

ambulance arrived. After a competency evaluation determined that Waldron was

competent at the time of the DWI offenses but not at the time of the obstructing-legal-

process offense due to a head injury sustained during the accident, the state dismissed the

charge of obstructing legal process.

Before trial, Waldron moved to suppress her statements to the responding law

enforcement officers, which were recorded by the responding trooper’s dashboard camera. 1

1
The video from the trooper’s dashboard camera showed the front of the house and did not
capture any of the events inside the house. But the video captured audio from the trooper’s
body microphone. The audio from the video recording included the entire interaction
between Waldron and law enforcement officers while the responding trooper was inside
the house.

3
She argued that the law enforcement officers violated her constitutional rights by failing to

provide her with a Miranda warning before questioning her, or alternatively, by causing

her to make involuntary statements. The district court denied Waldron’s suppression

motion, determining that the “rescue doctrine”—an exception to the requirement for a

Miranda warning—justified the law enforcement officers’ questions to Waldron absent a

Miranda warning.

Waldron’s pretrial motion also sought exclusion of her statements from trial under

the rules of evidence, asserting that the statements were unfairly prejudicial. The district

court did not explicitly address this motion.

Waldron then had a jury trial. The state introduced the recording of Waldron’s

statements to law enforcement in the house following the car accident. Additionally, the

state presented evidence of Waldron’s alcohol concentration and testimony from the

responding trooper. The responding trooper testified that the car involved in the accident

was registered to Waldron. He also testified that he observed just one set of footprints in

the snow leading away from the car.

Waldron testified on her own behalf. According to Waldron, she did not consume

any alcohol, she began to feel sick after she ate dinner with her boyfriend, and she did not

remember driving her car.

The jury found Waldron guilty of both charges, and the district court entered

convictions on both counts. The district court sentenced Waldron to 90 days of jail time,

stayed for a year, and probation.

Waldron appeals.

4
 DECISION

I. The district court did not err by denying Waldron’s pretrial motion to suppress
her statements on constitutional grounds.

Waldron first challenges the district court’s denial of her pretrial motion to suppress

evidence on constitutional grounds. She argues that the district court erred in determining

that the “rescue doctrine” allowed the law enforcement officers who responded to the

accident to interrogate her. According to Waldron, the officers should have provided her

with a Miranda warning before asking questions. And even if no Miranda warning was

required, Waldron contends that her statements were involuntary due to her condition.

When considering a challenge to a district court’s pretrial ruling on a motion to

suppress evidence, the appellate court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal

conclusions de novo. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011).

A. Because Waldron was not subjected to custodial interrogation, no
Miranda warning was required.

Before the police can question a suspect in custody, they must provide the suspect

with a Miranda warning. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 30 (Minn. 2016) (citing Miranda

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)). Among other rights, a Miranda warning advises a

suspect of the privilege against self-incrimination, which is guaranteed by the Fifth

Amendment of the United States Constitution. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. To ensure

compliance with the requirement for a Miranda warning, the United States Supreme Court

has held that any statements made during a custodial interrogation when a Miranda

warning has not been provided must be suppressed. Id. at 479.

5
 Here, there is no dispute that the first trooper to arrive at the house, and a second

officer who arrived shortly thereafter, asked Waldron some questions. In considering

Waldron’s suppression motion, however, the district court did not make any explicit

findings about whether Waldron was subjected to a custodial interrogation. Instead, the

district court determined that an exception to the Miranda requirement—the rescue

doctrine—applied. See State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Minn. 1992) (“[T]he

rescue doctrine is applicable in emergency situations where exigent circumstances may

excuse compliance with the Miranda rules in instances of overriding need to save human

life or to rescue persons whose lives are in danger.” (quotation omitted)).

Waldron asks us to conclude that a Miranda warning was required and that the

district court erred in invoking the exception to Miranda. But the state urges us to affirm

the district court’s denial of Waldron’s suppression motion on the alternative ground that

Waldron was never subjected to a custodial interrogation and thus no Miranda warning

was required. Citing State v. Grunig, the state notes that it is entitled to raise alternative

arguments on appeal to support a district court’s decision if the factual record is sufficiently

developed for consideration of the alternative theory, the law supports the alternative

theory, and a decision on the alternative theory would not expand the relief granted below.

660 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn. 2003). The state points out that it argued to the district court

that there was no custodial interrogation and developed a factual record that supports this

alternative theory. We agree with the state’s analysis, and we sustain the district court’s

6
denial of Waldron’s suppression motion on the alternative ground that there was no

custodial interrogation necessitating a Miranda warning.

To determine whether an individual was in custody for the purpose of the Miranda

requirement, a court should consider the surrounding circumstances. State v. Scruggs, 822

N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2012). Factors suggesting that a person was in custody include:

(1) the police interviewing the suspect at the police station;
(2) the suspect being told he or she is a prime suspect in a
crime; (3) the police restraining the suspect[’]s freedom of
movement; (4) the suspect making a significantly
incriminating statement; (5) the presence of multiple officers;
and (6) a gun pointing at the suspect.

State v. Vue, 797 N.W.2d 5, 11 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). And factors suggesting

that an individual was not in custody include brief questioning, a nonthreatening

environment, an explicit statement by police that the person is not under arrest, and police

allowing the person to make phone calls or leave after they gave their statement. Scruggs,

822 N.W.2d at 637.

Interrogation is “express questioning or any words or actions on the part of the

police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating

response.” State v. Heinonen, 909 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2018) (quotations omitted). A

custodial interrogation occurs when “questioning [is] initiated by law enforcement officers

after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of

action in any significant way,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, or “if, based on all the

surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe

7
that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” Vue, 797

N.W.2d at 10-11 (quotation omitted); see also Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d at 637.

“The issue of whether a suspect is in custody and therefore entitled to a Miranda

warning presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review.”

State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2013). A district court’s findings of fact as

they relate to the circumstances of the interrogation are reviewed for clear error, but

appellate courts conduct “an independent review of the [district] court’s determination

regarding custody and the need for a Miranda warning.” Id. at 167-68. Considerable, but

not unlimited, deference is given to a district court’s “fact-specific resolution of such an

issue when the proper legal standard is applied.” Id. at 168.

Waldron does not challenge as clearly erroneous any of the district court’s factual

findings underlying its implicit determination that there was a custodial interrogation.

Based on the district court’s undisputed factual findings, we determine, based on our

independent review, that there was no custodial interrogation requiring a Miranda warning.

We reach this conclusion for two reasons.

First, considering the surrounding circumstances, Waldron was not in custody when

she was questioned. At the outset of Waldron’s encounter with law enforcement—and,

indeed, for the majority of that encounter—there was just one law enforcement officer

present. The homeowners were also present during the encounter, and they were also

interacting with law enforcement. Waldron was not in a police station, jail, or a squad car.

She was lying on the floor of a house that she entered on her own initiative. And the

responding trooper made clear that medical help had been summoned for Waldron. The

8
questions posed by law enforcement were not accusatory. Rather, they were open-ended

attempts to figure out what had happened and whether there was another injured person

outside in the cold. The totality of these circumstances indicates that Waldron was not in

custody when she made the statements at issue. See Vue, 797 N.W.2d at 11 (instructing

district courts to consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether an

individual is in custody for the purpose of a Miranda warning).

Second, there was no interrogation. Police are not required to give a Miranda

warning when engaging in “general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a

crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process.” Miranda, 384

U.S. at 477. This includes “on-the-scene questioning” of individuals suspected of driving

while under the influence. See Steinberg v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 357 N.W.2d 413,

416 (Minn. App. 1984) (“[U]pon arriving at the scene of an accident an officer need not

give a Miranda warning to a person suspected of DWI.”); see also State v. Werner, 725

N.W.2d 767, 769-71 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating that asking a DWI suspect about alcohol

consumption does not constitute an interrogation); State v. Herem, 384 N.W.2d 880, 883

(Minn. 1986) (observing that an “officer’s subjective intent or . . . belief that defendant was

driving under the influence” does not on its own “necessitate a Miranda warning”). Here,

law enforcement officers asked Waldron general on-the-scene questions after responding

to a serious car accident. These questions did not amount to an interrogation.

Because there was no custodial interrogation, no Miranda warning was required.

And because no Miranda warning was required, there was no violation of the Miranda

9
requirement. Given this determination, we do not reach the question of whether the rescue

exception to the Miranda requirement applied.

B. Because the record contains no evidence of police coercion, Waldron’s
argument that her statements were “involuntary” fails.

Separate from the Miranda requirement, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution bars the government from introducing in

evidence any statement that was involuntarily given. State v. Zabawa, 787 N.W.2d 177,

182 (Minn. 2010); see also State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Minn. 1995) (stating

that the voluntariness requirement is separate from the Miranda requirement). In

considering whether a statement was involuntary, “courts inquire whether police conduct,

together with other circumstances surrounding the interrogation, was so coercive, so

manipulative, and so overpowering as to deprive a defendant of his ability to make an

unconstrained and wholly autonomous decision to speak as he did.” State v. Clark, 738

N.W.2d 316, 333 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). The relevant circumstances

surrounding an interrogation include the suspect’s age, maturity, intelligence, education,

experience, ability to comprehend, lack of or adequacy of warnings, length and legality of

detention, nature of interrogation, physical deprivations, and limits on access to family and

friends. See id. at 332; State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 170 (Minn. 1997); State v.

Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 614 (Minn. 2004).

Although Waldron argued to the district court that her statements were involuntary,

the district court did not address this issue. On appeal, Waldron does not contend that the

district court’s failure to address the issue was error. And, generally, we will not make

10
such a determination in these circumstances. See Palladium Holdings, LLC v. Zuni Mortg.

Loan Tr. 2006-OA1, 775 N.W.2d 168, 177-78 (Minn. App. 2009) (“Appellate courts cannot

assume a district court erred by failing to address a motion, and silence on a motion is

therefore treated as an implicit denial of the motion.”), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 2010).

Instead, Waldron argues that we should determine, applying de novo review, that her

statements were involuntary.

Our standard of review permits us to consider de novo whether Waldron’s

statements were voluntary. Appellate courts “review a district court’s conclusion as to the

voluntariness of a statement de novo to determine whether the state proved voluntariness

based on the totality of the circumstances.” Clark, 738 N.W.2d at 333. A district court’s

factual findings bearing on voluntariness are reviewed for clear error. Id.

Reviewing the issue de novo, we conclude that the state satisfied its burden of

establishing the voluntariness of Waldron’s statements. The record contains no evidence

of police coercion. Instead, the audio recording of the interaction between Waldron and

law enforcement officers reveals a routine investigation of an accident involving an injury.

“Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to a finding that a confession is

involuntary.” Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 169 (emphasis added). Because there was no

coercion, Waldron’s statements were not involuntary.

Waldron argues that the responding trooper acted coercively by refusing to assist

her when she was in obvious pain and by continuing to question her in this situation. The

record does not support this argument. Although Waldron was apparently in pain, the

responding trooper assured her that an ambulance had been summoned and explained that

11
he would not touch her so as not to exacerbate any of her injuries. This conduct is not

consistent with coercion.

Waldron also argues that her statements were involuntary due to her mental

condition. She points out that a subsequent competency evaluation deemed her incapable

of appreciating the nature of her actions following the car accident because she sustained

a head injury. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that “a defendant’s

mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion,” does not

“dispose of the inquiry into constitutional ‘voluntariness,’” and absent coercive police

activity “causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any

state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.” Colorado v. Connelly,

479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986); see also State v. Mills, 562 N.W.2d 276, 283 (Minn. 1997) (“The

fact that a defendant suffers from a mental deficiency is, alone, insufficient to render a

statement . . . involuntary. Instead, coercive police activity is a predicate to a finding that

a statement . . . was made involuntarily.” (citation omitted)), overruled by State v. McCoy,

682 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 2004) (overruling Mills on grounds unrelated to voluntariness).

Waldron’s mental condition may have made her more susceptible to police coercion. But

because there was no police coercion, we cannot conclude that her statements were

involuntary. Accordingly, we reject her argument that her statements should have been

suppressed because they were not voluntary.

12
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to introduce
Waldron’s statements in evidence at trial.

As an alternative to her constitutional challenges, Waldron argues that the district

court abused its discretion in allowing the state to introduce the recording of her statements

at trial because they were more prejudicial than probative. She contends that the district

court should have excluded the statements under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403, as she

requested in her pretrial motion.

Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” Relevant evidence “has probative value when it, in

some degree, advances the inquiry.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005).

Evidence is unfairly prejudicial under rule 403 when it is “not merely damaging evidence

[or] even severely damaging evidence,” but when it “persuades by illegitimate means,

giving one party an unfair advantage.” Id.

“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and

[appellate courts] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.”

State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion

when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts

in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).

Waldron argues her statements were inadmissible under rule 403 because they were

“the unreliable ramblings of an incompetent person, . . . had very low probative value[,]

13
and were extremely prejudicial, and confusing to the jury.” We disagree with this analysis.

The statements were quite probative of the issues at trial—whether Waldron drove the car

and whether she was under the influence of alcohol when she drove. And although the

statements were damaging to the defense, Waldron does not explain how they were unfairly

prejudicial—how they “persuade[d] by illegitimate means, giving [the state] an unfair

advantage.” See Schulz, 691 N.W.2d at 478. Because the statements were probative, and

Waldron fails to identify any unfair prejudice, we discern no abuse of discretion in the

district court’s decision to admit the statements in evidence at trial.

III. The district court erred by convicting Waldron of two DWI offenses based on
the same behavioral incident.

Waldron argues that the district court erred in entering convictions for both counts

of DWI—and the state agrees. Under Minnesota law, a criminal defendant “may be

convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat.

§ 609.04, subd. 1 (2022). The supreme court has interpreted this section “to bar[] multiple

convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single

behavioral incident.” State v. Jackson, 363 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1985). When a

defendant is convicted of more than one charge for a single-behavioral incident the district

court must “adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count only.” State v.

LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984). Whether a conviction violates section

609.04 is a legal question that an appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Bonkowske, 957

N.W.2d 437, 443 (Minn. App. 2021).

14
 At sentencing, the district court stated that it was entering convictions for both DWI

offenses—one count for driving with an alcohol concentration over the legal limit as

measured within two hours of driving and one count for operating a motor vehicle while

under the influence of alcohol. 2 Because both of these offenses arose from the same

behavioral incident and involved the same conduct, this was error. We therefore reverse

and remand to the district court to vacate one of the two convictions.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

2
Generally, appellate courts “look to the official judgment of conviction in the district
court file as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated.”
Spann v. State, 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted). Here, no warrant
of commitment was filed, so we consider the district court’s oral pronouncement at
sentencing as evidence. See State v. Staloch, 643 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Minn. App. 2002).

15