State of Minnesota v. Justin Louis Hudak

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0468

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Justin Louis Hudak,
Appellant.

Filed January 29, 2024
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-21-5697

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and

Ross, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SCHMIDT, Judge

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for aiding and abetting

second-degree assault and a drive-by shooting, appellant Justin Louis Hudak argues that

respondent State of Minnesota failed to prove that he “knowingly and intentionally” aided
the principal actor in shooting the victim. Because the state presented sufficient evidence,

we affirm.

FACTS

In August 2021, Hudak drove to a gas station in St. Cloud, Minnesota with S.S. in

the passenger seat. Hudak went into the gas station where N.J. was checking out at the

register. Hudak and N.J. had a verbal altercation in the gas station. After exiting the gas

station store, Hudak returned to his car and told S.S. about his exchange with N.J. S.S.

replied, “I got a gun, don’t worry,” and said, “if they shoot at us, they shoot at us.” S.S.

then retrieved a gun from his waistband.

Hudak drove a short distance in the gas station parking lot and stopped near N.J.

N.J. made a hand gesture directed at Hudak, telling him to “get the f--k on.” The

passenger-side window of Hudak’s car was opened a crack in the parking lot, and the

window came down more as the vehicle left the parking lot. At S.S.’s direction, Hudak

turned right out of the gas station. The car slowed to a stop in front of the gas station—

where N.J. was standing—and S.S. fired multiple shots. One bullet struck N.J. in the arm,

and another hit him in the abdomen. Hudak then sped away.

Hudak admitted that S.S. shot at N.J., and that he knew S.S. had a gun prior to the

shooting. Hudak also assisted police in finding the gun.

The state initially charged Hudak with aiding and abetting a second-degree assault.

The state amended the complaint to add a charge of aiding and abetting a drive-by shooting.

A jury found Hudak guilty of both charges. The district court sentenced Hudak to

120 months in prison. This appeal follows.

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 DECISION

In arguing that this court should reverse his convictions for aiding and abetting a

second-degree assault and aiding and abetting a drive-by shooting, Hudak argues the state

did not prove that he knowingly and intentionally aided S.S. in shooting N.J.

A person is criminally liable for the crime of another “if the person intentionally

aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit

the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2020). An individual acts intentionally if they

either have the purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or believe that the act

performed, if successful, will cause that result. Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (2020).

Therefore, to be guilty of aiding and abetting, the state must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that (1) the person knew their accomplice was going to commit a crime, and (2) the

person intended their presence and actions to further the commission of that crime.

State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012).

Hudak’s sufficiency of the evidence argument requires us to “carefully examine the

record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would

permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263

(Minn. 2016) (quotation and citations omitted). We view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict, and we assume that the jury disbelieved any evidence conflicting

with the verdict. Id. This court will not overturn a verdict if the jury, upon application of

the presumption of innocence and the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,

could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense. Id.

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 The level of scrutiny that an appellate court applies to a sufficiency-of-the-evidence

claim turns on whether the elements of the offense were supported by direct or

circumstantial evidence. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). A

challenge to a verdict based on circumstantial evidence may not rely on mere conjecture or

speculation. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 480 (Minn. 2010).

Hudak challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his state of mind at the time of

the shooting, which is generally proved by circumstantial evidence. Al-Naseer,

788 N.W.2d at 474. Because the challenged evidence is circumstantial, we apply the

heightened scrutiny of the two-step test in evaluating its sufficiency. Id. at 473-74.

First, we identify the circumstances proved. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598. In

doing so, we only consider “those circumstances that are consistent with the verdict,”

meaning we assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense’s

witness. Id. at 599.

Second, we review the evidence to “determine whether the circumstances proved

are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”

Id. (quotations omitted). In doing so, we independently examine “the reasonableness of all

inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved.” Id. “Circumstantial

evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so

directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any

reasonable inference other than guilt.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473.

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 Circumstances proved

The circumstances proved that are consistent with the verdict are as follows. Hudak

pulled into a gas station with S.S. sitting in the passenger seat of Hudak’s car. While inside

the gas station, Hudak and N.J. got into a verbal altercation. After leaving the gas station,

Hudak returned to his vehicle where he told S.S. about his exchange with N.J. S.S. replied,

“I got a gun, don’t worry,” and added, “if they shoot at us, they shoot at us.” S.S. then

pulled a gun from his waistband. Hudak admitted that he knew S.S. had a gun prior to the

shooting. Hudak drove his vehicle a short distance in the parking lot, stopped near N.J.,

and remained there for a brief period of time. N.J. made a hand gesture directed at Hudak’s

car. The passenger-side window of Hudak’s car was slightly open in the parking lot, and

the window came down more as the car pulled out of the lot. At S.S.’s direction, Hudak

turned right out of the parking lot. Hudak slowed the car to a stop in front of the gas station

where N.J. stood. S.S. then fired multiple shots, striking N.J. twice. Hudak sped away

from the scene with S.S. Hudak later took officers to retrieve the gun.

The circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

The circumstances proved show that Hudak knew S.S. had a gun, saw S.S. pull out

the gun from his waistband, and stopped his car near N.J. The passenger-side window was

initially opened a crack, and was rolled down further as Hudak drove out of the parking

lot. Hudak followed S.S.’s instruction to turn right out of the parking lot. Hudak slowed

the car to a stop in front of where N.J. stood. Hudak kept the car in that spot while S.S.

fired multiple shots. Hudak then sped away from the scene with S.S.

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 Hudak generally argues that “as a whole,” the circumstances proved do not exclude

an alternative theory that he did not know or intend to aid S.S. in committing the shooting.

However, in making this argument Hudak relies on evidence that is inconsistent with the

verdict, contrary to the applicable standard of review. 1 See Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598.

Hudak also appears to argue that the evidence did not establish that S.S. directly

told Hudak that S.S. intended to shoot N.J. But such evidence is not required as the jury

may rely on circumstantial evidence in deciding whether the defendant had the requisite

state of mind. See State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. 2013) (“A jury may infer

the requisite state of mind from a variety of facts, including presence at the scene of the

crime, a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime, a lack of

objection or surprise under the circumstances, and flight from the scene of the crime with

the principal offender.”). The state is not required to present evidence that S.S. directly

told Hudak that S.S. intended to shoot N.J. in order to establish that Hudak knowingly and

intentionally assisted S.S. Accordingly, Hudak’s argument is unpersuasive.

Finally, Hudak argues that these circumstances do not preclude a reasonable

inference that Hudak understood S.S.’s statements to be an assurance of protection or that

Hudak simply thought S.S. was going to brandish the gun “in an act of bravado.” However,

this theory does not account for the totality of the circumstances proved, which includes

Hudak knowing S.S. had a gun, the passenger-side window being rolled down, Hudak

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Hudak argues that the circumstances proved include the facts that he and N.J. did not talk
about weapons or guns inside the gas station, and Hudak did not appear to be angry or
upset during the exchange with N.J. However, those circumstances are immaterial under
the applicable standard.

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slowing the car to a stop in front of N.J., Hudak staying stopped while S.S. fired multiple

shots, and then Hudak speeding away from the scene with S.S. Because Hudak’s

alternative inferences regarding the circumstances proved are not reasonable—and rely

upon conjecture and speculation—they are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except

that of guilt.

Affirmed.

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