Corey Pearson v. St. Cloud Hospital, Emergency Physicians Professional Association, ...

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0546

Corey Pearson,
Appellant,

vs.

St. Cloud Hospital, et al.,
Respondents,

Emergency Physicians Professional Association,
Respondent.

Filed May 13, 2024
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-21-6760

Sarah R. Jewell, River Valley Law, P.A., Waite Park, Minnesota (for appellant)

Cally Kjellberg-Nelson, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondents
St. Cloud Hospital, et al.)

Michael J. Moberg, Elaine E. Luthens, Jackson Lewis P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent Emergency Physicians Professional Association)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Halbrooks,

Judge. ∗

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

Appellant challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of her claims under the

Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), her claims under the Minnesota whistleblower act

(MWA), and her claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. She also

challenges the district court’s denial of her motions to compel discovery. Because no

genuine issues of material fact exist precluding the grant of summary judgment for

respondents and any error related to the motions to compel is harmless, we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent St. Cloud Hospital is one of several medical facilities that make up

respondent CentraCare Health System (collectively, CentraCare). Appellant Corey

Pearson worked for CentraCare as a registered nurse at St. Cloud Hospital in the emergency

trauma center. Although CentraCare employed the nurses who worked in the hospital’s

emergency trauma center during the relevant period, it did not employ the physicians.

Instead, CentraCare contracted with respondent Emergency Physicians Professional

Association (EPPA), which in turn employed the physicians who worked in the emergency

trauma center.

Pearson left her employment with CentraCare in 2020 and initiated this lawsuit in

2021. The lawsuit was based on alleged harassment and retaliation by employees of

CentraCare and EPPA.

2
 Background 1

At the time of the underlying events, CentraCare’s director of the emergency trauma

center for the St. Cloud Hospital was responsible for managing the nurses in the unit. The

CentraCare director also worked in a partnership with an EPPA medical director, who

managed the EPPA physicians working in the emergency trauma center.

On February 25, 2020, Pearson told the CentraCare director that Dr. S, an EPPA

physician, made sexual and inappropriate comments toward her while at work. She also

reported that she had concerns about some nurses having relationships with doctors and

acting unprofessionally. That day, the CentraCare director informed the EPPA medical

director about Dr. S’s conduct toward Pearson. Later that same day, the EPPA medical

director placed Dr. S on administrative leave. The EPPA medical director spoke with

Dr. S, who denied engaging in “sexual harassment,” but did not deny engaging in the

conduct reported by Pearson. EPPA terminated Dr. S’s employment in March 2020.

On February 25, after telling her concerns to the CentraCare director, Pearson

completed her shift in a different part of St. Cloud Hospital—the behavioral-health area—

to avoid interacting with Dr. S. At the end of the shift, a different EPPA physician, Dr. B,

approached Pearson. He asked her “if he had done anything that offended [her].” Dr. B

followed up by explaining that Dr. S had told him that Pearson had recently reported sexual

harassment in the workplace and stated that Dr. B was involved. The following day,

1
Consistent with the standard of review, our recitation of the facts is based on the evidence
viewed in the light most favorable to Pearson as the nonmoving party. See Kenneh v.
Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 228 (Minn. 2020). “[W]e do not weigh facts or
make credibility determinations.” Id.

3
Pearson worked her shift without incident. At the start of Pearson’s next shift, on March 2,

Dr. B pulled Pearson aside. Pearson testified that Dr. B seemed upset and complained that

“because of [her] reporting they had to do this sensitivity training” and that “having to do

this training, it’s a bunch of bullsh-t.” Following this interaction, Pearson broke out in

hives and the CentraCare director allowed her to leave work early. Throughout March

2020, Pearson requested that CentraCare take her off the schedule at St. Cloud Hospital.

On April 6, 2020, Pearson met with the EPPA medical director, who informed her

that Dr. S had been terminated. Later that month, Pearson requested to return to work in

the behavioral-health area and to work a shift alongside another nurse in case she needed

to leave early. CentraCare allowed her to do so, and Pearson worked a partial shift on

April 29. Pearson testified that other nurses “ignored” her during the shift and that one

doctor gave her a “different look.” Pearson worked her final shift at the emergency trauma

center on May 8, alongside another nurse. On that day, Pearson was working “in the

middle of the emergency room right behind where the doctors all sit,” instead of in the

behavioral-health area. During the shift, other nurses ignored her and one nurse “roll[ed]

her eyes at [Pearson].” On May 28, Pearson sent a letter expressing her intent to end her

employment at the emergency trauma center and to seek similar positions elsewhere within

CentraCare.

During summer 2020, after filing a workers’ compensation claim, Pearson worked

with a rehabilitation consultant from the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry to

help her return to work as a nurse. CentraCare also worked with Pearson to find her another

position within CentraCare, including identifying a registered-nurse position at a facility

4
in Monticello in June 2020. Instead, Pearson accepted a position outside of CentraCare in

October 2020. Then, in March 2021, Pearson and CentraCare entered into a stipulated

settlement of Pearson’s workers’ compensation claim related to alleged psychological

injuries sustained on or about March 2, 2020, in the course of employment.

District Court Proceedings

Pearson served EPPA with a summons and complaint on August 10, 2021, and

CentraCare on August 18, 2021, and filed an amended complaint in February 2022.

Pearson’s amended complaint alleged two counts of employment discrimination under the

MHRA; two counts of violations of the MWA; and negligent hiring, supervision, and

retention. The amended complaint alleged that one EPPA physician sexually harassed her.

The amended complaint also alleged that Pearson suffered retaliation by CentraCare nurses

and EPPA physicians after she reported that an EPPA physician sexually harassed her and

that CentraCare nurses were prescribing medication without a physician’s order. The

amended complaint alleged that Pearson “had severe anxiety and panic attacks resulting in

a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).”

CentraCare and EPPA each filed motions for summary judgment, which Pearson

opposed. Pearson also filed motions to compel discovery against EPPA and CentraCare,

which both opposed.

The district court denied Pearson’s motion to compel discovery from CentraCare

and denied in part and reserved in part Pearson’s motion to compel discovery from EPPA.

The district court subsequently granted CentraCare’s and EPPA’s motions for summary

judgment and dismissed the amended complaint.

5
 Pearson appeals.

DECISION

Pearson argues that the district court erred by granting CentraCare’s and EPPA’s

motions for summary judgment and dismissing her MHRA claims, MWA claims, and

claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. She also argues that the district

court erred by denying her motions to compel. We first address Pearson’s arguments

regarding the summary-judgment dismissal of her claims and then discuss her arguments

regarding the motions to compel.

I. The district court did not err by granting CentraCare’s and EPPA’s motions
for summary judgment.

“We review a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo.” Henry v.

Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 988 N.W.2d 868, 880 (Minn. 2023). “We will affirm a grant of

summary judgment if no genuine issues of material fact exist and if the [district] court

accurately applied the law.” Hanson v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 972 N.W.2d 362, 371-72 (Minn.

2022). Furthermore, “we may affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained

on any grounds.” Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn. 2012).

“In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts and

factual inferences against the moving parties.” Hanson, 972 N.W.2d at 372 (quotation

omitted). To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present specific,

admissible evidence that demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact. Doe, 817 N.W.2d

at 163. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence regarding

6
an essential element to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” St. Paul

Park Refin. Co. v. Domeier, 950 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).

Accordingly, “the nonmoving party must do more than rely on unverified or conclusionary

allegations in the pleadings or postulate evidence which might be produced at trial.”

W.J.L. v. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted).

For each of the claims, the district court determined that Pearson failed to establish

a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law was proper. We

consider in turn Pearson’s claims under the MHRA, her claims under the MWA, and her

claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.

A. The district court did not err by granting summary judgment on
Pearson’s MHRA claims.

We first address Pearson’s two MHRA claims, which alleged that CentraCare and

EPPA engaged in sex discrimination and improperly handled her report of sexual

harassment.

The MHRA prohibits, as relevant to Pearson’s claims, unfair discriminatory

practices related to employment. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.08 (Supp. 2023). 2 But the

MHRA imposes a one-year statute of limitations to bring such claims. See Minn. Stat.

§ 363A.28, subd. 3(a) (2022) (“A claim of an unfair discriminatory practice must be

2
The MHRA was amended in 2023. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19, §§ 45-72, at 1149-
62. Previous versions of the MHRA were in effect during the underlying events and when
the district court granted respondents’ motions for summary judgment. The amendments
do not change the substance of the section applicable to Pearson’s claims. We therefore
cite the current version of the MHRA. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (recognizing “general rule . . . that appellate
courts apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on a case”).

7
brought as a civil action . . . within one year after the occurrence of the practice.”). The

district court determined that Pearson’s MHRA claims were time-barred because she failed

to identify discriminatory acts or occurrences within that one-year statute-of-limitations

period. Pearson contends that there are genuine issues of material fact about whether she

continued to be subjected to discrimination by respondents during the statute-of-limitations

period and therefore whether her MHRA claims are timely under the continuing-violations

doctrine. We are unpersuaded.

“Under Minnesota law, each individual discriminatory act which is part of a

continuing violation triggers anew the time period for reporting the entire pattern of

discrimination, as long as at least one incident of discrimination occurred within the

limitations period.” Abel v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., 947 N.W.2d 58, 70 (Minn. 2020)

(quotations omitted). “Mere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to

prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination.” Sigurdson v. Isanti

County, 448 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1989) (quotation omitted). “The critical question is

whether any present violation exists within the statute of limitations period.” Abel,

947 N.W.2d at 71 (quotation omitted).

Pearson concedes that, in order for her MHRA claims to survive, she must identify

evidence of discrimination between August 2020 and August 2021. The statute-of-

limitations period runs from August 2020 to August 2021 because Pearson served

respondents with her complaint in August 2021. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3; see

also Abel, 947 N.W.2d at 68-69. And Pearson also does not dispute: (1) that Dr. S’s

alleged harassment occurred well before August 2020, or (2) that she last worked in the

8
St. Cloud Hospital emergency trauma center in May 2020. Instead, Pearson argues that

respondents continued to discriminate against her by offering her “alternative work

positions” that were “low skilled” or “directly conflicted with her children’s school

schedules and would cause her to have to interact with the” emergency trauma center.

Even if we assume that these alternative job offers qualified as discrimination within

the scope of section 363A.08, Pearson does not identify any evidence of such offers

between August 2020 and August 2021 to support her continuing-violation theory. The

sole record evidence related to job offers is from June 2020, two months too early to fall

within the statute-of-limitations period. Absent any evidence of allegedly discriminatory

acts during the statute-of-limitations period, there is no genuine dispute of material fact

that Pearson’s MHRA claims were time-barred. See Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 163. We

therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment on those claims. 3

3
Pearson’s amended complaint alleged two counts under section 363A.08: (1) “violation
of Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, based on sex discrimination,” and (2) “violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 363A.08, based on invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
In granting summary judgment, the district court construed the second count as a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, rather than an MHRA claim. At oral argument,
Pearson conceded that both claims were brought under the MHRA and subject to its statute
of limitations. We also note that, even if the complaint alleged an intentional-infliction-
of-emotional-distress claim, Pearson does not identify the “egregious” conduct required to
sustain an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. See Langeslag v. KYMN Inc.,
664 N.W.2d 860, 864-65 (Minn. 2003) (“We have cautioned that intentional infliction of
emotional distress is sharply limited to cases involving particularly egregious facts and that
a high threshold standard of proof is required to submit the claim to a jury.” (quotations
omitted)); see also Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 439 (Minn. 1983)
(“[E]xtreme and outrageous [conduct] must be so atrocious that it passes the boundaries of
decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized community.” (quotations omitted)).

9
 B. The district court did not err by granting summary judgment on
Pearson’s MWA claims.

We next address Pearson’s two whistleblower claims, which alleged that EPPA and

CentraCare employees retaliated against her for reporting sexual harassment and other

improper conduct.

The MWA prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who, “in

good faith, reports a violation, suspected violation, or planned violation of any federal or

state law.” Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1) (2018); 4 see also Hanson, 972 N.W.2d at 372

(“In short, the statute makes it illegal for an employer to punish an employee for reporting

violations of law in good faith.”). Pearson concedes that, to survive summary judgment,

she must provide evidence of an “adverse employment action” against her in retaliation for

conduct protected by the MWA. See Moore v. City of New Brighton, 932 N.W.2d 317, 323

(Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2019). The district court determined that

there was no evidence that Pearson suffered an adverse employment action, and therefore

Pearson’s whistleblower claims failed. Pearson contends that the district court erred

because Pearson presented evidence of an adverse employment action—namely, a

“constructive discharge” by CentraCare. 5 We are not persuaded.

4
The MWA was amended in 2023 with respect to the actions prohibited. 2023 Minn. Laws
ch. 53, art. 11, § 26, at 1290-91. We therefore cite the version in effect at the time of
CentraCare’s alleged conduct.
5
To the extent that Pearson challenges the dismissal of her whistleblower claims against
EPPA, we conclude that summary judgment is appropriate. The MWA provides that “[a]n
employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise discriminate against, or
penalize an employee.” Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1 (emphasis added); see also Minn.
Stat. § 181.935(a) (2018) (“[A]n employee injured by a violation of section 181.932 may

10
 At the outset, we note that neither this court nor the supreme court has applied the

constructive-discharge doctrine—a doctrine typically applied in cases arising under the

MHRA or Title VII—to a whistleblower claim. See Henry, 988 N.W.2d at 884 (“[A]

plaintiff can satisfy the adverse employment action element of a disparate treatment claim

under the [MHRA] by demonstrating constructive discharge.”); see also Coursolle v. EMC

Ins. Grp., Inc., 794 N.W.2d 652, 662 (Minn. App. 2011) (“Neither the supreme court nor

this court has applied the constructive discharge doctrine to a whistleblower claim.”), rev.

denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 2011). Nonetheless, assuming without deciding that a constructive

discharge can constitute an “adverse employment action” for the purpose of a

whistleblower claim, we conclude that summary judgment is still appropriate.

A “constructive discharge arises when the working conditions are so intolerable that

a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.” Henry, 988 N.W.2d at 885

(quotation omitted). A person alleging constructive discharge must allege:

“(1) objectively intolerable working conditions that are (2) created by the employer with

the intention of forcing the employee to quit.” Id. To satisfy the first prong, a plaintiff

must show either “harassment [that] was so severe or pervasive that a reasonable person

would have felt compelled to resign” or that “an employer act[ed] in a manner so as to have

communicated to a reasonable employee that she will be terminated.” Id. at 886. To satisfy

bring a civil action . . . .”). The undisputed evidence shows that Pearson’s employer was
CentraCare, not EPPA. Neither Pearson, nor our independent research, has identified
authority suggesting that Pearson can assert a claim under the MWA against a
nonemployer. We therefore affirm the summary-judgment dismissal of Pearson’s
whistleblower claims against EPPA on that basis. See Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 163.

11
the second prong, the plaintiff must show that “the employer deliberately created

intolerable working conditions with the intent of forcing the employee to quit” or that

“resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the employer’s deliberate

actions.” Id. at 887.

Pearson asserts that she was constructively discharged by “the hostile work

environment that had been caused by [CentraCare’s] handling of the report of sexual

harassment” and by CentraCare’s offers of “alternative positions that . . . were neither

realistic nor in line with [Pearson’s] certifications or experience.” While we acknowledge

that Pearson has presented evidence of her own subjective emotional distress resulting from

her work environment, the standard for demonstrating a constructive discharge is an

objective one. Based on that standard, we conclude that a reasonable jury could not find

that the evidence constitutes “objectively intolerable working conditions,” as required to

meet the first prong. See id. at 885. In other words, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Pearson as the nonmoving party, the alleged harassing behaviors—being

confronted by Dr. B and rude or cold interactions by other nurses—do not rise to the level

of “harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point” required for a hostile-work-environment

constructive discharge. See id. (quotation omitted). Likewise, Pearson has not established

a genuine dispute of material fact that CentraCare’s offers “communicated to a reasonable

employee that she will be terminated.” See id. at 887. The sole offer in the record is for a

medical-surgical registered-nurse position at CentraCare’s Monticello facility, and Pearson

does not identify evidence that this job offer was unrealistic or below her qualifications.

12
 Furthermore, even if we assume that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding

the first prong, there is no evidence suggesting that CentraCare intended to force Pearson

to quit, as required by the second prong. Instead, the record suggests that CentraCare

wanted to retain Pearson as a nurse after she reported the sexual harassment. As a result,

there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Pearson was constructively discharged, and

the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on these claims.

C. The district court did not err by granting summary judgment on
Pearson’s claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.

Finally, we turn to Pearson’s claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention,

which allege that EPPA placed certain physicians at St. Cloud Hospital whom EPPA knew

or had reason to know had substance-abuse issues and had previously sexually harassed

nurses.

“Minnesota recognizes three causes of action where a claimant sues an employer in

negligence for injuries caused by one of its employees: negligent hiring, negligent

retention, and negligent supervision.” M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849, 856 (Minn.

App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 1995). As relevant to this appeal, a viable claim

for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention requires the plaintiff to suffer physical injury

or threat of physical injury. Johnson v. Peterson, 734 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Minn. App. 2007)

(negligent hiring and supervision); Bruchas v. Preventive Care, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 440, 443

(Minn. App. 1996) (negligent retention and supervision). The district court determined

that Pearson did not identify evidence of physical injury or threat of physical injury.

Pearson argues that the district court erred because the manifestation of hives following an

13
interaction with Dr. B—which she acknowledges was “because of her PTSD”—qualifies

as a physical injury. We are not persuaded.

To support her argument, Pearson relies on Garvis v. Employers Mutual Casualty

Co., 497 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1993). In Garvis, the supreme court considered the definition

of “bodily injury” as used in an insurance policy and “conclude[d] that emotional distress

with appreciable physical manifestations can qualify as a ‘bodily injury’ within the

meaning of the insurance policy.” 497 N.W.2d at 257. But Garvis did not consider what

constitutes a physical injury for purposes of a common-law negligence claim. See id. at

256-58. In the context of claims for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, this court

has rejected the argument that emotional distress resulting in physical symptoms qualifies

as a “physical injury” and instead underscored that “emotional distress is not a physical

injury” for such claims. Johnson, 734 N.W.2d at 278 (affirming rule 12 dismissal of

negligent-hiring and negligent-supervision claims alleging “emotional distress that may

have caused heart problems and anxiety disorders”). Thus, Pearson’s emotional distress,

regardless of its severity and physical symptoms, does not qualify as physical injury under

existing precedent for the purpose of a negligent-hiring, negligent-supervision, or

negligent-retention claim. See id. We therefore conclude that the district court properly

granted summary judgment on Pearson’s negligence claims.

In sum, Pearson has not presented evidence to demonstrate a genuine dispute of

material fact regarding the viability of her MHRA claims, her MWA claims, or her

negligence claims. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in

favor of CentraCare and EPPA.

14
II. Any error related to Pearson’s motions to compel discovery from CentraCare
and EPPA is harmless.

In addition to her challenges to the summary-judgment dismissal of her claims,

Pearson argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to compel

discovery from CentraCare and by denying in part and reserving in part her motion to

compel discovery from EPPA. We conclude that, even assuming the district court erred

with respect to either motion, Pearson is not entitled to relief.

Pearson does not articulate how the requested discovery would preclude summary

judgment on her claims against CentraCare or EPPA. And based on our review of

Pearson’s motions to compel, the record, and our grounds for affirming the grant of

summary judgment, we conclude that the relevant information for each claim is within

Pearson’s personal knowledge. Thus, under the circumstances, the requested discovery

would not give rise to a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to any of Pearson’s

claims. As a result, the district court’s decisions on Pearson’s discovery motions do not

provide a basis to disturb the grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents. See

Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); see, e.g., Kahn v. Tronnier,

547 N.W.2d 425, 431 (Minn. App. 1996) (declining to address merits of the district court’s

denial of a motion to compel because, even “if the [district] court’s refusal to require father

to produce the financial information was an error, that error was harmless”), rev. denied

(Minn. July 10, 1996).

Affirmed.

15