State of Minnesota v. Raymont Michael Redmond

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0744

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Raymont Michael Redmond,
Appellant.

Filed May 13, 2024
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-4504

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and

Klaphake, Judge. ∗

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction for two counts of first-degree

criminal sexual conduct, appellant argues that the district court erred by allowing the state

to introduce evidence of the victim’s out-of-court statements and by failing to give a

specific unanimity instruction to the jury. Appellant also argues in a pro se supplemental

brief that the jury was “tainted” by two evidentiary issues. Because we discern no plain

error by the district court and because appellant’s pro se argument does not warrant relief,

we affirm.

FACTS

In February 2022, P.J. disclosed to her mother that appellant Raymont Michael

Redmond had been sexually abusing her. Redmond is P.J.’s stepfather. P.J. was 14 years

old when she told her mother about the abuse.

After the disclosure, P.J.’s mother contacted the police, and a peace officer

responded to Redmond’s home. P.J. told the officer that Redmond had been coming into

her room at night since approximately 2019. At first, Redmond asked her to pull down her

pants. Then, in 2021, Redmond started forcing P.J. to take off her pants so that he could

penetrate her vagina with his penis. P.J. reported to the officer that Redmond penetrated

her vagina on three separate occasions and that the last time was in November 2021. In

the weeks following her statement to the officer, P.J. gave statements about Redmond’s

abuse to a forensic interviewer and to a pediatric nurse practitioner.

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 In March 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged Redmond with two counts

of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minnesota Statutes sections 609.342,

subdivision 1a(g) (Supp. 2021), and 609.342, subdivision 1(g) (2020). The first count

alleged that Redmond “engaged in sexual penetration and/or sexual contact” with a child

under the age of 16 between September 15, 2021, and December 31, 2021. The second

count alleged the same type of conduct between May 1, 2021, and September 14, 2021.

The case proceeded to a jury trial in January 2023.

At trial, P.J. testified about Redmond’s visits to her room and the various occasions

when Redmond pressured her into sexual acts. P.J. stated that the first time Redmond came

into her bedroom alone was when she was 13 years old and in the sixth grade. According

to P.J.’s testimony, Redmond came into P.J.’s room at about 6:00 a.m. on a school day and

asked her to touch him. Redmond then grabbed her arm and tried to move it so that she

was touching his penis. P.J. moved away and, just then, her alarm clock sounded.

Redmond instructed P.J. not to tell anyone about what had occurred and left the room.

P.J. testified that on subsequent occasions when Redmond visited her bedroom, he

penetrated her vagina with his penis. P.J. testified that Redmond sexually penetrated her

“[m]ore than once.” On one occasion, Redmond entered P.J.’s room, asked her to touch

him, pulled her pants down, and then began sexually penetrating her vagina. P.J. told

Redmond that it hurt and tried to push him away. After Redmond “finally got off of [her],”

he talked to P.J. for a short time and then left the room.

On another occasion when Redmond engaged in sexual penetration, the incident

started with Redmond coming into P.J.’s bedroom and asking her to take naked pictures of

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him. P.J. told Redmond that she did not know where her phone was located because she

did not want to take pictures of him. During the encounter, Redmond told P.J. that “he

didn’t know that [P.J.] thought of him as a real dad.” Redmond then hugged P.J. On cross-

examination, P.J. confirmed that she told the forensic interviewer about this incident. She

also confirmed that this was “the most recent incident” of sexual penetration by Redmond,

that it happened at night, that she “told him that it hurt,” and that as soon as she “started

making noises,” he left.

P.J. testified that the penetration occurred in 2021. When asked what time of year

“the incidents” of penetration occurred, P.J. responded that “[i]t wasn’t cold, so . . . maybe

when summer was starting.”

Finally, P.J. testified about an encounter outside the home, when she was in

Redmond’s car with him at a Family Dollar parking lot. While they were talking, Redmond

brought up the first incident, when he attempted to make her touch his penis. Redmond

then pulled out his penis and asked P.J. to touch it. P.J. refused. Redmond then asked P.J.

to put her hands in her pants and “play with” herself. P.J. testified that she complied to

make “[t]he whole situation” go faster.

The police officer, forensic interviewer, and nurse to whom P.J. disclosed

Redmond’s abuse also testified at the trial. The officer recounted P.J.’s statements during

the officer’s visit to Redmond’s home in February 2022. The forensic interviewer

authenticated a recording of P.J.’s forensic interview from February 2022, which was

played for the jury and admitted into evidence. During the interview, P.J. described

Redmond’s escalating conduct over the previous three years, which progressed from

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Redmond entering her room at night and asking her to touch his genitals to Redmond

locking her door and vaginally penetrating her with his penis. P.J. also said that once,

while she was in Redmond’s car with him at a Family Dollar parking lot, Redmond showed

her his penis and brought up the first time he visited P.J.’s bedroom at night. P.J. told the

forensic interviewer that the last incident of penetration occurred when she was 14 years

old and when “[i]t was probably just starting to get cold out.” Lastly, the nurse testified

about P.J.’s statements during a medical examination in March 2022. The nurse testified

that P.J. thought that Redmond penetrated her “two or three times,” with the most recent

incident occurring in November 2021. Redmond did not object to the state’s elicitation of

P.J.’s statements via any of the three witnesses.

Redmond testified and denied P.J.’s allegations. Redmond also testified about his

relationship with P.J.’s mother. He explained that the relationship grew “rocky” in 2021,

and that P.J. had witnessed him physically abusing her mother. On cross-examination,

Redmond testified that he believed that P.J. was fabricating the allegations of sexual abuse

to protect her mother from Redmond’s physical abuse.

After the parties’ closing arguments, the district court instructed the jury that, in

order to find Redmond guilty of the two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, the

jury must find that: (1) Redmond “engaged in sexual penetration with [P.J.]”; (2) P.J. was

under the age of 16; (3) Redmond had a significant relationship with P.J.; and

(4) Redmond’s acts took place during the relevant time period, as identified in each count.

The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The district court imposed

concurrent, executed sentences of 172 months on each count.

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 Redmond appeals.

DECISION

Redmond argues that the district court committed two errors. First, he asserts that

the district court erroneously permitted the state to introduce evidence of P.J.’s out-of-court

statements to the peace officer, forensic interviewer, and nurse as substantive evidence

supporting count one. Second, he contends that the district court failed to provide a specific

unanimity instruction regarding count two. Redmond also raises various arguments in a

pro se supplemental brief. We address Redmond’s arguments in turn.

I. The district court did not commit plain error by allowing the state to introduce
evidence of P.J.’s out-of-court statements.

Redmond first argues that the district court erred by permitting the state to introduce

evidence of out-of-court statements that P.J. made to the peace officer, forensic

interviewer, and nurse. Redmond did not object to the admission of this evidence at trial.

Typically, “[a]ppellate review of an evidentiary issue is forfeited when a defendant fails to

object to the admission of evidence.” State v. Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 2018).

But an appellate court may review forfeited issues for plain error. Id. at 650; see also Minn

R. Crim. P. 31.02 (“Plain error affecting a substantial right can be considered . . . on appeal

even if it was not brought to the [district] court’s attention.”). To establish plain error, a

defendant must demonstrate that “(1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the

error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d at 650 (quotation

omitted). “If any prong of the test is not met, the claim fails.” State v. Jackson,

714 N.W.2d 681, 690 (Minn. 2006). And even if a defendant satisfies the plain-error test,

6
we will “correct the error only when it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356

(Minn. 2022).

Redmond asserts that the district court plainly erred by admitting evidence of P.J.’s

out-of-court statements because the statements were inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay “is a

statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,

offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(c).

Hearsay is only admissible as provided by the rules of evidence or by other rules prescribed

by the supreme court or legislature. Minn. R. Evid. 802. But some out-of-court statements

are not hearsay, including certain prior consistent statements by a witness who testifies at

trial. Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).

Because Redmond did not object at trial to testimony regarding P.J.’s out-of-court

statements, the district court did not expressly address the admissibility of the evidence.

On appeal, Redmond assumes that the statements were admitted as prior consistent

statements under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B). Under the prior-consistent-

statements exemption, a statement is not hearsay if (1) the declarant testifies at trial, (2) the

declarant “is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement,” (3) the statement is

“consistent with the declarant’s testimony,” and (4) the statement is “helpful to the trier of

fact in evaluating the declarant’s credibility as a witness.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1).

Redmond only disputes the third prong—whether P.J.’s out-of-court statements were

consistent with her testimony.

7
 For trial testimony and a prior statement to be consistent, they “need not be

identical.” State v. Zulu, 706 N.W.2d 919, 924-25 (Minn. App. 2005); see also

State v. Bakken, 604 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 24,

2000) (“The trial testimony and the prior statement need not be verbatim.”). Thus,

admission of a statement “that is reasonably consistent with the trial testimony is not

reversible error.” Zulu, 706 N.W.2d at 924 (quotation omitted) (determining that criminal-

sexual-conduct victim’s prior statements were reasonably consistent with her trial

testimony and that any inconsistencies were not substantial).

Redmond argues that P.J.’s out-of-court statements to the peace officer, forensic

interviewer, and nurse are not consistent with P.J.’s trial testimony. Redmond asserts that

P.J.’s out-of-court statements indicated that Redmond last penetrated P.J. in November

2021, but P.J. did not explicitly testify at trial as to when the last act of penetration occurred.

Redmond contends that, without P.J.’s out-of-court statements, there is no evidence

supporting his conviction under count one, which required the jury to find that Redmond

penetrated P.J. between September 15, 2021, and December 31, 2021.

Our review of the record shows that P.J.’s out-of-court statements to the forensic

interviewer, peace officer, and nurse regarding the acts of penetration are reasonably

consistent with her trial testimony and therefore were not erroneously admitted. At trial,

P.J. testified that during one instance when Redmond was penetrating her, she tried to push

him off and that it hurt. P.J. testified that after Redmond got off of her, he talked for a

while and then left. Similarly, in her statement to the forensic interviewer, P.J. stated that,

on the first occasion when Redmond penetrated her, she told him that it hurt, and that

8
Redmond did not stop until P.J. pushed him off. P.J. also told the interviewer that, after

the penetration ended, Redmond talked to P.J. before eventually leaving.

P.J.’s trial testimony and her statement at the forensic interview are also reasonably

consistent with regard to another incident of penetration. At trial, P.J. testified about an

incident in which Redmond entered P.J.’s bedroom and asked her to take naked pictures of

him. P.J. testified that she pretended to not know where her phone was so she would not

have to take naked pictures. During that encounter, Redmond also told P.J. that he did not

know that she saw him as her real dad and then started crying and hugged her. On cross-

examination, P.J. testified that this incident had been the most recent incident of

penetration. P.J. described the very same encounter to the forensic interviewer. In sum,

P.J.’s trial testimony and forensic interview contain markedly similar details about the

various incidences of penetration, and so we conclude that they are reasonably consistent.

P.J.’s trial testimony about the incidents of penetration is also reasonably consistent

with the out-of-court statements that she made to the peace officer and the pediatric nurse

practitioner. According to the peace officer’s testimony about P.J.’s out-of-court

statement, P.J. “tried pushing [Redmond] off of her” and then “after a while, she

would . . . make noises, [and Redmond] would then get up and leave the bedroom.” The

nurse’s testimony about P.J.’s statements contained fewer specific details. But the nurse

did testify that P.J. said that Redmond penetrated her “two or three times” in 2021 and that

the most recent time was in November 2021. At trial, P.J. testified that Redmond

penetrated her “[m]ore than once” in 2021. We conclude that P.J.’s statements to the peace

officer and the nurse are also “reasonably consistent” with her trial testimony.

9
 Redmond is correct that P.J.’s out-of-court statements included detail about when

the last act of penetration occurred and, at trial, P.J. did not expressly testify to when the

last act occurred. But that additional detail in her out-of-court testimony does not make

her trial testimony inconsistent with the out-of-court statements. See id. at 924-25 (holding

that forensic interview was reasonably consistent with trial testimony and therefore

admissible even when interview included “statements that were in the interview but not

testified to at trial”). And P.J. did not testify in a manner inconsistent with these statements.

In other words, she did not testify that the last act of penetration was not in November

2021.

In addition, P.J.’s testimony was substantially consistent with her prior statements

regarding other incidents that did not involve penetration, such as the time Redmond first

came into P.J.’s bedroom and the Family Dollar incident. Therefore, we conclude that

P.J.’s out-of-court statements are “reasonably consistent” with P.J.’s trial testimony and

the district court did not err when it admitted the testimony. 1

Further, Redmond has not shown that the alleged error was plain as required under

the applicable standard of review. “An error is plain if it is clear and obvious . . . .”

State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010). In other words, the error “must

have been so clear under applicable law at the time” of trial that “the defendant’s failure to

object—and thereby present the [district] court with an opportunity to avoid prejudice—

1
The state also argues that P.J.’s out-of-court statements were admissible under the residual
exception to the rule against hearsay pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 807. Because
we conclude that P.J.’s statements were admissible as prior-consistent statements, we need
not determine whether the statements were also admissible under rule 807.

10
should not forfeit his right to a remedy.” State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504

(Minn. 2006).

In Manthey, the supreme court addressed whether the admission of alleged hearsay

amounted to plain error. Id. Because of the “complexity and subtlety of the operation of

the hearsay rule and its exceptions,” the supreme court observed that an objection to a

hearsay statement is “particularly important” so that a full record of the statement’s

admissibility is generated. Id. The supreme court noted that, without an objection, “the

state was not given the opportunity to establish that some or all of the statements were

admissible under one of the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Id. And so, the

supreme court held that the statements at issue were not “clearly or obviously inadmissible

hearsay” in light of the undeveloped record and declined to grant relief under the plain-

error test. Id. at 504-05.

Like in Manthey, Redmond’s failure to object to the admission of P.J.’s out-of-court

statements deprived the state of an opportunity to develop a record on the admissibility of

those statements. Given the lack of a record on the admissibility of the statements and for

the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Redmond has not demonstrated that the

statements at issue were “clearly or obviously inadmissible hearsay.” See id. at 504.

Therefore, Redmond has not demonstrated that the district court committed plain error.

See id. at 504-05; Matthews, 779 N.W.2d at 549. Accordingly, we need not address the

remaining parts of the plain-error test. See Jackson, 714 N.W.2d at 690.

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II. The district court did not commit plain error by failing to give the jury a
unanimity instruction.

Redmond next argues that the district court erred in its jury instructions regarding

count two by failing to “require all twelve jurors to unanimously agree that the [s]tate

proved a single act of sexual penetration.” Redmond did not object to the jury instructions

at trial. Accordingly, we review Redmond’s argument under the plain-error test.

State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2015). Again, to satisfy the plain-error test,

Redmond must demonstrate (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects his substantial rights.

Id. An error in jury instructions affects a defendant’s substantial rights “if the error was

prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.” Id. (quotation omitted).

A jury’s verdict must be unanimous in all criminal cases. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01

subd. 1(5). “To achieve that end, a jury must unanimously find that the government has

proved each element of the offense.” State v. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d 717, 730-31

(Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). “[T]he jury must unanimously agree on which acts the

defendant committed if each act itself constitutes an element of the crime,” but the jury is

not required to agree on “alternative means or ways in which the crime can be committed.”

State v. Stempf, 627 N.W.2d 352, 354-55 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted).

However, “different factual courses of conduct or states of mind that are offered to prove

an element of a crime must show equivalent blameworthiness or culpability.” State v.

Dalbec, 789 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn.

Dec. 22, 2010).

12
 Redmond relies heavily on Stempf to argue that the district court plainly erred by

not giving a specific unanimity instruction. In that case, the state charged Stempf with one

count of a controlled-substance crime for possession of methamphetamine. Stempf,

627 N.W.2d at 354. The state introduced evidence that police seized methamphetamine

from Stempf’s place of work, as well as methamphetamine found in a truck where Stempf

rode as a passenger. Id. At trial, Stempf denied owning the methamphetamine found at

his work. Id. He presented evidence that two other people, with whom he worked, had

access to the location where the drugs were seized. Id. Stempf also denied owning the

methamphetamine found in the truck, and he presented evidence suggesting that it could

have belonged to the truck’s owner. Id.

Stempf “requested an instruction requiring the jurors to evaluate the two acts

separately and unanimously agree that the state had proven the same underlying criminal

act beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The district court declined Stempf’s request. Id.

During closing argument, the state told the jury “that it could convict if some jurors found

appellant possessed the methamphetamine found in the truck while others found he

possessed the methamphetamine found on the premises.” Id. The jury found Stempf guilty

of a single count of controlled-substance possession. Id.

We reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court abused its discretion

by refusing to give Stempf’s requested unanimity instruction. Id. at 359. We examined

the elements of the charged offense, which included “unlawful possession.” Id. at 357.

Because the statute provided that the act of possession is an element of the crime, we held

that the jury was required to unanimously agree “on one act of possession that has been

13
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We noted that “the state did not elect which act

of possession it was relying on for conviction” and that “[s]ome jurors could have believed

appellant possessed methamphetamine found on the [work] premises while other jurors

could have believed appellant possessed the methamphetamine found in the truck.” Id. at

358.

Since our decision in Stempf, caselaw on the question of a unanimous verdict has

continued to develop. More recently, in State v. Rucker, we concluded that the district

court was not required to provide an unanimity instruction in a case involving criminal

sexual conduct. 752 N.W.2d 538, 554 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 23,

2008). In that case, the state charged Rucker with several counts of first- and second-

degree criminal sexual conduct concerning dozens of acts of sexual penetration with two

victims. Id. at 543-44. Rucker “consistently testified at his trial that he had no sexual

contact with” the victims. Id. at 544. On appeal, Rucker argued that the jury should have

been given a unanimity instruction “as to which specific act [Rucker] committed.” Id. at

548. We disagreed and distinguished Stempf, observing that

[T]he prosecution here did not emphasize certain incidents,
distinguish as to the proof of some incidents compared to
others, or encourage the jury to find certain incidents were
more likely to have occurred than other incidents, and
appellant did not present separate defenses for each incident of
alleged sexual abuse; rather, he simply maintained throughout
his trial that he never had sexual contact with either child-
victim. The victims referred to a few specific dates in their
testimony on which incidents of abuse occurred, but with
respect to their testimony and the state’s case as a whole, these
recollections served as examples of appellant’s conduct and
not distinct allegations of sexual abuse.

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Id. We concluded “that the district court did not err in not instructing the jury that it must

unanimously agree on which specific incidents formed the basis of appellant’s

convictions.” Id.

Similarly, here we discern no plain error by the district court in not providing an

instruction requiring the jury to unanimously agree on one specific incident of sexual

penetration to support its guilty verdict on the second count of criminal sexual conduct.

The Rucker decision distinguishes Stempf and establishes that a district court does not err

by omitting a specific unanimity instruction when the defendant denies all allegations of

criminal sexual conduct without raising separate defenses for each alleged act, and the state

does not emphasize particular acts. Here, the state presented evidence of distinct acts of

penetration, but the state did not “encourage the jury to find certain incidents were more

likely to have occurred than other incidents.” Id. And Redmond did not raise separate

defenses to the various allegations. Instead, like the defendant in Rucker, Redmond simply

denied the allegations. In our view, these facts are more like Rucker than Stempf. We

therefore conclude that Redmond has not shown that the district court erred, much less

plainly erred, by not providing a specific unanimity instruction on the criminal sexual

conduct charge in count two. 2

2
As discussed above, we conclude that Redmond has not satisfied the plain-error test
regarding either alleged error—namely, the admission of P.J.’s out-of-court statements and
the lack of the unanimity instruction. But, even if we had concluded that Redmond satisfied
the plain-error test on either alleged error, we still would not reverse because neither
alleged error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 356.

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III. Redmond’s pro se supplemental arguments are forfeited.

In a pro se supplemental brief, Redmond argues that his convictions should be

reversed because two evidentiary issues “tainted the jury.” First, Redmond claims that

camera footage would have shown “that no crime happened.” Second, Redmond argues

that the nurse “was not suppose[d] to say that the test could prove if something did or did

not happen” but “she did anyway.” Redmond does not include citations to the record or

legal authority in support of his arguments.

“Claims in a . . . supplemental brief that are unsupported by either arguments or

citation to legal authority are forfeited,” and “will not [be] considered unless prejudicial

error is obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 650-51

(Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted); see also Brooks v. State, 897 N.W.2d 811, 818-19

(Minn. App. 2017) (declining to consider arguments “based on mere assertion and not

supported by legal authority or argument”). On mere inspection, Redmond’s supplemental

arguments fail to demonstrate any obvious, prejudicial error. Therefore, we conclude that

Redmond’s supplemental claims are forfeited, and we decline to review them.

Affirmed.

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