State of Minnesota v. Camille Lashay Dennis-Bond

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0842

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Camille Lashay Dennis-Bond,
Appellant.

Filed April 29, 2024
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-21-2353

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Heather Pipenhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Travis M. Keil, Chanhassen, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and

Cleary, Judge. ∗

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for third-degree murder, criminal

vehicular homicide, criminal vehicular operation, and careless driving, appellant argues

that she is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred when it rejected her Batson

challenge. In the alternative, appellant argues that her convictions of third-degree murder,

criminal vehicular homicide, and criminal vehicular operation should be reversed because

the evidence at trial was insufficient. Appellant also argues that the district court abused

its discretion by denying her motion for a downward dispositional or durational departure.

We affirm.

FACTS

The following facts summarize the evidence received during the jury trial, viewed

in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. On the morning of Sunday, April 4, 2021,

appellant Camille Lashay Dennis-Bond was driving to church in her black Chevy Malibu

on eastbound County Road 42 near the cities of Burnsville and Savage. Dennis-Bond’s

brother, L.B., was also driving to church at the same time and from the same location as

Dennis-Bond. He drove separately in a white Chrysler. Dennis-Bond had a friend riding

in the passenger seat of her car. Dennis-Bond’s sister, C.M.B., was riding in the passenger

seat of L.B.’s car.

According to Dennis-Bond’s passenger, the siblings’ cars were driving side-by-side

down County Road 42. After stopping at a stop light, Dennis-Bond and L.B. rolled down

their windows. As the cars idled, the siblings talked about “who could accelerate faster

2
from the stoplight.” When the light turned green, the cars rapidly accelerated down the

road. Several other drivers saw the two cars race down County Road 42 at what were

described as “horrific” speeds.

As the siblings proceeded eastbound, L.B.’s Chrysler collided with a red

Honda CRV that was turning across County Road 42 at an intersection. The force of the

collision flipped the CRV and split the car in half. Dennis-Bond avoided the collision and

pulled to the side of the road, where she exited her vehicle and ran over to the scene of the

accident. Dennis-Bond was heard saying that she hoped the driver of the CRV was dead.

The driver of the CRV and his passenger died immediately at the scene of the crash.

C.M.B. also suffered serious injuries. Dennis-Bond was arrested at the scene.

A crash-reconstruction specialist with the Minnesota State Patrol (the sergeant)

obtained data from the “air-bag control module” in L.B.’s car, which provided “a short

window of pre-crash information.” Using surveillance video from a nearby business and

applying “energy and momentum equations” to the data from L.B.’s car, the sergeant

determined that L.B. was travelling between 99 and 112 miles per hour at the time of the

collision. And based on the surveillance footage, the sergeant concluded that

Dennis-Bond’s car was travelling between 91 and 107 miles per hour just before the crash.

The speed limit on County Road 42 at the scene of the crash was 50 miles per hour. Based

on his experience, the sergeant opined that Dennis-Bond and L.B. were racing.

The sergeant also determined that the CRV was travelling between 15 and 17 miles

per hour when it was struck by L.B.’s car. According to the sergeant, the CRV “would

have cleared the intersection significantly” had L.B. and Dennis-Bond been traveling the

3
speed limit. The sergeant determined that L.B.’s speed was the “primary factor” for the

crash, and that Dennis-Bond’s “comparable speeds with” L.B. was a “secondary factor.”

Respondent State of Minnesota filed a complaint in October 2021 charging

Dennis-Bond with two counts of third-degree murder and two counts of criminal vehicular

homicide for the deaths of the CRV driver and his passenger. See Minn. Stat.

§§ 609.195(a), .2112, subd. 1(a)(1) (2020). Because of C.M.B.’s serious injuries, the state

also charged Dennis-Bond with criminal vehicular operation—for a total of five charges

arising from the collision. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 1(1) (2020). Dennis-Bond

moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the state lacked probable cause. The district

court denied Dennis-Bond’s motion and scheduled a trial.

Dennis-Bond’s jury trial began on December 5, 2022. During jury selection, the

state used a peremptory strike on Prospective Juror 7, who is a person of color. Dennis-

Bond challenged the state’s peremptory strike, arguing that the strike was based solely on

the prospective juror’s race. The district court upheld the state’s peremptory strike,

concluding that there was “not a sufficient basis to find that purposeful discrimination ha[d]

been established.”

The case proceeded to trial, where several witnesses testified, including uninvolved

drivers, first responders, and law-enforcement officers (including the sergeant), as

summarized above. Before closing argument, the district court granted Dennis-Bond’s

motion to include a count of careless driving in the jury instructions as a lesser included

offense. The jury found Dennis-Bond guilty on all six counts—the original five counts

plus the careless-driving count.

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 Before sentencing, Dennis-Bond moved for a downward dispositional or durational

departure. The district court denied Dennis-Bond’s motion and imposed concurrent,

executed sentences of 150 and 180 months, respectively, on the third-degree-murder

convictions and 38 months on the criminal-vehicular-operation conviction. 1 This appeal

follows.

DECISION

Dennis-Bond makes three arguments on appeal. First, she contends that she is

entitled to a new trial because the district court clearly erred by denying her challenge of

the state’s peremptory strike of a prospective juror of color. Second, Dennis-Bond argues

that her convictions for all charges except careless driving should be reversed because the

evidence was insufficient for the jury to determine that her conduct caused the collision.

Finally, Dennis-Bond asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying her

motion for a downward dispositional or durational departure. We address Dennis-Bond’s

arguments in turn.

I. The district court did not clearly err by denying Dennis-Bond’s Batson
challenge.

Each party to a criminal trial is afforded a limited number of peremptory strikes,

which “allow a party to excuse a prospective juror without providing a reason.” State v.

Lufkins, 963 N.W.2d 205, 209 (Minn. 2021); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 6. A

party may use a peremptory challenge “to strike a prospective juror that the party believes

1
The district court did not impose sentences on Dennis-Bond’s two convictions of criminal
vehicular homicide or her conviction of careless driving.

5
will be less fair than some others” in an effort “to select as final jurors the persons they

believe will be most fair.” State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 100 (Minn. 2009) (quotation

omitted). But a party may not use a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror

based on race, as doing so violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986);

see also State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 136-37 (applying Batson). A party’s assertion

that a peremptory strike is based on race is referred to as a Batson challenge. See Lufkins,

963 N.W.2d at 209.

Minnesota courts use a three-step framework set forth by the United States Supreme

Court in Batson to determine whether a peremptory challenge was motivated by racial

discrimination. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 101; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3).

Under this framework,

(1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the
prosecutor executed a peremptory challenge on the basis of
race; (2) the burden then shifts to the prosecution to articulate
a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question; and
(3) the district court must determine whether the defendant has
carried the burden of proving purposeful discrimination.

Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 101. We afford a district court “great deference” in a Batson ruling

“because the record may not reflect all of the relevant circumstances that the court may

consider.” Id. (quotation omitted). As a result, we will not reverse a district court’s ruling

on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d 717,

724 (Minn. 2007); see also State v. Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792, 811 (Minn. 2019) (holding

6
that a district court’s ruling on a Batson challenge is reviewed for clear error unless the

district court “makes its determinations using the wrong legal standard”).

Dennis-Bond brought a Batson challenge after the state struck Prospective Juror 7.

Addressing Dennis-Bond’s Batson challenge, the district court first determined that

Dennis-Bond had made a prima facie showing that the peremptory strike was based on

race. Next, the district court determined that the state offered a race-neutral explanation

for the peremptory strike of Prospective Juror 7 based on his “responses regarding a car

accident that he was previously in.” Lastly, the district court concluded that Dennis-Bond

failed to demonstrate that the strike was motivated by purposeful discrimination, and it

denied the Batson challenge.

Dennis-Bond argues that the district court erred by denying her Batson challenge.

Because the district court determined that Dennis-Bond made a prima facie showing of

discrimination and proceeded to steps two and three of her Batson challenge, we need not

address step one. See Lufkins, 963 N.W.2d at 210 (holding that “the question as to step

one is moot on appeal” when the district court proceeds to steps two and three of a Batson

analysis). We therefore only consider steps two and three of the district court’s Batson

analysis, as follows.

A. Race-Neutral Explanation

At step two of the Batson analysis, the state must “offer a reasonably specific

explanation that the court can use to determine whether that reason is related to the case

being tried.” Id. at 211 (emphasis omitted). The explanation “need not be persuasive or

even plausible,” Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 101, and “will be deemed race-neutral unless a

7
discriminatory intent is inherent in the . . . explanation,” Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d at 726

(quotation omitted).

The prosecutor told the district court that its race-neutral reason for striking

Prospective Juror 7 was based on Prospective Juror 7’s description of his involvement in a

car accident and his analysis of fault. During voir dire, Prospective Juror 7 admitted that

he once rear-ended a student driver who stopped abruptly when a traffic light turned

yellow. Prospective Juror 7 acknowledged that he should have given the student driver

more space, especially because it was raining and hailing at the time. But Prospective

Juror 7 maintained that he was not “100 percent at fault” and that the student driver

probably should have proceeded through the yellow light instead of “slamming the brake

right away.” When explaining the state’s reason for striking Prospective Juror 7, the

prosecutor focused on how Prospective Juror 7 “stuck to his guns that a large part of [the

accident] could have been avoided if [the] driver ahead of him would have simply . . . gone

through the intersection.” The prosecutor told the district court that the state believed it

would be inappropriate to seat Prospective Juror 7 in a case that involved comparing the

fault of drivers involved in an accident. The district court concluded that the state’s

proffered reason was nondiscriminatory. We agree.

The state’s justification for the strike concerned a race-neutral topic relevant to

Dennis-Bond’s trial—namely, comparative fault in motor-vehicle accidents. Thus, the

state’s proffered reason was “reasonably specific,” “related to the case being tried,” and

not inherently discriminatory. See Lufkins, 963 N.W.2d at 210-11. We therefore conclude

8
that the district court did not clearly err in its determination that the state articulated a

nondiscriminatory justification for the strike.

B. Pretext

At step three of the Batson analysis, the challenging party must prove “that the

peremptory strike was motivated by racial discrimination and that the proffered reasons

were merely a pretext for the discriminatory motive.” Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d at 726

(quotation omitted). The district court determined that there was “not a sufficient basis to

find that purposeful discrimination ha[d] been established.” Dennis-Bond argues that the

district court clearly erred and that pretext is evident from the record because (1) the state

mischaracterized Prospective Juror 7’s answers and (2) the state did not use a peremptory

strike on a white juror who provided “similar” answers to Prospective Juror 7. As follows,

we are not persuaded by either argument.

1. Factually Incorrect Information

Dennis-Bond asserts that the prosecutor offered “factually incorrect” information in

support of the race-neutral justification by mischaracterizing Prospective Juror 7’s answers

during voir dire. Dennis-Bond argues that this mischaracterization is evidence that the

prosecutor’s justification was merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive and that the

district court clearly erred when it found otherwise.

Dennis-Bond is correct that there was a discrepancy between one of Prospective

Juror 7’s answers and the prosecutor’s characterization of that answer. During questioning,

Prospective Juror 7 admitted that he should have given the student driver more space. By

contrast, in response to Dennis-Bond’s Batson challenge, the prosecutor recounted that

9
Prospective Juror 7 “did not, in any of his [answers], as the [s]tate recalls, talk about what

he could have done differently” to avoid the accident. The state does not dispute that the

prosecutor’s recollection of Prospective Juror 7’s answer “was not entirely correct.” But

the state contends that “the crux of the [s]tate’s basis for striking [Prospective Juror 7] had

to do with his statements about fault, which the prosecutor accurately stated.” The state’s

argument is persuasive.

In State v. Gomez, the prosecutor used a peremptory strike on a Black prospective

juror who believed that her father had been wrongly convicted of a crime because there

was insufficient evidence of his guilt. 721 N.W.2d 871, 883-84 (Minn. 2006). The

prosecutor explained that they struck the prospective juror because she was still convinced

that her father was wrongly convicted. Id. at 884. Gomez argued that the prosecutor

exaggerated the prospective juror’s answer by describing the juror’s “family having gone

to some length to examine the evidence of her father’s guilt.” Id. The supreme court held

that, even if the prosecutor exaggerated the prospective juror’s response, “it was not an

exaggeration of [the prospective juror’s] belief that her father was wrongly convicted, the

reason for the strike.” Id.

Here, regardless of the prosecutor’s mischaracterization of Prospective Juror 7’s

answer to the question of what he could have done differently to avoid the accident with

the student driver, the record reflects that Prospective Juror 7 nonetheless attributed some

fault to the student driver. And the state’s proffered reason for striking Prospective Juror 7

was because of “how he assigned fault to this person that he rear-ended.” Thus, as in

Gomez, the prosecutor’s exaggeration of the degree to which Prospective Juror 7 attributed

10
fault to the student driver was not an exaggeration of Prospective Juror 7’s belief that he

was not “100 percent at fault” for rear-ending another driver. See id. Because this case

involved, in part, a determination of who was at fault for causing a collision, it was

reasonable for the state to strike Prospective Juror 7 based on his perception of comparative

fault. We discern no reason to conclude that the prosecutor’s limited misstatement shows

that the reason given by the state for striking Prospective Juror 7 was a pretext for

discrimination.

2. The State’s Refusal to Strike a Comparable White Juror

Dennis-Bond also argues that the state’s refusal to strike Prospective Juror 24, who

is White and was also questioned about fault in a car accident, is further evidence of pretext.

Prospective Juror 24 explained that she was involved in a car accident when she hit another

vehicle after she drove through a stop sign without stopping. When asked whose fault the

crash was, Prospective Juror 24 emphasized that she could not see the stop sign because it

was obscured by overgrown branches, but she did acknowledge that she hit the other

vehicle. She also agreed that, had the stop sign been visible, the accident would have been

her fault.

While both Prospective Jurors 24 and 7 answered questions about attributing fault

in a car accident, Prospective Juror 24’s answers are distinguishable from the answers of

Prospective Juror 7 because Prospective Juror 24 did not attribute fault to the other driver.

Instead, she stated that the accident occurred because she did not see the obstructed stop

sign. And so, the prosecutor may have reasonably concluded that Prospective Juror 24’s

experience would not bias any decision in Dennis-Bond’s trial regarding the central issues

11
of evaluating causation and fault among drivers. Thus, the state’s decision not to strike

Prospective Juror 24 does not suggest that the state struck Prospective Juror 7 solely

because of his race.

In sum, Dennis-Bond has not demonstrated that the prosecutor’s reason for striking

Prospective Juror 7 was pretextual. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did

not clearly err by determining that Dennis-Bond failed to prove purposeful discrimination

under step three of the Batson analysis or by denying Dennis-Bond’s Batson challenge.

See Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 101.

II. The evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that Dennis-Bond was a proximate cause of the victims’ deaths and injuries.

Next, Dennis-Bond argues that her convictions of third-degree murder, criminal

vehicular homicide, and criminal vehicular operation should be reversed because there was

insufficient evidence produced at trial “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that her driving

conduct was a substantial factor in causing the accident.” We are not persuaded.

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we conduct a

painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient

to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” State v. Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823, 832 (Minn.

2012) (quotation omitted). We must “assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and

disbelieved contrary evidence.” State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. 2010)

(quotation omitted). “We will not disturb a verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for

the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a

12
reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proven guilty of the

offense charged.” State v. Flowers, 788 N.W.2d 120, 133 (Minn. 2010) (quotation

omitted).

“[T]he [s]tate bear[s] the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every

element of a charged offense in a criminal trial.” State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 919

(Minn. 2019). The causation elements of third-degree murder, criminal vehicular

homicide, and criminal vehicular operation are the only elements that Dennis-Bond

challenges on appeal. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.195(a) (“Whoever, without intent to effect

the death of any person, causes the death of another by perpetrating an act eminently

dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life, is guilty

of murder in the third degree . . . .” (emphasis added)), .2112, subd. 1(a)(1) (“[A] person is

guilty of criminal vehicular homicide . . . if the person causes the death of a human being

. . . as a result of operating a motor vehicle: (1) in a grossly negligent manner[.]” (emphasis

added)), .2113, subd. 1(1) (“A person is guilty of criminal vehicular operation resulting in

great bodily harm . . . if the person causes great bodily harm to another . . . as a result of

operating a motor vehicle: (1) in a grossly negligent manner[.]” (emphasis added)).

The applicable statutes do not define “cause,” but Minnesota law provides that the

causation element is assessed in terms of proximate cause. See State v. Smith, 119 N.W.2d

838, 848-49 (Minn. 1962) (applying the substantial-factor test and proximate-cause

principles to a previous version of the third-degree murder statute); 2 State v. Jaworsky, 505

2
We are not aware of any court applying the proximate-cause or substantial-factor test to
the cause element of third-degree murder under section 609.195(a). But the supreme court

13
N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. App. 1993) (observing that “[c]riminal vehicular homicide and

criminal vehicular operation are derived from involuntary manslaughter” and thus that an

actor must proximately cause death or injury to be found guilty of those offenses), rev.

denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1993); State v. Smith, 819 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Minn. App. 2012)

(explaining that “Minnesota law requires the state to prove that the act of operating a motor

vehicle was the proximate cause of the victim’s death” for a person to be convicted under

the criminal-vehicular-homicide statute), aff’d, 835 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2013); State v.

Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Minn. App. 2011) (same), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14,

2012).

“A proximate cause is something that played a substantial part in bringing about the

death or injury.” Smith, 819 N.W.2d at 728 (quotation omitted). “There can be more than

one cause of harm.” State v. Hofer, 614 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Minn. App. 2000). An

intervening, superseding cause of harm can limit a defendant’s liability for their own

culpable conduct if it breaks the chain of causation. Id. An intervening cause is considered

a superseding cause, however, only if four conditions are met:

has routinely observed that the cause element of various homicide offenses requires proof
that the defendant’s acts were a substantial causal factor in the victim’s death. See State v.
Olson, 435 N.W.2d 530, 531, 534 (Minn. 1989) (applying the substantial-factor test to
second-degree murder and first-degree manslaughter); State v. Sutherlin, 396 N.W.2d 238,
240-41 (Minn. 1986) (applying the “substantial causal factor” test to first-degree murder).
The pattern jury instructions for third-degree murder also define “cause” as “a substantial
factor in causing the death.” 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.15 (2023). Finally, the
parties do not dispute that the proximate-cause standard applies to the cause element of
third-degree murder under section 609.195(a). For these reasons, we assume without
deciding that the cause element of section 609.195(a) is assessed under the proximate-cause
lens.

14
 1) its harmful effects must have occurred after the original
negligence; 2) it must not have been brought about by the
original negligence; 3) it must have actively worked to bring
about a result which would not otherwise have followed from
the original negligence; and 4) it must not have been
reasonably foreseeable by the original wrongdoer.

Id. But “[w]hen the acts or omissions of two or more persons combine to bring about a

harmful result, those acts or omissions are concurring causes of the harm.” Id.

Dennis-Bond contends that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find beyond

a reasonable doubt that her conduct was a proximate cause—i.e., played a substantial part

in the deaths and injuries at issue—because her car did not collide with the CRV. Instead,

she argues that the evidence establishes that L.B.’s driving conduct was a “superseding

intervening cause of the accident.” We disagree.

We have already addressed a similar issue in another case, in which multiple drivers

were speeding in concert and a collision with an uninvolved vehicle ensued. See In re

Welfare of C.P.W., 601 N.W.2d 204, 209-10 (Minn. App. 1999), rev. denied (Minn.

Nov. 23, 1999). C.P.W. involved a high-speed car chase where a driver, J.M.P., was

pursued by three vehicles, including one driven by C.P.W., a juvenile. Id. at 206. The

chase proceeded through a residential area, where the drivers travelled between 55 and 90

miles per hour. Id. Eventually, J.M.P. ran a red light and struck another car, killing one

person and injuring several others. Id. As a result, the state filed a delinquency petition

charging C.P.W. with one count of criminal vehicular homicide and several counts of

criminal vehicular operation. Id. at 206-07. At the probable-cause hearing, “[t]he district

court concluded C.P.W.’s driving was not the proximate cause of the collision because

15
J.M.P.’s decision to speed through the intersection was a superseding intervening force

breaking the chain of causation.” Id. at 207. The state appealed that determination. Id.

We reversed the district court’s determination that the state lacked probable cause

to charge C.P.W. Id. at 210. We concluded that, even though C.P.W.’s vehicle “was not

physically involved in the accident, C.P.W. was such an active participant in the ongoing

course of conduct that he was effectively a proximate cause of the accident.” Id. at 209.

We determined that the evidence showed that “C.P.W. and J.M.P. were not acting

independently of each other” and were “jointly engaged in conduct demonstrating a

conscious disregard for the safety of the public.” Id. We held that J.M.P.’s driving was

not a superseding cause because there was “substantial evidence that J.M.P.’s decision to

run the final red light was the natural end of the sequence of events, not an unrelated event

that altered the likely result of the dangerous car chase.” Id. at 209-10.

Similarly, here, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Dennis-Bond’s conduct was a proximate cause of the deaths

and injuries even though her vehicle was not physically involved in the accident. Further,

the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that L.B.’s decision to speed through the

intersection was not a superseding cause. At trial, Dennis-Bond’s passenger testified that,

just prior to the collision, Dennis-Bond and L.B. talked through open car windows while

stopped at a red light. The two specifically discussed “who could accelerate faster from

the stoplight.” The passenger added that both Dennis-Bond and L.B. “accelerated quickly”

once the light turned green. Similarly, another driver, who was stopped behind the cars at

16
the red light, confirmed that the cars had their windows lowered and there was “a lot of

talking” between the cars. After the light turned green, the cars “took off.”

At an ensuing intersection, a driver waiting to make a U-turn witnessed the cars

speed past her. The driver noted that one car “was just slightly in front of the other and

they were going at a high rate of speed and it appeared like they were racing.” Moments

later, the driver witnessed the collision between L.B.’s Chrysler and the red CRV.

Yet another driver testified that, while stopped at a red light to cross County

Road 42, he saw two cars racing at “horrific” speeds. The driver testified that the cars

“were really close to each other” and it appeared that “one of them was trying to kind of

get up past the other one.” After the cars passed him, the driver looked down for a moment

before looking up again and saw the collision.

Finally, the sergeant, who is a crash-reconstruction specialist, testified that L.B.’s

speed was the “primary factor” for the crash and Dennis-Bond’s “comparable speeds with

the Chrysler” was a secondary factor. The sergeant added that Dennis-Bond and L.B.

appeared “to keep their speeds together,” which, in his experience as a state trooper,

indicated they were racing. The sergeant added that the CRV “would have cleared the

intersection significantly” had Dennis-Bond and L.B. not been speeding.

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, demonstrates that

Dennis-Bond and L.B. were not acting independently of each other. The evidence indicates

that the racing was initiated by Dennis-Bond’s banter with L.B. and her rapid acceleration

at the stoplight, and that Dennis-Bond continued to play an active role in the racing by

jockeying for position with L.B. The evidence also shows that the two were racing at

17
“horrific” speeds and entered the intersection where the collision occurred nearly

simultaneously. The mere fact that Dennis-Bond avoided the collision does not diminish

her active participation in the racing prior to the collision. A reasonable juror could

conclude that Dennis-Bond played a substantial part in bringing about the deaths and

injuries. And the evidence was sufficient to conclude that L.B.’s decision to speed through

the final intersection “was the natural end of the sequence of events.” See C.P.W., 601

N.W.2d at 210. L.B.’s speeding was not a superseding cause because it was “not an

unrelated event that altered the likely result of the dangerous [racing].” 3 Id. Accordingly,

taken in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to

find Dennis-Bond guilty of third-degree murder, criminal vehicular homicide, and criminal

vehicular operation.

III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dennis-Bond’s
motion for a downward dispositional or durational departure.

Finally, Dennis-Bond argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying

her motion for a downward dispositional or durational departure at sentencing. We

disagree.

3
Dennis-Bond also suggests that the victim’s decision to turn through the intersection
without yielding to L.B. and Dennis-Bond was a superseding cause of the collision. We
reject this argument for two reasons. First, “[t]he driver of any vehicle traveling at an
unlawful speed shall forfeit any right-of-way which the driver might otherwise have.”
Minn. Stat. § 169.20, subd. 1(d) (Minn. 2020). Second, the sergeant testified that the CRV
would have made it through the intersection if not for Dennis-Bond’s and L.B.’s speeds.
Accordingly, the jury could reasonably conclude that Dennis-Bond caused the collision
and that the CRV’s entrance into the intersection was not a superseding cause.

18
 District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to depart from a

presumptive sentence. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). We will not disturb

a district court’s refusal to depart “absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Oberg,

627 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 22, 2001). A district

court abuses its discretion if its decision “is based on an erroneous view of the law or is

against logic and the facts in the record. State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn.

2015) (quotation omitted).

The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prescribe a presumptive sentence or range of

sentences “for offenders for whom imprisonment is proper.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd.

5(2) (2020). A district court must pronounce a sentence within the applicable guidelines’

range unless it finds “identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a

departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020). But a district court is not required to

depart even when substantial and compelling circumstances are present. See State v. Back,

341 N.W.2d 273, 275 (Minn. 1983) (“[W]e will not interfere with a sentence that falls

within the presumptive sentence range even if there are grounds that would justify

departure.”).

At sentencing, Dennis-Bond moved for a downward dispositional or durational

departure. “A dispositional departure places the offender in a different setting than that

called for by the presumptive guidelines sentence.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623

(Minn. 2016). “A dispositional departure typically focuses on characteristics of the

defendant that show whether the defendant is particularly suitable for individualized

treatment in a probationary setting.” Id. (quotation omitted). By contrast, a durational

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departure concerns the length of the sentence and “must be based on factors that reflect the

seriousness of the offense, not the characteristics of the offender.” Id.

In her motion for a downward dispositional departure, Dennis-Bond sought

probation and a stay of the presumptive prison sentences for her convictions. In support

of her motion, Dennis-Bond focused on the qualities that made her particularly suitable for

probation, including that she (1) was only 19 years old at the time of the accident; (2) had

“aspirations of going to the National Guard, attending college, and [attending] law school”;

(3) had no prior adult criminal history; (4) had no new violations and had abided by court

orders while on conditional release; (5) had strong family and community support; and

(6) showed remorse and “regrets speeding, yelling at the Honda CRV, the lives lost, and

most importantly, realizes she must make better decisions.”

And, in support of her motion for a downward durational departure, Dennis-Bond

noted that she “was not involved directly in the accident at all” and “avoided the collision

entirely.” Dennis-Bond also argued that the driver of the CRV “failed to yield as required

and pulled out in front of traffic travelling eastbound on County Road 42.” Dennis-Bond

argued that these facts lessened the seriousness of the offense.

The district court declined to grant Dennis-Bond’s motion for a dispositional

departure, stating that Dennis-Bond failed to demonstrate “a substantial and compelling

reason” to conclude that she was amenable to probation. The district court emphasized

that, although Dennis-Bond complied with the conditions of release during the trial, she

was also cited twice for speeding since the accident. The district court also declined to

grant a durational departure for any of the three convictions at issue. The district court

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stated that granting Dennis-Bond’s motion “would diminish or minimize the facts that led

to the crash, which was driving down the highway at twice the legal limit, at roughly 100

miles an hour.”

Renewing the arguments she made at sentencing, Dennis-Bond contends that the

district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a downward dispositional or

durational departure when it imposed sentences for her two convictions of third-degree

murder and her conviction of criminal vehicular operation. We are not persuaded.

Even if a mitigating factor justifies departure, we will not ordinarily interfere with

the imposition of a presumptive sentence. See State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668

(Minn. 2006); State v. Musse, 981 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Minn. App. 2022), rev. denied (Minn.

Dec. 28, 2022). Moreover, when the record shows that the district court carefully evaluated

the testimony and information presented, we “may not interfere” with the district court’s

decision not to depart. State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn. App. 1985)

(emphasis added). Refusals to depart will be reversed only in “rare” cases. Kindem, 313

N.W.2d at 7.

This is not the rare case that warrants reversal. At the sentencing hearing, the district

court considered a number of victim-impact statements, Dennis-Bond’s arguments for

departure, Dennis-Bond’s presentence investigation report, and the sentencing guidelines

before imposing sentences for third-degree murder and criminal vehicular operation. The

sentences imposed by the district court were each within the presumptive sentencing range

under the guidelines. Because the record reflects that the district court carefully evaluated

the testimony and information presented at sentencing and imposed presumptive sentences,

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we “may not interfere with the [district] court’s exercise of discretion.” Van Ruler, 378

N.W.2d at 80-81. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying

Dennis-Bond’s motion for a downward dispositional or durational departure when

imposing sentences for the convictions of third-degree murder and criminal vehicular

operation.

Affirmed.

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