State of Minnesota v. Jeremy Jermaine Chamberlain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1053

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeremy Jermaine Chamberlain,
Appellant.

Filed May 20, 2024
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-21-861

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larkin,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction of theft of a motor vehicle arguing: (1) the

evidence is not sufficient to prove that he knew or had reason to know that the vehicle was
stolen, (2) the district court plainly erred by admitting testimony about the 911 call that

precipitated his encounter with police, and (3) the prosecutor committed unobjected-to

misconduct in closing argument by referencing the 911-call testimony and shifting the

burden of proof to appellant. We affirm.

FACTS

On April 15, 2021, M.A. reported to law enforcement that his 2011 Chevy Equinox

was stolen from the parking lot of his apartment building in St. Cloud. On May 12,

St. Cloud police received an anonymous 911 call alerting them that two men were

recklessly driving a vehicle in the parking lot of a different apartment building and had

almost crashed into the building. The caller provided a description of the vehicle and the

license-plate number; both matched M.A.’s stolen Chevy.

Three officers responded. When the first two officers arrived, they found M.D.J.

sitting in the passenger seat of the Chevy. A second man, later identified as appellant

Jeremy Jermaine Chamberlain, was standing outside on the driver’s side of the Chevy near

the trunk with the driver’s door open. The officers removed M.D.J. from the Chevy and

handcuffed and detained both men. After he was placed in the back of a squad car,

Chamberlain asked for his cellphone. One of the officers located and retrieved it from the

driver’s seat of the Chevy, where it was plugged into the vehicle’s charging port. M.D.J.

told an officer that neither he nor Chamberlain owned the Chevy.

When the third officer arrived, he searched the Chevy. In the Chevy’s trunk, the

officer found a black purse containing a wallet and an insurance card belonging to a

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woman. The officer called the woman, who reported that her black purse was recently

stolen. Officers later called M.A. to retrieve the Chevy from the scene.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Chamberlain with motor-vehicle theft and

receiving stolen property. The case proceeded to a jury trial during which the state offered

testimony from the three officers, M.D.J., and M.A. M.A. testified that the broken ignition

key that officers found in the Chevy was in the vehicle at the time it was stolen. He

described the Chevy’s damaged condition following the theft, including a missing rear-

view mirror and damage to the front bumper and the gasket of the driver’s window. M.A.

also testified that the phone charging port does not work unless the Chevy is running.

The jury found Chamberlain guilty as charged. The district court convicted him of

motor-vehicle theft and imposed a sentence of 13 months’ imprisonment.

Chamberlain appeals.

DECISION

I. Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s determination that Chamberlain knew
or had reason to know that the Chevy was stolen.

A person commits theft of a motor vehicle when they “take[] or drive[] a motor

vehicle without the consent of the owner or an authorized agent of the owner, knowing or

having reason to know that the owner or an authorized agent of the owner did not give

consent.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(17) (2020). Chamberlain argues that the

evidence is insufficient to support the knowledge element of the offense. A defendant’s

knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence. State v. Al-Naseer, 734 N.W.2d

679, 688 (Minn. 2007).

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 When a sufficiency challenge relates to circumstantial evidence, we apply a two-

step analysis. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 598-601 (Minn. 2017). First, we identify

the circumstances proved “by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict,”

giving deference to the jury’s credibility determinations. Id. at 600. Second, “we consider

the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved.” Id. at 601.

The circumstances proved must, when viewed as a whole, “be consistent with a reasonable

inference that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except

that of guilt.” Id. “But we will not overturn a guilty verdict on conjecture alone.” State v.

Hayes, 831 N.W.2d 546, 553 (Minn. 2013).

Here, the circumstances proved are as follows. On April 15, 2021, M.A.’s Chevy

was stolen with a broken ignition key inside. On May 12, 2021, police officers found

Chamberlain standing outside the driver’s side of the Chevy, near the trunk, with the

driver’s door open. M.D.J. was sitting in the passenger seat and told officers that the Chevy

did not belong to Chamberlain. The broken ignition key was in the car and a purse stolen

from a different individual on a different date was in the trunk. The Chevy had a broken

gasket on the driver’s window. Neither Chamberlain nor M.D.J. owned the Chevy. M.A.

does not know Chamberlain or M.D.J. and did not consent to either of them using the

Chevy.

Chamberlain argues that the state’s evidence is insufficient to show that he knew or

had reason to know that the owner of the Chevy did not consent to someone else using it. 1

1
Chamberlain also argues there is insufficient evidence to support the knowledge element
of the possession-of-stolen-property offense. Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2020)

4
We disagree. The Chevy had damage to the driver’s window, a broken ignition key, and a

stolen purse in the trunk. And passenger M.D.J. expressed his knowledge at the scene that

Chamberlain did not own the Chevy. We are satisfied that these circumstances proved are

consistent with a reasonable inference of guilt.

In contrast, Chamberlain does not articulate a reasonable hypothesis of innocence

from these circumstances. Instead, he points to the fact that the car was missing for about

a month, 2 his compliance with the officers, and the lack of evidence—aside from the

broken gasket on the driver’s window—of forced entry. We are not persuaded. First, this

evidence is not part of the circumstances proved. See State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466,

472 (Minn. App. 2019) (circumstances proved are those that are consistent with the jury

verdict). Second, an appellant “cannot rely on the absence of evidence to establish a

reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” State v. McMahon, No. A18-1620, 2019 WL

(defining offense to include “any person who receives [or] possesses . . . any stolen
property . . . knowing or having reason to know the property was stolen”). The amended
warrant of commitment indicates that this count was dismissed. But even if it was not,
Chamberlain’s sufficiency argument fails for the reasons stated above.
2
Both parties cite State v. Hager, which holds that the “unexplained possession of stolen
property within a reasonable time after a . . . theft will in and of itself be sufficient to sustain
a conviction.” 727 N.W.2d 668, 678 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted). Chamberlain
argues that the passage of almost a month is not a “reasonable time” and therefore not
sufficient to sustain a conviction; the state contends otherwise. We need not determine
what constitutes a “reasonable time” because the other circumstantial evidence is sufficient
to sustain Chamberlain’s conviction. And Minnesota caselaw suggests that unexplained
possession, regardless of the amount of time passed, is sufficient to sustain the conviction.
State v. Bagley, 175 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Minn. 1970) (stating roughly four months after a
series of burglaries began was still a reasonable amount of time within which to discover
the stolen goods).

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4008101, at *5 (Minn. App. Aug. 26, 2019) 3 (an appellant must provide a basis to reverse

by pointing to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than

guilt). Chamberlain’s argument does precisely that.

Because the circumstances proved are consistent with a finding of guilt and

inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, we conclude that sufficient

evidence supports the jury’s determination that Chamberlain knew or reasonably knew the

Chevy was stolen.

II. Any error in admitting the unobjected-to testimony regarding the 911 call did
not affect Chamberlain’s substantial rights.

Chamberlain also challenges the admission of the police officers’ testimony about

the 911 call, arguing that it is inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement

offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Such statements

are inadmissible unless they fall within several enumerated exceptions. See Minn. R. Evid.

803, 804. “The number and variety of exceptions to the hearsay exclusion make objections

to such testimony particularly important . . . [so] that a full discussion of admissibility [can]

be conducted at trial.” State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006).

Where, as here, there was no objection at trial, we review for plain error, considering

whether (1) there was error, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the error affects the appellant’s

substantial rights. State v. Epps, 964 N.W.2d 419, 422-23 (Minn. 2021). An error is plain

if it clearly “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Wren, 738

3
We cite nonprecedential opinions for their persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

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N.W.2d 378, 393 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). Such an error affects a defendant’s

substantial rights if “the error was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.” State

v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998). Even if the three plain-error prongs are

established, we may only grant relief if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity,

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn.

2016) (quotation omitted).

The challenged testimony of the three officers is as follows. A 911 call was

received, and the caller informed the police that two men were recklessly driving a car in

the parking lot of an apartment building. Chamberlain contends that this testimony is

hearsay, and its admission affected his substantial rights because it was used to prove that

he took or drove the Chevy. These contentions are unavailing.

First, we are not convinced that admission of this testimony constitutes plain error.

Indeed, evidence of reports made to police are “generally admissible to give jurors the

context for an investigation.” State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014); see Griller,

583 N.W.2d at 743 (holding no abuse of discretion in admitting letter sent to police

department and content of police interviews with neighbors because the testimony

“provided the jury with the context necessary to explain how the investigation against

Griller began and why the police were excavating [Griller’s] backyard”); see also Minn.

R. Evid. 402 (stating unless otherwise excluded, all relevant evidence is admissible).

Second, the record does not persuade us that admission of the challenged testimony

affected Chamberlain’s substantial rights. Even without the 911 call, there is sufficient

evidence that Chamberlain took or drove the Chevy. When the officers arrived, the stolen

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Chevy was at the reported location. Chamberlain was standing next to the driver’s side

and the driver’s door was open. His cellphone was on the driver’s seat and plugged into

the charging port, which only works if the Chevy is running.

In sum, the challenged 911-call testimony provided context for the officer’s

encounter with Chamberlain. The lack of a timely objection deprived the state of the

opportunity to reframe its questions or argue that an exception to the hearsay rule applied.

More importantly, our careful review of the record persuades us that any error in admitting

this testimony did not affect Chamberlain’s substantial rights to warrant relief on appeal.

III. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct or error in closing argument.

Because Chamberlain did not object to the claimed prosecutorial misconduct, we

apply a modified plain-error test. Epps, 964 N.W.2d at 423. Under this test, Chamberlain

bears the burden to show both that the prosecutor committed error and that the error is

plain. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). If he makes such a showing,

the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that the error did not prejudice the appellant’s

substantial rights. Id. And if the state fails to meet that burden, we determine whether

reversal is required to uphold the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. Id.

Prosecutors have “considerable latitude in closing argument” and are not “required

to make a colorless argument.” State v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 1996). A

prosecutor “may present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences

that can be drawn from that evidence in its closing argument.” State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d

569, 587 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). But comments that misstate or dilute the state’s

burden of proof are “highly improper and constitute[] prosecutorial misconduct.” State v.

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McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 750 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). In determining

whether a prosecutor committed plain error in a closing argument, we consider “the closing

argument as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of

context or given undue prominence.” State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 1993).

Chamberlain argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument improperly shifted the

burden to Chamberlain on the knowledge element of the motor-vehicle theft offense. 4 The

prosecutor said:

So, know or have reason to know that something is
stolen. What does that mean? You can’t—when you go in the
world you’re not allowed to put your head in the sand and say,
“Give me that. I don’t know that that—I don’t know that that’s
stolen.” You’re not allowed to just take property, possess
property, and say, “Prove I knew that it was stolen.” The law
allows for that.

[We] [h]ave reason to know that it’s stolen. . . . It’s an
expensive object. It’s not something that you readily hand out
to other people. . . . [I]t is an unusual object in that it has an
inherent piece that you need to get into that vehicle, which is a
key. Someone has to give you a key . . . .

So when you are sitting in a vehicle with a broken key,
with no rearview mirror, with a stolen purse, with somebody
else’s wallet, with perhaps controlled substances in the vehicle
and you know it doesn’t belong to you, you have knowledge or
reason to know that that vehicle is stolen. If you know that
your passenger didn’t have a right to that vehicle, that you have
no right to that vehicle, you know it’s not yours, and “we just
sat down,” you know or have reason to know that vehicle is
stolen.

4
Chamberlain also asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument
by discussing the officers’ testimony about the 911 call. Because we conclude that
admission of that testimony was not plain error, the prosecutor did not err or commit
misconduct by referencing it in closing argument.

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Chamberlain asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because a curative instruction should

have been given and that the prosecutor or the district court should have reiterated that the

burden of proof is on the state. The state responds that the prosecutor was simply

explaining the difference between “knowing” and “having reason to know” that an item is

stolen. The state has the better argument.

Review of the closing argument as a whole demonstrates that the prosecutor made

the challenged statements while describing the circumstances that prove Chamberlain had

the requisite knowledge. On rebuttal, the prosecutor returned to the topic of distinguishing

between “knowing” and “having reason to know” something is stolen. While the

prosecutor could have chosen different words to make this point, we do not read the closing

argument to impermissibly shift the burden of proof to Chamberlain. Rather, the closing

argument urged the jury only to determine that the circumstantial evidence of

Chamberlain’s knowledge was sufficient to find him guilty. On this record, we discern no

prejudicial misconduct.

Affirmed.

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