Jermaine Edward Harris v. State of Minnesota

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1219

Jermaine Edward Harris, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 3, 2024
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-33511

Tyler Bliss, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Larson, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARSON, Judge

In this appeal from an order denying his petition for postconviction relief, appellant

Jermaine Edward Harris argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

petition without an evidentiary hearing and determined that his claims did not satisfy any
exception to the two-year statutory time bar under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2022).

We affirm.

FACTS

This appeal stems from Harris’s petition for postconviction relief, which largely

relied on an affidavit from J.H. (affiant) recanting the testimony he gave at Harris’s third

trial for the murder of R.J. (victim). The following facts are derived from the evidence

presented at Harris’s third trial and Harris’s submissions with his petition for

postconviction relief.

The Underlying Killing

On November 21, 2012, victim was shot and killed. The underlying trials involved

four people relevant to this appeal: (1) Harris; (2) affiant, who was a close friend to Harris;

(3) victim; and (4) D.D. (witness), who was a close friend to victim.

Prior to the killing, Harris became upset with victim because victim had sex with

the mother of Harris’s child. In July 2012, Harris and victim engaged in a physical

altercation, which affiant and affiant’s brother broke up. A second altercation soon

followed between Harris, victim, and others, during which Harris was shot in the leg.

Harris and victim supposedly settled their dispute in September 2012.

On the night of November 21, 2012, Harris, affiant, victim, and witness went

together to get “wet sticks”—cigarettes laced with PCP. Victim and witness rode in a

Chevrolet Impala; Harris and affiant rode in a Ford Explorer. After the men obtained the

wet sticks, they eventually parked to smoke the wet sticks in an area Harris selected.

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Victim and witness moved into the Explorer and sat in the back seat. Harris sat in the

driver’s seat, and affiant sat in the front passenger’s seat.

After they smoked the wet sticks, witness and victim exited the Explorer and walked

toward the Impala. Both men stopped to urinate. As witness walked back to the Impala

from a nearby tree, witness saw Harris exit the Explorer with a gun in his hand and fire at

least three shots. Witness took cover behind the Impala and heard victim cry out as he was

shot. Witness then saw Harris get back into the Explorer and heard the Explorer drive

away. As the Explorer left, witness found victim unconscious where he collapsed behind

the Impala. Witness spoke to police on November 24, 2012, and identified Harris and

affiant as being involved in the shooting. Witness testified at trial consistent with the facts

given above.

Procedural History

Respondent State of Minnesota indicted Harris and tried him twice on charges of

first- and second-degree intentional murder pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185, 609.19.

Harris’s first two trials ended in hung juries, and the district court declared a mistrial in

both instances. After the second trial, the district court dismissed the indictment but

allowed the state to refile a criminal complaint to prosecute the case a third time. The state

immediately filed a new complaint charging Harris with second-degree intentional

murder. 1 At the third trial, the jury found Harris guilty of second-degree murder. The

district court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Harris to an executed 450-

1
The state also charged Harris with prohibited person in possession of a firearm pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subds. 1(2), 2(b) (2012), but later dismissed the charge.

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month prison term. Harris appealed his conviction, and we affirmed the conviction in a

nonprecedential opinion. See State v. Harris, No. A14-1039, 2015 WL 4714657, at *1, *7

(Minn. App. Aug. 10, 2015), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2015). The Minnesota Supreme

Court denied Harris’s petition for discretionary review, Harris did not file a petition for

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, and the judgment became final on

November 23, 2015.

Affiant’s Previous Statements

When law enforcement first interviewed affiant in November 2012, he was reluctant

to speak and denied being present when victim was killed. Eventually, affiant was

subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury. Affiant testified that, after the four men smoked

the wet sticks, affiant heard gunshots, and, when Harris got back into the Explorer, Harris

said, “He shot me, I shot him.” Affiant gave a similar account to law enforcement in a

recorded statement after his grand-jury testimony. There, affiant said: Harris exited the

Explorer and walked toward the Impala; affiant then heard several gunshots; and, when

Harris returned to the Explorer, Harris said something like “I shot him because he shot

me.”

At Harris’s first trial, inconsistent with his grand-jury testimony and recorded

statement, affiant testified that he did not remember much, he did not hear any gunshots,

and Harris never said, “He shot me, I shot him.” Affiant claimed he fabricated the earlier

statements. Affiant also testified that he lied to the grand jury because the prosecutors

pressured him and threatened to arrest him if he did not agree with their version of events.

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 Between Harris’s first two trials, the state charged affiant with aiding an offender

under Minn. Stat. § 609.495, subd. 3 (2012), on the theory that affiant lied to the jury in

the first trial. Despite being subpoenaed to testify at Harris’s second trial, affiant refused

to do so. Affiant was held in contempt of court and sentenced to 90 days in jail. Before

the third trial, affiant entered a guilty plea to the aiding-an-offender charge, admitting that

he lied to the police and under oath at the first trial. Affiant had not yet been sentenced at

the time of Harris’s third trial.

At Harris’s third trial, affiant testified that he lied during Harris’s first trial when he

testified that Harris did not say, “He shot me, I shot him.” Affiant also offered an account

of the killing that was consistent with his grand-jury testimony and recorded statement.

Affiant testified that he smoked PCP with Harris “numerous times,” and that Harris acted

“[k]ind of aggressive” under the influence of PCP. Affiant further testified that the state

did not offer him a plea deal for his aiding-an-offender charge; instead, he pleaded guilty

because he decided to tell the truth. Affiant expressed his understanding that he had no

plea deal with the state and that the judge in his case would determine his sentence. He

also acknowledged his understanding that the state would advise the judge regarding the

state’s view of an appropriate sentence based on affiant’s conduct at Harris’s third trial.

Harris’s Petition for Postconviction Relief

On October 13, 2021, affiant signed an affidavit claiming he was asleep at the time

victim was killed, he had not heard gunshots, Harris did not say anything to affiant about

shooting anyone, and almost all of affiant’s testimony at Harris’s third trial was false.

Affiant also claimed that he lied when he testified that the prosecutors did not give him a

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plea deal, and that he lied when he testified that he “was not pleasing the prosecutors when

[he] pled guilty and [he] just wanted to be held accountable for [his] actions.”

Based largely on this affidavit, Harris filed a petition for postconviction relief.

Harris argued that he was entitled to postconviction relief because the affidavit provided

evidence that he was innocent. He also argued that his petition should be considered, even

though it was filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction became final,

because his petition satisfied the newly-discovered-evidence and interests-of-justice

exceptions to the two-year statutory time bar. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2), (5).

The postconviction court denied Harris’s petition in full, without an evidentiary hearing,

on the grounds that Harris failed to show the affidavit met the requirements for the newly-

discovered-evidence or interests-of-justice exceptions. Harris appeals.

DECISION

Harris argues the postconviction court erred when it summarily denied his petition

for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. We review a

postconviction court’s decision to summarily deny “a petition for postconviction relief for

an abuse of discretion.” El-Shabazz v. State, 984 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. 2023). “A

[postconviction] court abuses its discretion when it has ‘exercised its discretion in an

arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made

clearly erroneous factual findings.’” Id. (quoting Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596

(Minn. 2017)). “We review [a postconviction] court’s legal conclusions de novo and its

factual findings for clear error.” Id.

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 “A postconviction court need not grant a hearing on a claim if the files and records

of the proceeding conclusively establish that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Colbert

v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 2015) (citing Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2014)).

“Accordingly, a postconviction court may summarily deny a claim that is untimely under

the postconviction statute of limitations, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) [(2022)] . . . .”

Id. A petitioner must file a petition for postconviction relief within two years after “an

appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal” unless any of the five statutory

exceptions apply. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)-(b) (2022).

Harris did not file his petition for postconviction relief within two years of the

judgment of conviction becoming final. However, he argues the postconviction court

should have granted him an evidentiary hearing because his postconviction petition

satisfied the newly-discovered-evidence 2 and interests-of-justice exceptions to the

statutory time bar. See id., subd. 4(b)(2), (5). We address each argument below.

I.

Harris first argues the postconviction court abused its discretion when it determined

Harris is not entitled to relief under the newly-discovered-evidence exception to the

statutory time bar. We are not persuaded.

2
Harris argues he has satisfied the newly-discovered-evidence exception to the procedural
bar established in State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976). We note that there is
no newly-discovered-evidence exception to the Knaffla procedural bar. See, e.g., Crow v.
State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 9-10 (Minn. 2019) (explaining that there are two exceptions the
Knaffla procedural bar: the novel-legal-issue exception and the interests-of-justice
exception). But we discern, based on the substance of the argument, that Harris intended
to argue that he satisfied the newly-discovered-evidence exception to the statutory time
bar, and we will treat the argument as such.

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 The newly-discovered-evidence exception requires a petitioner to demonstrate that

the evidence:

(1) is newly discovered; (2) could not have been ascertained by
the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or the
petitioner’s attorney within the 2-year time-bar for filing a
petition; (3) is not cumulative to evidence presented at trial;
(4) is not for impeachment purposes; and (5) establishes by the
clear and convincing standard that petitioner is innocent of the
offenses for which he was convicted.

El-Shabazz, 984 N.W.2d at 574 (quoting Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Minn.

2012)). “All five requirements must be met for the newly discovered evidence exception

to apply.” Id. We conclude the affidavit fails to satisfy the fourth and fifth prongs of the

newly-discovered-evidence exception.

Beginning with affiant’s claims that he was asleep at the time of the killing, he did

not hear gunshots, and Harris did not say anything to affiant about shooting anyone, we

conclude these statements fail to satisfy the fifth prong. 3 To satisfy the fifth prong, Harris

must do more than introduce uncertainty about his guilt. See Henderson v. State, 906

N.W.2d 501, 506 (Minn. 2018). Instead, Harris must “allege the existence of evidence,

which, if true, would establish [his] innocence by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Miles v. State, 800 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Minn. 2011)). An

evidentiary hearing is not required when the facts alleged in the petition, taken as true, “are

3
Harris asserts the claims in the affidavit “would probably produce a more favorable result
on retrial as [they] did in the prior two trials.” But Harris misstates the relevant standard.
To satisfy the newly-discovered-evidence exception to the two-year statutory time bar,
Harris must establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is innocent, not that he
might have obtained a more favorable result. See El-Shabazz, 984 N.W.2d at 574.

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legally insufficient to show [petitioner’s] innocence by a clear and convincing standard.”

Id. at 507.

In Henderson, the supreme court affirmed the summary dismissal of a

postconviction petition based on affidavits that failed to exculpate appellant. See id. There,

the evidence presented in the affidavits did not contradict evidence of guilt presented at

trial. Id. at 507-08. Because “other evidence of [petitioner]’s guilt remain[ed] regardless

of whether the affidavits [were] true,” the supreme court determined the facts alleged in

the affidavits did not clearly and convincingly show that petitioner was innocent. Id. And

because the facts were legally insufficient to show innocence, petitioner had not satisfied

the newly-discovered-evidence exception, rendering his petition untimely. Id. at 508.

This case is similar to Henderson. Even if true, affiant’s statements are not

inconsistent with guilt. In the affidavit, affiant neither claims someone else killed victim,

nor offers any positive evidence that Harris did not kill victim. The sum and substance of

affiant’s statement is that affiant did not observe Harris kill victim. Further, affiant’s

claims do not contradict witness’s testimony that witness observed Harris kill victim. In

light of witness’s detailed and consistent description of the night victim was killed, and

more importantly, the affidavit’s failure to contradict witness’s account, we conclude the

affidavit fails to clearly and convincingly establish that Harris is innocent.

Addressing affiant’s claims that the state engaged in previously undisclosed

coercive conduct toward affiant, we conclude these claims fail to satisfy prongs four and

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five. 4 Prong four requires that the petitioner proffer evidence that “is not for impeachment

purposes.” El-Shabazz, 984 N.W.2d at 574; see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2)

(stating that “newly discovered evidence” cannot be “for impeachment purposes”).

Impeachment evidence is “[e]vidence used to undermine a witness’s credibility.” Black’s

Law Dictionary 700 (11th ed. 2019). Affiant’s statements regarding the state’s allegedly

coercive conduct are plainly impeachment evidence; their sole purpose is to undermine the

credibility of affiant’s testimony at Harris’s third trial. Further, as with the statements

recanting his prior testimony, affiant’s statements regarding the state’s allegedly coercive

conduct—even taken as true—are not inconsistent with guilt and therefore do not satisfy

prong five. The state’s alleged conduct in no way negates witness’s consistent testimony

that he observed Harris kill victim. Thus, affiant’s statements regarding the state’s conduct

do not establish clearly and convincingly that Harris is innocent.

For these reasons, we conclude the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion

when it determined the files and records in this case conclusively established that Harris is

not entitled to relief because he failed to satisfy the newly-discovered-evidence exception

to the statutory time bar.

4
According to Harris, the postconviction court improperly focused on affiant’s recantation
of his testimony from the third trial and failed to consider the allegations surrounding the
state’s coercive conduct. Harris claims that the state’s conduct “was not known and could
not have been discovered” by Harris because only affiant and the state held that
information. But the record plainly shows that the postconviction court did, in fact, analyze
affiant’s statements in the affidavit about the “‘plea deal’ and the purported threats from
the State.”

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 II.

Harris also contends the postconviction court abused its discretion when it

determined the files and records in this case conclusively established that Harris is not

entitled to relief because he failed to satisfy the interests-of-justice exception to the

statutory time bar. We are, again, unpersuaded.

The interests-of-justice exception requires that “the petitioner establish[] to the

satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.”

Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5). “The interests of justice exception to the two-year time

bar is intended for injustices related to delays in filing a petition, not an injustice related to

the merits of the petition.” Andersen v. State, 982 N.W.2d 448, 456 (Minn. 2022). “The

interests-of-justice exception is available only in rare and exceptional situations.” Hooper

v. State, 888 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Minn. 2016).

We cannot say that the postconviction court abused its discretion when it determined

Harris failed to meet the high bar the interests-of-justice exception demands. The record

shows that Harris knew the state would push for a harsher sentence in affiant’s aiding-an-

offender case if affiant did not testify favorably during Harris’s third trial. Harris was

aware that affiant changed his story multiple times throughout the investigation and

Harris’s prosecution. And Harris knew affiant gave testimony at Harris’s first trial that

was consistent with the statements made in affiant’s affidavit. Thus, assuming that the

claims in the affidavit are true, Harris would have been aware of those claims at the time

of his third trial and could have brought his petition for postconviction relief in a timely

manner. Harris has failed to demonstrate that an injustice prevented him from doing so.

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 For these reasons, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it

determined the files and records in this case conclusively established that Harris is not

entitled to relief because he failed to satisfy the interests-of-justice exception to the

statutory time bar. We therefore conclude the postconviction court did not abuse its

discretion when it summarily denied Harris’s petition for postconviction relief.

Affirmed.

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