State of Minnesota v. Chaz Edwin Johnson

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1304

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chaz Edwin Johnson,
Appellant.

Filed May 28, 2024
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-21-904

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Jessica A. Bierwerth, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Mark D. Kelly, Law Offices of Mark D. Kelly, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and

Reilly, Judge. ∗

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SEGAL, Chief Judge

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for fifth-degree drug

possession, appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence because law enforcement did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion of a

traffic violation or criminal activity sufficient to justify the stop or subsequent search of

appellant’s vehicle. We affirm.

FACTS

In April 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Chaz Edwin

Johnson with two counts of fifth-degree controlled-substance possession. The charges

stemmed from a traffic stop and subsequent search of Johnson’s car, during which law

enforcement discovered suspected controlled substances. Johnson moved to suppress the

evidence obtained as a result of the search, arguing that law enforcement lacked reasonable,

articulable suspicion to justify the stop and subsequent search, and therefore any evidence

discovered during the search should be suppressed.

The district court held a contested omnibus hearing on the motion. The following

summarizes the testimony presented at the hearing. On September 10, 2020, a police

officer assigned to the Dakota County Drug Task Force was conducting surveillance at a

drug store parking lot in Hastings. The parking lot had been the subject of complaints

concerning drug use, drug dealing, and other trafficking activities. While conducting

surveillance, the officer observed a car with a single occupant that was parked away from

the store by the back of the lot even though there were available parking spaces near the

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store. The car’s occupant was later identified as Johnson. The officer’s suspicions were

raised by the car’s isolated location in the parking lot and the fact that Johnson remained

inside the car. Another car then drove up and parked close to Johnson’s vehicle. The

officer observed a female driver get out of her car and walk over to speak with Johnson.

During the brief interaction between Johnson and the woman, the officer believed he

witnessed Johnson pass something to the woman. The woman then entered the drug store.

The officer then saw the woman leave the drug store with a shopping bag and enter

the passenger side of Johnson’s car. The officer observed that the woman and Johnson

both reclined their seatbacks to the point that the officer was unable to see anyone inside

the car. However, “[f]rom time to time . . . a head would pop up . . . turning side to side

like they’re looking around.” After a few minutes, Johnson and the woman sat up and

drove away, leaving the woman’s car in the parking lot. The officer communicated his

observations to other law enforcement in the area, and another agent with the drug task

force initiated a traffic stop of Johnson’s vehicle.

When the officer arrived at the scene of the traffic stop, law enforcement was

already conducting a search of Johnson’s vehicle. The agent who conducted the traffic

stop informed the officer that, during the stop, Johnson admitted he had a

tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) vape cartridge and had handed it to the agent. As a result,

officers conducted a search of the car for additional controlled substances. During the

search, officers found a crystal substance, which tested presumptively positive for

methamphetamine. They also found 45 pills that were later identified as four different

types of controlled substances.

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 Following the omnibus hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress.

Johnson waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to a court trial based on stipulated

evidence pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. The district court found Johnson

guilty of one count of fifth-degree controlled-substance crime and sentenced him to 17

months in prison, stayed execution of the sentence, and placed Johnson on probation for

three years.

DECISION

Johnson challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. He argues

that law enforcement lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to support the

initial traffic stop or subsequent expansion of the stop. We address each in turn. We review

de novo a district court’s determination of reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. State v.

Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011).

An investigatory stop of a vehicle is valid if an officer has “specific and articulable

facts establishing reasonable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation or criminal activity.”

State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn. 1981) (quotation omitted). The

reasonable suspicion standard is “not high.” State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn.

2006) (quotation omitted). But an officer’s suspicion cannot be based on a hunch; it must

be objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Taylor, 965

N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021).

Here, the district court relied on the following circumstances as its basis for denying

the motion to suppress: (1) the parking lot where the officer conducted surveillance was

known for drug use and trafficking; (2) the two vehicles were parked near each other but

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away from other vehicles and the entrance to the store; (3) Johnson and the woman engaged

in a hand-to-hand transaction before the woman entered the store; (4) after the woman

exited the store and got in Johnson’s vehicle, she and Johnson reclined their seats back—

resulting in them being out of view—but occasionally lifted their heads to look around;

and (5) the officer had seen similar behavior during past drug transactions.

Johnson argues that there are innocent explanations for his behavior that dispel any

suspicion of drug-related criminal activity. But “even lawful activity can serve as the basis

for reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 754. And this court has observed that “innocent

explanations, when taken together with the police officers’ training and experience, . . . are

sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion.” State v. Hunter, 857 N.W.2d 537, 544

(Minn. App. 2014). The officer here had extensive experience as a police officer and

received specialized training as a member of the drug task force, which included “training

on parking lot details and drug transactions.” He also testified about specific behaviors

that, based on his specialized training and experience, were consistent with drug-related

criminal activity. On this record, the totality of the circumstances supports the district

court’s determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing

sufficient to support the stop of Johnson’s vehicle.

We turn next to Johnson’s challenge to the expansion of the traffic stop to include a

search of his car. A warrantless search is “presumptively unreasonable unless one of a few

specifically established and well-delineated exceptions applies.” State v. Licari, 659

N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).

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 The district court determined that the search of Johnson’s vehicle was permissible

under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Under this exception, a police

officer may search a vehicle without a warrant if there is “probable cause to believe the

search will result in a discovery of evidence or contraband.” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d

768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). During the traffic stop, Johnson “admitted to

having a THC vape cartridge in his pocket and handed it to [an] officer.” The district court

determined that, at the point Johnson handed the THC vape cartridge over, “officers had

probable cause to believe that a search of the vehicle would result in the discovery of further

drugs or evidence of a crime w[ould] be found.”

Johnson does not contest the determination that the THC vape cartridge provided

officers with probable cause to search his vehicle for controlled substances. Rather,

Johnson argues that the vehicle stop was impermissibly expanded “in both scope and

duration . . . when [he] was badgered by law enforcement about whether the vehicle

contained contraband and was threatened with a vehicle search with or without his

consent.” He asserts that “[t]he vape pen cartridge was only offered to law enforcement

after said impermissible expansion of the initial seizure of a traffic stop.” He cites as

support State v. Dezso, in which the supreme court explained the factors that are considered

when determining whether an individual voluntarily consented to surrendering evidence.

512 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1994) (noting “the nature of the encounter, the kind of person

the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said” are relevant considerations).

We are not persuaded. The record reflects that the purpose of the initial stop was to

investigate Johnson for the “use, possession, or sale of drugs.” The agent’s initial questions

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about whether there was anything illegal in the car were therefore appropriate because they

were “strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the

stop permissible.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004) (quotation

omitted). The expansion—the search of the vehicle—occurred only after Johnson handed

the THC vape cartridge to the agent and provided him with probable cause to search the

car.

Johnson also appears to argue on appeal that he did not voluntarily hand over the

THC vape cartridge, but rather only did so because he felt compelled by law enforcement’s

unconstitutional questioning of him. We conclude, however, that Johnson failed to assert

this argument in his motion to the district court and that it was therefore forfeited. State v.

McCabe, 890 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017).

Johnson’s memorandum submitted to the district court in support of his motion to suppress

states that, during the traffic stop, Johnson “offered law enforcement a vape with THC oil.”

And although Johnson offered testimony suggesting that he was overwhelmed by law

enforcement’s questioning, that testimony was not referenced in his memorandum, which

was submitted following the hearing. Johnson did not cite to Dezso or otherwise raise the

issue of his consent to handing over the THC vape cartridge. Rather, he generally argued

only that the “search was not supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal

activity beyond the original purpose of the stop.” And because he did not raise the issue,

the district court did not make detailed findings about the nature of the encounter and

questioning that resulted in Johnson handing over the THC vape cartridge, and it did not

address the legal argument now raised. Because the issue was not raised at the district

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court, we decline to address it for the first time on appeal. See State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d

237, 246 (Minn. 2017) (declining to address a constitutional issue raised for the first time

on appeal).

Affirmed.

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